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The Center contains 65 shops, 10 restaurants, and a cinema; 
public sidewalks and streets border it on two sides. The 
Center rt:ictly prohibits •all non-commercial handbilling or 
petitioning. 
Appellees were high school students who set up a 
card table in a corner of the Center's central courtyard and 
solicited support, including signatures on a petition, for 
their opposition to a United Nations resolution against 
"Zionism." Appellees did not hand out leaflets. v-:;heir ac-
tivity was peaceful, orderly, and apparently well-received. 
They were quickly approached by the Center's private security 
guards, informed of the no-solicitation policy, and requested 
to leave. 
Appellees immediately left the premises. They filed 
suit in Superior Court seeking to enjoin enforcement of the 
Center's policy. The Superior Court denied an injunction and 
the District Court of Appeal affirmed. 
vf°he California Supreme Court reversed, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 
153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979), holding that appellants should have 
been enjoined from denying access to appellees. Overruling its 
prior decision in Diamond v. Bland, 11 Cal. 3d 331, 113 Cal. 
Rptr. 468, 521 P.2d 460 (1974), the majority of 4 justices held 
that appellants' property rights in the Center must in appro-
priate cases yield to paramount State interests. The court found 







Art. I,§§ 2 and 3 of the California Constitution, - which 
it found to be broader in scope than the analogous First 
Amendment protection. The court held that Lloyd Corp. v. ----------. 
Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972), did not preclude this result. 
Justice Richardson, writing for himself and two 
others, ~ssented. In his view, 
"The majority relegates the private 
property rights of the shopping center 
owner to a secondary, disfavored, and 
subservient ~osition via-a-vis the 
'free speech claims of plaintiffs. 
Such a holding clearly violates federal 
constitutional guarantees announced in 
Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner. . • • " 
3. CONTENTIONS: (a) Relying primarily on Lloyd 
Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972), appellants argue that 
the decision below infringes on their prope2 rights protected 
by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. In Lloyd Corp., the 
Court "granted certiorari to consider [the] contention that 
[requiring a shopping center to provide access to a group seeking 
to distribute political handbills] violates rights of private 
1/ 
- Art. 1, § 2 of the California Constitution provides: •~very 
person may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments 
on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right. 
A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press." 
~ 
Art. 1 § 3 provides: "The people have the right to instruct 
their representatives, petition the government for the redress of 






property protected by the Fifth arid Fourteenth Amendments." 
Id., at 552-53. Holding that the shopping center was not 
required to provide such access, the Court emphasized that 
"[t]he Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of private 
property owners . o o must be respected and protected." Id. , 
at 570. The need to protect property ~sis stressed in 
other cases in this line of decisions. Central Hardware Co. 
v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 547 (1972) (finding of First Amendment 
right of union organizers to solicit on employer's parking lots 
would "constitute an unwarranted infringement of long-settled 
rights of private property protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments''); Marsh Vo Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946) (in 
determining whether State can punish persons distributing re-
ligious literature in a company-owned town, Court "must balance 
the constitutional rights of owners of property against those of 
the people to enjoy freedom of press and religion o • • • ") • 
The decision of the California court, appellants argue, 
conflicts with that of the Oregon Supreme Court in Lenrich 
Associates v. Heyda, 264 Ore. 122, 504 P.2d 112 (1972), noted in 
86 Harv. L. Rev. 1592 (1973). A plurality of the Court there 
held that, although Oregon might indeed give greater protection 
to speech under i/own Constitution than is afforded by the 
First Amendment, Lloyd Corp. barred it from forcing a shopping 
center to provide access to religious prosyletizers. 
Appellees respond that Lloyd Corp. merely held that the 






therefore the First Amendment did not apply. As the Court 
said in Lloyd Corp o, "[i]n addressing [the basic issue in 
this case], it must be remembered that the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments safeguard the rights of free speech and assembly by 
limitations on state action, not on action by the owner of 
private property used nondiscriminatorily for private purposes 
only," 407 U.S., at 567 (emphasis in original); see also Hudgins 
v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520-521 (1976). Hence the Court did not 
reach the question of whether shopping centers have an absolute 
constitutional right to deny access to individuals seeking to use 
such property as a forum. Appellees suggest that the rights of 
shopping center owners, · like all other private property rights, 
are subject to the State's power to impose reasonable restrictions 
on the use of land. They cite Agricultural Labor Relations Board 
v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 3d 392, 128 Cal. Rptr. 183, 546 P.2d 
687, appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, 
429 U.S. 802 (1976), where the Supreme Court of California held 
that union organizers could be granted access to private property 
under state law. Compare NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 
105 (1956). States also have unquestioned power to enjoin 
nuisances, to prohibit discriminatory denials of access to private 
parks, and to enforce zoning regulations. The present restriction 
on land usage is reasonable and is designed to further an important 
State constitutional policy. Therefore no substantial federal 






·Second, appellees urge that the decision below is 
based on an adequate and independent state ground. 
.----. --- -. z.-
(b) Appellants contend, secondly, that the decision 
infringes on their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of 
free speech. This right necessarily implies a "right to 
refrain from speaking at all," Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 
705, 714 (1977), which is violated when a shopping center 
with a strict no-petition policy is forced to open its property 
to those wishing to solicit support and ex2ress their beliefs. 
~.---- zw;:& ~ 
See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); 
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
Appellees respond that no First Amendment right is 
violated because appellants are not forced to say anything, nor 
would any of the statements made by appellees be attributed to 
appellants. Further, there is here a compelling state objective 
of protecting the exercise of rights deemed essential to the 
State's sytem of government. Miami Herald is distinguishable 
because of the special institution of the press involved there. 
4. DISCUSSION: This is another case in which a state 
court has sought to provide more expansive protections for 
individual rights under _state law than are provided by the federal 
Constitution. Generally, the state court can do this freely be-
cause the power limited is that of the state itself, and there is 
no federal constitutional impediment to a state's ceding some of 
l 
its own powers to its citizens. However, in the present case, 







rights of one group of private citizens by limiting the 
rights of another. Such an action raises questions under 
the federal Constitution. Appellees are incorrect in 
asserting that the California Constitution is an adequate 
ground to support the judgment below. 
Although appellees have not challenged this Court's 
jurisdiction, I am doubtful that the case is properly framed 
as an appeal. Appellants do not appear to have urged in the 
California Supreme Court that Art. 1, §§ 2 and 3 of the California 
Constitution are unconstitutional. Rather, their contention seems 
to have been that it would be unconstitutional to force them to 
give access to appellees. I would suggest that the Court dismiss 
the appeal and treat the papers as a petition for ce~t (or, if 
it grants review, it might consider postponing jurisdiction for 
the merits). 
On the private property issue, appellants are correct 
that the decision below conflicts with that of the Oregon Supreme 
Court in Lenrich Associates. 
Much of the discussion in the briefs is directed at 
an ambiguity in Lloyd Corp. It is somewhat difficult to tell 
from that decision whether the holding was that (1) there was 
state action, but the leafleters' First Amendment rights were 
outweighed by the Fifth Amendment rights of the owners; or 
(2) there was no state action, and therefore the leafleters had 
no First Amendment rights vis-~~vis the owner. Appellants 
endorse the first interpretation, and assert that if the shopping 
-




center owner's Fifth Amendment rights outweigh federal 
First Amendment rights, then 3! fortiori the owner's rights 
must prevail over any rights enshrined in the California 
Constitution. 
Appellees urge the second interpretation, namely 
that Lloyd Corp. found state action lacking. If this is 
correct, there is the further question of whether the State's 
enforcing private access onto the Center constitutes a tak-
2/ 
ing. - On the one hand it could be argued that what is created 
here is a public real property easement, which fits well with 
traditional concepts of taking. On the other hand, the State's 
action could be analogized to zoning or land use regulation, for 
3/ 
which no compensation is due. -
On the First Amendment question, it is not clear that 
appellants raised this argument below, since neither the majority 
nor the dissenting opinions speak to it. The Wooley and Barnette 
decisions do not seem apposite, since in those cases the indi-
viduals were themselves forced to make a statement with which they 
disagreed. But Miami Herald seems relevant, since it addressed 
2/ 
- Although appellants argue, in addition to the Taking Clause, 
that they were deprived of their property without Due Process, 
I see little merit to this argument. Surely hearings before 
three levels of the California Court system is a full measure of 
procedural due process. 
3/ 
- Appellants do not speak to the question of compensation, 






the question of when the owner of private property (a 
newspaper) could be forced to allow its use as a forum 
for the views of others. I do not find appellees' 
distinction between newspapers and shopping centers entirely 
convincing in this regard. 
This case has several features that incline towards l grant or note: a conflict between state courts; the op-
portunity to clarify an opinion which has caused some confusion; 
and the context of a state constitution broader than its federal 
counterpart, which presents the federal constitutional issues in 
an unusual posture. To the best of my knowledge, the Court has 
never taken a case arising in this context, and perhaps it should 
be wary of doing so now. The Court's decision may turn, in the 
end, on whether it agrees with appellees', or appellants', reading 
of Lloyd Corp. 
A motion to dismiss, a response, and four amicus briefs 
in support of JS filed. 
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provisions of the California constitution, t o enter the shopping 
center for the purpose of soliciting sivnatures a o a pe tition. -
I. Jurisdictio 
The Court 
appellees' contentions that 
Takings Clause and First Amendment claims to the California 
courts, and that the California Supreme Court decision rests on 
an adequate state ground. The adequate state ground claim is 
frivolous, because the appellants' claim is precisely that the 





- - 2. 
The presentation issue is somewhat closer, but 
appellants' reply brief adequately shows that both claims were 
ra ed properly in the state courts. Although the asserted 
invasion of property rights appears primarily to have been 
raised through citation and discussion of Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 
407 U.S. 551 ( 1972), this case plainly was viewed from its 
inception as implicating rights to private property based in 
part on the Takings Clause. Appellants also cite language from 
one of their briefs in the California Supreme Court that clearly 
raises the First Amendment claim. Although appellants admit 
that this claim was raised for the first time in the California 
Supreme Court, they cite California cases supporting their 
contention that this was permissible under state procedural law. 
I would concltide that all of the issues are here. 
II. Property Rights 
The essential question is whether the United States 
Constitution provides any protection for property rights over 
and above the specific doctrines that have been developed in 
connection with the Takings Clause and the Due Process Clause. 
Appellants do not seriously 
here. Under the Penn Central 
contend that there was 
analysis, I agree that 
been no taking. (The SG' s Brief is persuasive on this point). 
Al though appellants place somewhat more reliance on the Due 
Process Clause, I do not think it can be contended seriously 
that there has been any arbitrary deprivation of property here. 
- - 3. 
- Leaving aside the possible First Amendment rights of the 
landowner, see Part III, infra, this is just another case of 
state regulation of the property use. There is no question, in 
.., -----~,_..~,.-,, ~-----~......__,.... ....,, ---
light of the facts mentioned in the California Supreme Court 
opinion, that the state has a substantial interest in preserving 
opportunities for expression in an era when central business 
districts are declining. And the means chosen by the California 
con st i tut ion as construed in this case are not unreasonable: 
the court recognized and preserved the property owner's right 
reasonably to regulate expressive activity to prevent 
interference with his business. 
Instead of relying directly on these two established 
forms of "property right," appellants contend that their rights 
- "rest on a number of constitutional sources, each of which 
separately protects property owners against different forms of 
encroachment by the state, and which, when viewed together, 
unquestionabl y prevent this state-mandated infringement of Mr. 
-
Sahadi' s rights." Appellants' Reply Brief 13. Al though I am 
not entirely at rest on the issue, I do not think this vague, 
penumbral property right is sufficient to justify invalidation 
of duly adopted state law. 
It is certainly arguable that "property," like 
--"liberty" in the Due Process Clause, should have some 
substantive meaning independent of state law. But the Court has l 
held repeatedly in procedural due process cases that state law 
creates and defines property rights. E.g., Flagg Bros., Inc. v. 
~ ._..,, ~ ~---------------
-
- - 4. 
Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978);* Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 
(1976). The law is also clear that the state may 1 imi t and 
regulate the use of property to a very considerable extent. 
E.g., Exxon Corp v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 ( 1978) 
(upholding state statute prohibiting petroleum refiners from 
operating gas stations in state); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 
502 (1934) ("[Neither] property rights nor contract rights are 
absolute; . Equally fundamental with the private right is 
that of the public to regulate it in the common interest . 
• II ) • 
The only substantive limitation on the states in this 
regard is the Takings Clause and the Due Process guarantee 
against arbitrariness. Indeed, there is a rather elaborate set 
- of factors to be considered under the Takings Clause in 
determining when a State has overstepped the bounds of 
regulation that may define property rights and violated the 
-
federal Constitution. Penn Central Transport Co. v. New York, 
438 U.S. 104, 124-128 (1978). As Pegn Central suggests, 
property rights depend in large part on "expectations." Id., at 
124. And it is state law that creates those expectations. When 
that law is changed, the question whether the expectations may 
be defeated properly is analyzed under the Takings Clause. I 
* I note in passing that there is a rather puzzling state 
action question in this case raised by the holding of Flagg 
Bros. The UCC sale of property by private parties that was - -
challenged in that case was not "state action" despite the 
fact that the private seller could only act as he did because 
of state law authorizing him to do so. It is not entirely 
clear how the appellees' insistence on using appellants' 
property for petitioning under authority of state law is 
different. 
- - 5. 
- have difficulty finding room for the sort of penumbral rights 
asserted by appellants. 
-
-
The mainstay of appellants' argument to the contrary is 
your opinion for the Court in Lloyd, supra. The question in 
that case was whether the First Amendment of its own force 
conferred a right to distribute handbills on a privately owned 
shopping center. The lower courts had held that it did, finding 
that Lloyd Center was "the functional equivalent of a business 
district" under Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), and 
Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 
308 (1968). In distinguishing Logan Valley in part because the 
handbillers there had adequate alternative avenues 
communication, you wrote, 
" [ i] t would be an unwarranted infringement of 
property rights to require them to yield to the 
exercise of First Amendment rights . . • Such an 
accommodation would diminsh property rights without 
significantly enhancing the asserted right of free 
speech . " Id . , at 5 6 7 . 
In characterizing the issues, the Lloyd opinion continued: 
"The basic issue in this case is whether respondents, 
in the exercise of asserted First Amendment rights, 
may distribute handbills on Lloyd's private property 
contrary to its wishes and contrary to a policy 
enforced against all handbilling. In addressing this 
issue, it must be remembered that the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments safeguard the rights of free 
speech and assembly by 1 imitations on state act ion, 
not on action by the owner of private property used 
nondiscriminatorily for pj.fvate purposes only. The 
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments are also relevant to this case. They 
provide that "[n]o person shall •.• be deprived of 
1 ife, 1 iberty or property, without due process of 
law." There is the further proscription in the Fifth 
Amendment against the taking of 'private property .. 
. for public use, without just compensation.'" Ibid. 
(emphasis in original). 
of 
- - 6. 









guest" may exercise general 







had there been any such dedication to public use as to alter the 
application of this rule to Lloyd center. You concluded that 
other private facilities might present different questions, but 
that "[w]e do say that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights 
of private property owners, as well as the first Amendment 
rights of all citizens, must be respected and protected •• 
We hold that there has been no such dedication of [the center] 
to public use as to entitle respondents to exercise therein the 
asserted First Amendment rights." Id., at 570. 
Appellants say Lloyd holds that asserted speech rights 
must yield to "federally protected property rights" "whenever 
adequate alternative avenues of communication are available." 
Brief for Appellants 10. Appellees counter that Lloyd was a 
state act ion case only, in which the Court conc l uded that the 
First Amendment simply didn't apply. Brief for Appellees 25-26. 
As there is no state action 1 imitation on the California free 
------speech clause, Lloyd is not even instructive in this case. 
The truth is that Lloyd is a bit confusing as to the 
ground of decision. But in view of the express holding of the 
case, I believe that appellees have the better of the argument. 
As your opinion noted, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment property 
rights were "relevant" and "must be respected and protected" in 
- -
7. 
- the course of determining whether private property owners have 
dedicated their property in such a manner as to make their anti-
handbilling conduct "state action" for purposes of the First 
Amendment. This generalized weighing process did not require 
specific identification of constitutional rights that would be 
infringed if handbillers were permitted to enter the shopping 
center. But this case presents an entirely different situation. 
' ---------------------------
The Court is not asked to accommodate two sets of federal 
constitutional interests that intersect in the "state action" 
doctrine. Rather, appellants ask the Court to invalidate under 
the United States Constitution a provision of a state 
constitution that has been construed to require certair#roperty 
owners to open their doors to reasonable expressive activity. 
- This cannot be done by vague references to rights that "find 
their source in" specific constitutional rights but themselves 
have no definition, no limits, and no name. Although the Court 
has used the technique of interpretation proffered by appellants 
in the privacy area, I can see no basis for engaging in it here. 
-
Appellants invoke a number of extreme hypotheticals in 
support of their theory of constitutional property rights. They 
claim that these rights would be violated if the state passed a 
.,/ 
law requiring homeowners to permit guests to put political signs 
on their lawns, or restaurants to permit handbilling among 
tables. Reply Brief 16. Al though these are harder cases, I do 
not believe they j ustify the creation of the indefinite new 






these hypotheticals would have much stronger traditional 
constitutional claims than appellants do here. The homeowner 
might have a First Amendment claim of his own, and regulation of 
private homes may infringe on protected privacy rights. I 
believe that the restaurant hypothetical invokes our intuitive 
sympathies because the potential for disruption of business 
appears so much greater than in this case. But that means that 
the restaurant owner might would have a considerably stronger 
case under the Takings Clause than do these appellants. Thus, I 
do not find the hypotheticals so compelling as to mandate the 
result sought by appellants here. 
I would conclude: ( i) that California's law is 
supported by substantial state interests that provide a rational 
basis for its regulation of appel..,lants' e._rog erty as a matter of --~ ~ 
substan,..:_ iv~ - ~ ue- ~ s, (ii) that there has been no taking, and 
(iii) that no other constitutional property right sufficient to 
invalidate an otherwise valid state law has been identified. 
III. First Amendment 
I find the First Amendment question somewhat easier. 
Appellants rest their case almost entirely on Wooley v. Maynard, 
430 U.S. 705 (1977) (the license plate "live free or die" 
slogan), although they also cite Board of Education v. Barnette 
319 U.S. 624 (1943) (student flag salute), and Miami Herald 
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (newspaper reply 
statute). The claim is that here, as in Wooley, an individual 






display ideological messages. This is said to run afoul of 
Barnette's admonition that no state may prescribe what shall be 
orthodox in matters of thought, and to violate appellant 
Sahadi's right "to refrain from speaking," Wooley, 430 U.S., at 
714. 
I have difficulty seeing this case as a "freedom of 
thought" case. Although the Court's reasoning in Wooley easily 
could cover this case, I think Wooley can and should be 
distinguished on several grounds. This case does not involve an 
individual compelled to display a state-prescribed message on an 
automobile he drives "as part of his daily life." 430 U.S., at 
715. Instead, it involves an owner of business property who is 
required to grant such access as may be reasonable to persons 
holding a variety of individual views, whose messages will be I 
immediately identifiable with themselves - not the shopping 
center. The chance that the message will be attributed to the 
property owner by his patrons is slim; it may be reduced even 
further by posting signs - as many airports do now - stating 
that the messages are those of the speakers, who are present 
only by reason of their constitutional rights. 
To be sure, similar points could have been made about 
the Jehovah's Witness automobile owners in Wooley. They too 
could have taken measures short of covering the state motto that 
would have disassociated themselves from the message. Indeed, 
both cases seem to me to be close to the line where a property 







sponsored messages approaches the trivial, de minimis level 
where no constitutional right is infringed. Neither is like 
Barnette, where the state literally put words in peoples' 
motfths, or Tornillo, which involved editorial control of the 
press. The differences between this case and Wooley may be 
slight. Nevertheless, it seems to me clear that Wooley fell -
barely - on the protected side of the line, while this case does 
not. I would reject the First Amendment claim. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
1. I believe that all of the issues were sufficiently 
raised to satisfy the requisites of this Court's jurisdiction. 
There is no adequate and independent state ground. The case is 
here. 
2. Although the property rights claim is intriguing, 
I do not believe that the Constitution supplies protect ion for 
property rights over and above the content of the specific 
guarantees embodied in the Takings and Due Process Clauses, as 
construed by this Court. Generalized notions of the importance 
of property rights may be relevant to the evaluations of claims 
for the extension of other constitutional protections into the 
private sector, as in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner. But the States are 
entitled to define property rights and to regulate them for the 
common good. Undefined and general "property rights" are not 
sufficient to invalidate state laws that purport to serve those 
objectives. For that, one must point to some specific 






is nothing to "balance" against the State constitutional 
provision. The State's regulation is reasonable, and there has 
been no taking. I would reject the property aspect of 
appellants' claim. 
3. I also would reject the First Amendment claim. As 
a practical matter, the extent to which appellant Sahadi is 
denied his "right to refrain from speaking" is de minimis, and 
Wooley v. Maynard is distinguishable. 
4. I would affirm the judgment of the California 
Supreme Court. 
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Dear Bill: ',. ,.,. . . " t 
• ,..., .. .,, 
. 
.... 
Over the weekend, as the author of Llo¥d v. Tanner, 
I read with more than the usual interest your opinion. 
Subject to the comments below, I think it is a fine draft and 
I expect to ioin it. 
I do have some sugqested changes in language, that 
I would appreciate your considering. I send you one of my 
copies on which I have noted the chanqes on oaqes 5 and 6. 
~ore fundamental is my concern that our opinion may be read 
more broadly even than that of the California Supreme Court. 
That Court emphasized that it was reading the California 
Constitution as it applied to the modern type of diversified 
shopping centers. I hope the California Court would not 
reach the same conclusion with respect to a free standing 
department store, where the leafleteers or picketers would be 
within the store itself rather than in what in essence is a 
public mall. 
Certainly, it would be unprecedented if a state 
extended its First Amendment clause to allow oicketing in any 
enterprise that invited the public to patronize it. One 
could be picketed at his table while dining in a restaurant, 
or beside the barber's chair when being sheared. 
~,. ~----
Although your opinion does refer repeatedly to 
shopping centers, would it not be helpful to address more 
explicitly the limitations that we perceive to be inherent in 
the opinion of the California Supreme Court? It is a fact of 
modern society that an enclosed area - often two or three 
city blocks - with a central public mall surrounded by dozens 
of separate stores, presents a unique situation quite 
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every city in our country. It seems to me that this 
be made quite clear in the opinion. 
A somewhat related point is the traditional 
limitation on First Amendment rights of •time, place and 
manner•. I believe your draft refers to this only in 
footnote 8 (p. 9), where the reference is limited to statinq 
what was said by the California Court. For me this 
limitation is central to any holdinq on this subject. I 
would never agree that a state constitution - however framed 
- could allow the type of picketing and pamphleteering that 
would be conducted by some groups if unrestrained as to time, 
place and manner. Even a qreat shopping center mall could 
become a zoo if some of the mobs we have seen here in 
Washington supportinq various causes occupied it. 
In sum, Bill, I think this is an extremely 
important case. It will prompt special interest qroups of 
all shades of persuasion to go to work immediately on state 
legislatures to expand the opportunities for promoting 
causes. We can be sure that every sentence in the opinion 
will be scrutinized for support of a far broader rule than 
that enunciated by the California Supreme Court. 
Sincerely, ~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
- -
~npr mu <!}llltrl cf iltt ~h ~htftg 
'JIM~,.<!}. 21lffe'1-~ 
April 21, 1980 
Re: 79-289 - Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins 
Dear Bill: 
I am glad to join your opinion for the Court. 






~u:pumt C!Jmtrl o-f flrt ~uh- ;§tatt11 
'Jlfrurfrin:gton. gl. C!J. 2Dffe.J.t~ 
CHAMBE RS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
April 21, 1980 
Re: 79-289 - Prune Yard Shopping Center 
v. Robins 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 





19-289 -Praneyard - Shopeinq - eenter: v; - !obins 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
~ 
I concur in the opinion of the Court on the 
understanding that our decision is limited to the type of 
shopping center involved in this case. Different questions 
would be presented if a State were to authorize stranqers to 
picket or leafleteer in privately-owned, free standinq stores 
and commercial premises. Nor would our decision today apply 
to all "shopping centers", as this generic term may include 
retail establishments that vary widely in size, location, and 
relevant characteristics. As the Court observes, State power 
to regulate private property is limited to the adoption of 
reasonable restrictions that "do not amount to a takinq 
without just compensation or contravene any other federal 
constitutional provision." ~, at 6. 
- -j;u:prttttt C!}ltltrl 1tf tlrt ~th j;faftg 
-agftittg~ ~. (!}. 2llffe'!.;l 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST I 
April 22, 1980 
Re: No. 79-289 PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins 
Dear Lewis: 
In reply to your memorandum of April 21st, I intend to 
make the following changes in my draft opinion for the 
Court in this case: 
Add after sentence ending on seventh line of page 8: 
The PruneYard is a large commercial complex that covers 
several city blocks, contains numerous separate business 
establishments, and is open to the public at large. The 
decision of the California Supreme court makes it clear 
that the PruneYard may restrict expressive activity by 
adopting time, place and manner regulations that will 
minimize any interference with its commercial functions. 
Appellees were orderly, and they limited their activity to 
the common areas of the shopping center. In these 
circumstances, the fact that they may have "physically 
invaded" appellants' property cannot be viewed as 
determinative. 
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CHAM BERS OF 
J USTI C E WI L LI AM H . REHNQUIST 
k.. ~ to ~:s- ~, ,~ ~ 
~ ~ J .~~~~~ 
~ fa-u- . ~,4~, ~k,~ 
Re: No. 79-289 Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins 'l'~ 
Dear Lewis: 
Thank you very much for your letter of April 22nd, 
indicating your approval of the addition which I proposed on 
page 8 of the presently circulating draft of this opinion, and 
your correct impression that I will incorporate the stylistic 
changes which you suggested on pages 5 and 6 in a second draft. 
The question in your letter of my thoughts as to your 
circulating a brief concurrence puts me in something of a 
bind: Potter may have told you, and at any rate asked me to 
speak to you, about the desirability of having at least a Court 
opinion in the airport search case in which he recently 
circulated a proposed Court opinion (United States v. 
Mendenhall). In the interim, the Chief has come out with a 
concurrence in what I regard as your very excellent opinion in 
United States v. Payner which I would have preferred to have 
remained unwritten. So I am somewhat ambivalent about even 
answering your question, since there is bound to be a certain 
amount of self-interest in the answer. Nonetheless, I shall 
try. 
As you will recall, your opinion in Lloyd v. Tanner, and 
Potter's in Hudgins v. NLRB, were both by divided Courts, and I 
do not think I am wronginbelieving that Bill Brennan and 
Thurgood would still be of the view that they should have been 
decided the other way. It seems to me that if you concur 
specially in this case, you would give them an opportunity to 
disagree with your concurrence, in effect saying that the Court 
opinion does reach the issues you quite rightly say it does not 
reach, and thereby inject some confusion into what we are 
expressly reserving by reason of my adoption of your 
suggestions made in your letter of April 22nd. On the whole, 
therefore, I would prefer to see you not write this particular 
concurring opinion, but I suppose that is true of the author of 
almost every proposed Court opinion in history. 
. - ... - -
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I shall incorporate the changes which you have suggested 
and I have agreed to all as previously referred to, and send 
around a second draft. My acceptance of your suggestions is in 
no way conditioned upon your decision whether or not to write a 
separate concurrence. Naturally, if either John or Potter, who 
have already joined, should object to the new circulation, I 
would have to try to work out some sort of an agreement, but I 
don't believe they will. 




j,npr.tttU <!fttttrt of tlft ~h j,filis 
~ as £ring~ J. <!J. 2llffe~, 
CHA MBERS O F 
JUSTICE WI LLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
April 22, 1980 
Re: No. 79-289 PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins 
Dear Lewis: 
In reply to your memorandum of April 21st, I intend to 
make the following changes in my draft opinion for the 
Court in this case: 
Add after sentence ending on seventh line of page 8: 
The PruneYard is a large commercial complex that covers 
several city blocks, contains numerous separate business 
establishments, and is open to the public at large. The 
decision of the California Supreme Court makes it clear 
that the PruneYard may restrict expressive activity by 
adopting time, place and manner regulations that will 
minimize any interference with its commercial functions. 
Appellees were orderly, and they limited their activity to 
the common areas of the shopping center. In these 
circumstances, the fact that they may have "physically 
invaded" appellants' · property cannot be viewed as 
determinative. 
Delete footnote 8, which is included in the above 
addition. Sincec 
1rf 
Mr. Justice Powell 
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Mv. ~hc:e l'L"'""'7)---~ ~ ~ ,.,...-.:,~  
~ r tf a,er.1 (1h. rr- '._fa ~ ~ 'tt) ki~ ~t:- -
~ 
~ fo: The Chief Juetice 
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b. Justioe Stewart 
Mr. Juatioe White 
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• Jus.tioe Rehnquist 
Mr. Justice Stev~.aa 
from-: Mr. ·Justio~ Marshall 
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\wi ~~jj SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
k\1> d w<M ~ No. 79-289 
-rt I, (j J PruneYardShoppingCenterandj 
~ fvl"· Fred Sahadi, Appellants, On Appeal from the Suprei:pe 
I v. Court of California. 
~11C€ (\;1M.,Si-J(t(L. Michael Robins et al. . · 
Wf1~ ~ l~t,~ [April ~, 1980] 
~ ~ cfh. MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, concurring. 
l(Ctne_ u }~~ rr t,vo . 
lv'Y'e<l
1
Je.cn ~ of 
~~-tk_ 
o1,o~ 
~ r~ Ca-Qif-. 
~lffe\ ~~ ~t\ed 
I join the opinion of the 'Court, but write separately to 
make a few additional points. 
I 
In Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U. S. 308 
(1968) , this Court held that the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments prevented a state court from relying on its law of 
trespass to enjoin the peaceful picketing of a business enter-
prise located within a shopping <ienter. The Court concluded 
that because the shopping center "serves as the community 
business block" and is open to the general public, "the State 
may not delegate the power, through the use of its trespass 
laws, wholly to exclude those members of the public wishing 
to exercise their First Amendment rights on the premises." 
4-() ~01!0 Id. , at 319. · The Court rejected the suggestion that such an 
\ l-. abrogation of the state law of trespass would intrude on the 
~ /n. JJ. J-~ onstitutionally protected property rights of shopping center 
, \ ) Jl\a-{ owners. And it emphasized that the shopping center was 
~ (~ r\.() open. to the public ~nd _that re~8?nable restrictions 01~ the 
~ exercise of commu111cat1ve act1v1ty would be perm1t~d. 
II v\ V~Vt . OV\} "[N]o meaningful claim to protection of a right of privacy r I L UL)~ can be advanced by respondents here. Nor 011 the facts of 
JU l the case can any significa1 
l essentially all'that 1s at issue." · Id. , at 324. 
'( (wt l~ . busine_ss operation _of t~e property be raised. Naked title is 
Cp, ftJ-7 lV\L '_ 1 , • · 
d . ) l nb h1Af UM~ I )nu\ tJLG_ lll\ (1M_ 1' l'\. ldV1 ~~IM 
?f:: o - , . - _J. - u~ ~/\l,LIUl ow ;:i;; . writ\ cl o,~ ~~.w~ ----7"'"1"'- • ~ ~ t= L '-' ___ ,1.-:1J 
A n f:. 11 n. )/} An l' ~cP _ .0 D ,4 l)(t.W"J( 
lf-
.• J.~1 .. 
. . - - ~-
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The Court in Logan Valley emphasized that if the property: 
rights of shopping center owners were permitted to overcome' 
the First Amendment rights of prospective petitioners, a sig-
nificant intrusion on communicative activity would result. 
Because "[t]he large-scale movement of this country's popu-
lation from the cities to the suburbs has been accompanied 
by the advent of the suburban shopping center," a contrary 
decision would have "substantial consequences for workers 
seeking to challenge substandard working conditions, con-
sumers protesting shoddy or overpriced merchandise, and mi-
nority groups seeking nondiscriminatory hiring policies." Id., 
at 324. In light of these realities, we concluded that the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments prohibited the State from using 
its trespass laws to prevent the exercise of expressive activities 
on privately owned shopping centers, at least when those 
activities were related to the operations of the store at which 
they were directed. 
In Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U. S. 551 (1972), the Court 
confined Logan Valley to its facts, holding that the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments were not violated when a State pro-
hibited petitioning that was not designed to convey informa-
tion with respect to the operation of the store that was being 
picketed. The Court indicated that a contrary result would 
constitute "an unwarranted infringement of property rights." 
Id., at 567. And in Hudgens v. National Labor Relations 
Board, 424 U. S. 507 (1976) , the Court ,concluded that Lloyd 
had in fact overruled Logan Valley. 
I continue to believe that Logan Valley was rightly decided, 
and that both Lloyd and Hudgens were incorrect interpreta-
tions of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. State action 
was present in all three cases. In all of them the shopping 
center owners had opened their centers to the public at large, 
effectively replacing the State with respect to such traditional 
First Amendment forums as streets, sidewalks, and parks. 
The State had in turn made its laws of trespass available to' 
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shopping center owners, enabling them to exclude those who 
wished to engage in expressive a-ctivity on their premises.1 
Rights of free expression become illusory when a State has 
operated in such a way as to shut off effective channels of 
communication. I continue to believe, then, that "the 
Court's rejection of any role for the First Amendment in the 
privately owned shopping center complex stems ... from an. 
overly formalistic view of the relationship between the insti-
tution of private ownership of property and the First Amend-
ment's guarantee of freedom of speech." Hudgens v. NLRB., 
supra, 424 U. S., at 542 (dissenting opinion). 
II 
In the litigation now before the Court, the Supreme Court 
of California construed the California Constitution to protect 
precisely those rights of communication and expression that 
were at stake in Logan Valley, Lloyd, and Hudgens. The 
California court concluded that its state "constitution broadly 
proclaims speech and petition rights. Shopping centers to 
which the public is invited can provide an essential and 
invaluable forum for exercising those rights." Like the Court 
in Logan Valley, the California court found that access to 
shopping centers was crucial to the exercise of rights of free 
expression. And like the Court in Logan Valley, the Cali-
fornia court rejected the suggestion that the Fourteenth 
Amendment barred the intrusion on the property rights of the 
shopping center owners. I applaud the court's decision, which 
is a part of a very healthy trend of affording state constitu-
tional provisions a more expansive interpretation than this 
Court has given to the Federal Constitution. See Brennan, 
State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 
90 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1977). 
1 In this respect the cases resembled Shelley v. K ramer, 334 U. S. 1 
(1948), and New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) , in which 
the common-law rules of contract, and t-0rt, were held to con~titute ,:,iate, 
action for Fourteenth Amendment purposes .. 
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Appellants, of course, take a different view. They contend 
that the decision below amounts to a constitutional' "taking" 
or a deprivation of their property without due process of 
law. Lloyd, they claim, did not merely overrule Logan 
Valley's First Amendfnent holding; it overruled its clue proc-
ess ruling as well, recognizing a federally protected right on 
the ·part of shopping ce11ter owners to exclude those who en-
gage in communicative activity on their property. In my 
view, the issue appellants .present is largely a restatement of 
the question of whether and to what extent a State may 
abrogate or modify common-law rights. Although the cases 
in this Court do not definitively resolve the question, they 
demonstrate that appe!lants' claim has no merit. 
. Earlier this Term, in Martinez v. California, - U.S.-. 
(1980), the Court was also confronted with a claim that the 
abolition of a cause of action previously conferred by state 
law was an impermissible taking of "property." We re-
sponded that even if a pre-existing state-law remedy "is a 
species of property protected by the Due Process Clause, . . . 
it would remain true that the State's interest in fru::;hioning its 
own rules of tort law is paramount to any discernible federal 
interest, except perhaps in protecting the individual from state 
action that is wholly arbitrary or irrational." Id., at -. 
Similarly, in the context of a claim that a guest statute 
impermissibly abrogated common-law rights of tort, the Court 
observed that the Due Process Clause does not forbid the "crea-
tion of new rights, or the abolition of old ones recognized by the 
common law, to attain a permissible legislative object." Sil-
ver v. Silver, 280 U. S. 117, 122 (1929). And in Munn v. 
Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 134 (1876), the Court upheld a statute 
limiting the permissible rate for the warehousing of grain. 
f'A person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of 
the common law. . . . Rights of property which have bee~ 
created by the common law cannot be taken away without, 
due jJtocess; but the law itself, as a rule of conduct, may b~ 
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changed at the will ... of the legislature, unless prevented 
by constitutional limitations. Indeed, the great office of 
statutes is to remedy defects in the common law as they are 
developed, and to adapt it to the changes of time and cir-
cumstances." See also Second Employer's Li,ability Cases, 
223 U. S. 1, 50 (1911); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 41 
(1932). 
Appellants' claim in this case amounts to no less than a 
suggestion that the common law of trespass is not subject 
to revision by the State, notwithstanding the California Su-
preme Court's finding that state-created rights of expressive 
activity would be severely hindered if shopping centers were 
closed to expressive activities by members of the public. If 
accepted, that claim would represent a return to the era of 
Lochner v. New York , 198 U. S. 45 (1905) , when common-
law rights were also found immune from revision by state or 
federal government. Such an approach would freeze the 
common law as it has been constructed by the courts, perhaps 
at its 19th century state of development. It would allow 
no room for change in response to changes in circumstance. 
The Due Process Clause does not require such a result. 
On the other hand, I do not understand the Court to sug-
gest that rights of property are to be defined solely by state 
law, or that there is no federal constitutional barrier to the 
abrogation of common-law rights by Congress or a state gov-
ernment. The constitutional terms "life, liberty, and prop-
erty" do not derive their meaning solely from the provisions 
of positive law. They have a normative dimension as well, 
establishing a sphere of private autonomy which government 
is bound to respect.2 Quite serious constitutional questions 
2 This undersfanding is embodied in cases in the procedural due process 
area holding tha.t at least ~ome "grievous los;;es" amount to "bberty" or 
"property" within the meaning of the Due Process Clause, even if those 
lo&;e:s arc not protected by statutory or common la.w. See Vitek v. 
79-289- CONCUR 
6 PRt;:-1'EYARD SHOPPINO CEKTER v. ROBINS 
might bf' ra.ised if a legislature attempted to abolish certain 
categories of common-law rights in some general way. In-
deed, our cases demonstrate that there are limits on govern-
mental authority to abolish "core" common-law rights, 
including rights against trespass, at least without a com-
pelling showing of necessity or a provision for a reasonable 
alternative remedy. 3 
That "core" has not been approached in this case. The 
California Supreme Court's decision is limited to shopping 
centers, which are already open to the general public. The 
O'Wners are permitted to impose reasonable restrictio11s on 
expressive activity. There has been no showing of interfm·-
ence with appellants ' normal business operations. The Cali-
fornia court has not permitted an invasion of any personal 
Jones . - U. S. - (1980), and casf's cited ; Mathews Y. Eldridye. 424 
U. S. ~H!), 333 (1976) . SPe also M f achwn v. Pa11v , 427 U. S. 215, 229 
(19io) ( STBYEN.;, J., di~t·nting). 
3 For example, in htgmha·111 \' . Wright, -130 U.S. 651 (1977) , the Court 
found a. eon,:tit11tional lilx·rt~· intere:<t in freedom from corporal punish-
ment , in la rgr part on the ground that. that interf'st ww, prot<>cted at 
common law. TIJP Court. ;:tatPd thnt. the "D11P Pror•p:,;,- Ch111sP . .. was 
in tended to give Amf'ricans at lea:-t the protEwtion against governmental 
power that. they had enjoyed as En~li,,hmPn again,-t the powPr of the 
Crown. Tl}(' liberty prc,wrn•d from deprivation without due process 
i11cl11ded the righ t 'generall~· to enjo~, t-hosf' privilegf's long recognized 
at common la"· as e:,:sential to the orclerely pur:;uit- of happine:;s by free 
men." Id ., at 673 (cit-ation omitted) . In Duke Power Co. " · Carolina 
Env . Study Group. -138 U. S. 59, 88 (1978), the Comt rP:o(•rvecl the 
quP:;t ion whet her .in crea.t ing a. eom1wn,mtion scheuw for victims of nuclea r 
aeeidPnt,-, Congn•:,::; wa:; <·011 :;titutionall)· obliged to "provide a rea.,;onable 
substitute renlf'dy" for the' abrogation of conunon-law rights of tort . 
Simila rly , iu Netc Yo rk Central Railroad v. Whi:te. 243 U. S. IR8, 201 
(1917). t he Court <'xpre.,;.sf'd uncertainty a" to wheth l'r ":1 "tat<·' might, 
without violPnre to the ron,.,titut.ional gua ranty of 'due proce;;:; of law,' 
:;ucldeutly ,;pt. asidl' a ll rommon-law rule;;: respe.rting liahilit)· n>< b(• tween 
employer aud Pmplo~·ee, without providing a reasonably ju:;t ;;uh><titute," 
aud "doubted whether the state could aboli;:;h all rights of artion on the 
one hand , or all defenses on the other, withou t :,:etting up something 
adequa te in their stead." 
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sanctuary. Cf. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557 (1969). 
No rights of privacy are implicated. In these circumstances 
there is no basis for strictly scrutinizing the intrusion author-
ized by the California Supreme Court. I join the opinion 
of the Court. 
' - -
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Pru~eYard ~hopping Center and) 
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v. Court of California! 
Michael ~obins et al. 
[April -, 1980] 
lvlfl. JusTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. 
We postponed jurisdiction of this appea.l from the Supreme 
Court of C1:1,lifornia to decide the important federal constitu-
tional questions it presented. Those are whether state con-
stitutional provisions, which permit individuals to exercise 
free speech and petition rights on the property of a privately 
owned shopping center to which the public is invited, violate 
the shopping center owner;s property rights under the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments or his free speech rights under 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 
I 
Appel1ant PruneYard is a privately owned shopping center 
in the city of Campbell,. Cal. It covers approximately 21 
acres-five devoted to parking and 16 occupied by walkways, 
plazas, sidewalks, and buildings that contain more than 65 
specialty shops, 10 restaurants, and a movie theater. The 
Prune Yard is open to the public for the purpose of encourag-
ing the patronizing of its commercia.l establishments. It has 
a policy not to permit any visitor or tenant to engage in any 
publicly expressive activity, including the circulation of peti-
tions, that is not directly related to its commercial purposes. 
This policy has been strictly enforced in a nondiscriminatory 
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Appellees are high school students who sought to solicit 
support for their opposition to a United Nations resolution 
against "Zionism." On a Saturday afternoon they set up a 
card table in a corner of Prune Yard's central courtyard. They 
distributed pamphlets and asked passersby to sign petitions, 
which were to be sent to the President and Members of Con-
gress. Their activity was peaceful and orderly and so far as, 
the record indicates · was not objected to by Prune Yard's 
patrons. 
Soon after appellees had begun soliciting signatures, a secu-
rity guard informed them that they would have to leave 
because their activity violated Prune Yard regulations. ·The 
guard suggested that they move to the public sidewalk at the 
Prune Yard's perimeter. Appe1lees immediately left the prem-
ises and later filed this lawsuit in the California Superior 
Court of Santa Clara County. They sought to enjoin appel-
lants from denying them access to the Prune Yard for the 
purpose of circulating their petitions. 
The Superior Court held that appellees were not entitled 
under either the Federal or Califoniia Constitution to exercise 
their asserted rights on the shopping center property. Juris-
dictional Statement, p. A-2. It concluded that there were 
"adequate, effective channels of communication for [appellees] 
other than soliciting on the private property of the [Prune-
Yard] ." Jurisdictional Statement, p. A-3. The California 
Court of Appeal affirmed. 
The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that the 
Californ ia Constitution protects "speech and petitioning, rea-
sonably exercised, in shopping centers even when the centers 
are privately owned." 23 Cal. 3d 899, 910 (1979). It con-
cluded that appellees are entitled to conduct their activity on 
PruneYard property. In rejecting appellants' contention 
that such a result infringed property rights protected by the 
Federal Constitution, the California Supreme Court observed: 
"'It bears repeated emphasis that we do not have under-
consideration the property or privacy rights of an individ..: -
- -
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ual homeowner or the proprietor of a modest retail estab-
lishment. As a result of advertising and the lure of a 
congenial environment, 25,000 persons are induced to 
congregate daily to take advantage of the numerous 
amenities offered by the [shopping center there]. A 
handful of additional orderly persons soliciting signatures 
and distributing handbills in connection therewith, under 
reasonable regulations adopted by defendant to assure 
that these activities do not interfere with normal business 
operations (see Diamond [ v. Bland, 3 Cal. 3d 653, 665 
(1970) (D-iamond I)]) would not markedly dilute defend-
ant's property rights.' ( [Diamond v. Bland, 11 Cal. 3d 
331 , 345 (1974) (D-iamond II)] (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).)" 
Id., at 910-911. 
The California Supreme Court thus expressly overruled its 
earlier decision in D-iamond II, which had reached an opposite 
conclusion. Id., at 910.1 Before this Court, appellants con-
tend that their "constitutionally established rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to exclude appellees from adverse use 
of appellants' private property cannot be denied by invocation 
of a state constitutional provision or by judicial reconstruction 
of a state's laws of private property." Jurisdictional State-
ment, p. 10. We postponed consideration of the question of 
1 The California Supreme Court in Diamond II had reasoned: 
" In this case, as in Lloyd [v. Tanner, 407 U. S. 551 (1972)], pla.intiffb 
frn,ve alternative, effective channels of communication, for the customers 
and employees of the center may be solicited on any public sidewalks, 
parks and streets adjacent to the Center and in the communities in which 
such persons reside. Unlike the situation in Marsh [v. Alabama, 326 U. S. 
501 (1946)] and [Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley 
Plaza, 391 U. S. 308 (HJ68)], no reason appears why such alternative 
means of communication would be ineffective, and plaintiffs concede that, 
unlike Logan. their init.iatiYe petition bears no particular relation to the 
shopping center, its individual stores or patrons." 11 Cal. 3d, a t. 335. 
Diamond II thus held that the shopping center owner's property rights 
outweighed the rights of free expression and petition asserted by the-
plu intiffs. Ib id. 
- -
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jurisdiction until the hearing of the case on the merits, We 
how affirm. 
II 
We initially conclude that this case is properly before us as 
an appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2). It has long been 
established that a state constitutional provision is a "statute" 
with -the meaning of § 1257 (2). See, e. g., Torcaso v. Wat-
kins, 367 U. S. 488, 489 (1961); Adamson v. California, 332 
U. S. 46, 48, n. 2 (1947); Railway Express Agency v. Vir-
ginia, 282 U. S. 440 (1931). Here the California Supreme 
Court decided that Art. I , §§ 2 and 3 of the California Consti-
t ution gave appellees the right to solicit signatures on appel-
lants' property in exercising their state rights of free expres-
sion and petition.2 In so doing, the California Supreme Court 
rejected appellants' claim that recognition of such a right 
violated appellants' "right to exclude others," which is a 
fundamental component of their federally protected property 
rights. Appeal is thus the proper method of review. 
III 
Appellants first contend that Lloyd v. Tanner, 407 U. S. 
551 (1972) , prevents the State from requiring a private shop-
ping center owner to provide access to persons exercising their 
state constitutional rights of free speech and petition when 
adequate alternative avenues of communication are availa-
ble. Lloyd dealt with the question whether under the Fed-
eral Constitution a privately owned shopping center ma.y pro-
hibit the distribution of handbills on its property when the 
handbilling is unrelated to the shopping center's operations. 
2 Art. I, § 2, of the California Constitution provides : 
"Every person may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments 
on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may 
not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press." 
Art . I, § 3, of the California Constitution provides: 
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Id. , at 552. The shopping center had adopted a strict policy 
against the distribution of handbills within the building com-
plex and its malls, and it made no exceptions to this rule. 
Id. , at 555.3 Respondents in Lloyd argued that because the 
shopping center was open to the public, the First Amend-
ment prevents the private owner from enforcing the hand-
billing restriction on shopping center premises. Id., at 564.4 
In rejecting this claim we substantially repudiated the ration-
ale of Logan Valley, which was later overruled in Hudgens v. 
NLRB, 424 U. S. 507 (1975) . We stated that property does 
not " lose its private character merely because the public is 
generally invited to use it for designated purposes,'' and that 
"[t]he essentially private character of a store and its privately 
owned abutting property does not change by virtue of being 
large or clustered with other stores in a modern shopping cen-
ter." 407 U. S., at 569. 
Our reasoning in Lloyd, however, does not ex proprio 
vigore limit the authority of the State to exercise its police 
power or its sovereign right to adopt in its own Constitution 
individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by 
the Federal Constitution. Cooper v. California, 386 U. S. 58, 
62 1967). See also 407 U. S., at 569-570. In Lloyd, supra, 
there was state cons,titutional or statutory provision that had 
been construed to create rights to the use of private property 
3 The center had banned handbilling because it "was considered likely to 
annoy customers, to create litter, potentially to create disorders, and gen-
erally to be incompatible with the purposes of the Center and the atmos-
phere sought to be preserved." Id ., at 555-556. 
4 Respondents relied on Marsh v. Alabama. 326 U. S. 501 ( 1946), and 
Amalgamated Food Employees Unian v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U. S. 
308 (1968) , in support of their claim that the shopping center's permis-
sion to the public to enter its property for the purpose of shopping caused 
its property to lose its private character, thereby permitting members of 
the public to exerric;e the same free speech rights as they would have on 
similar public facilities on the streets of a city or town. Both of those 
cases, however, involved no state law authorizing the conduct of the .solic..-
itors or handbillers. 
- -
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by strangers. comparable to those found to exist by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court here. It is, of course, well-established 
that a State in the exercise of its police power may adopt rea-
sonable restrictions on private property so long as the restric-
tions do not amount to a ta.king without just compensation 
or contravene any other federal constitutional provision. See, 
e. g., Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926); 
Yo,ung Y. American Mini Theatres, 427 U. S. 5C (1976). 
Lloyd held that when a shopping center owner opens his 
private property to the public for the purpose of shopping, 
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution does 
not thereby create individual rights in expression beyond those 
already existing under, applicable la.w. See also Hudgens v. 
National Labor Relations Board, 424 U. S. 507, 517- 521 
( 1976). 
IV 
Appellants next contend that a right to exclude others 
underlies the Fifth Amendment guarantee against the taking 
of property without just compensation and the Fourteenth 
Amendment guarantee against the deprivation of property 
lvithout due process of law.5 
It is true that one of the essential sticks in the bundle of 
property rights is the right to exclude others. Kaiser Aetna v. 
United States, 48 U. S. L. W. 4045, 4049 (1979). And here 
there has literally been a "taking" of that right to the extent 
5 Appellants do not maintain that this is a condemnation case. Appel-
lants' Reply Brief, p. 2. Rather, they argue that "[t]hc rights of a 
property owner are rooted in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against 
the taking of property without just compensation and are incorporated in 
the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee against the deprivation of property 
without clue proce.;,s of law." Brief of Appellants, p. 10. Here, of course, 
if the law required the conclusion that there was a "taking," there was 
concededly no compensation, just or otherwise, paid to appellants. This· 
argument, falls within appellants' contention that Lloyd is controlling, 
see 407 U.S., at 547, and was adequately presented below. See N ew York 
ex rel . Bryant v, Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63, 67' (1928). 
- -
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that the California Supreme Court has interpreted the state 
constitution to entitle its citizens to exercise free expression 
and petition rights on shopping center property.6 But it is 
well-established that "not every destruction or injury to prop-
erty by governmental action has been held to be a 'taking' in 
the constitutional sense." Armstrong v. United States, 364 
U. S. 40, 48 (1960). Rather, the determination whether a 
state law unlawfully infringes a land owner's property in 
violation of the Taking Clause requires an examination of 
whether the restriction on private property "fore [ es] some 
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and 
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." Id., at 
49.7 This examination entails inquiry into such factors as 
the character of the governmental action, its economic impact, 
and its interference with reasonable investment backed expec-
tations. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 48 U. S. L. W., at 
4048. When "regulation goes too far it will be recognized as 
a taking." Pennsyli·ania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S., at 
415. 
Here the requirement that appellants permit appellees to 
6 The term "property" as used in the Taking Clause includes the entire 
" group of rights inhering in the citizen's r ownership]." United States v. 
General Motors Corp., 323 U. S. 373 (1945). It is not used in the 
"vulgar and untechnica1 senEe of the physical thing with respect to which 
the citiz•n exercises rights recognized by law. [Instead, it] . .. denote[s] 
the group of rights inhering in the citizen's relation to the physical thing , 
as th!' right to possess, use and dispose of it. . . . The constitutional pro-
vision is addreEsed to every sort of interest the citizen may possess." 
Id., at 377-378. 
7 Thus, this Court has stated that the Fifth Amendment "prevents the 
publ ic from loading upon one individual more than his just share of the 
burdens of government, and says that when he surrenders to the public 
something more and different from that which is exacted from other mem-
bers of the public, a full and just equivalent shall be returned to him." 
Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893). 
See also Penn. Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 
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exercise state-protected rights of free expression and petition 
on shopping center property clearly does not amount to an 
unconstitutional infringement of appellants' property rights 
under the Taking Clause. There is nothing to suggest that 
preventing appellants from prohibiting this sort of activity 
will unreasonably impair the value or use of their property as 
a shopping center. The Prune Yard is a large commercial 
complex that covers ·several city blocks, contains numerous 
separate business establishments, and is open to the public 
at large. The decision of the California Supreme Court 
makes it clear that the Prune Yard may restrict expressive 
activity by adopting time, place and manner regulations that 
will minimize any interference with its commercial functions. 
Appellees were orderly, and they limited their activity to the 
common areas of the shopping center. In these circum-
stances, the fact that they may have "physically invaded" 
appellants' property cannot be viewed as determinative. 
This case is quite different from Kaiser Aetna v. United 
States, supra. Kaiser Aetna was a case in which the owners 
of a priva.te pond had invested substantial amounts of money 
in dredging the pond, developing it into an exclusive marina, 
and building a surrounding marina community. The marina 
was open only to fee-paying members, and the fees were paid 
in part "to maintain the privacy and security of the pond." 
Id., at 4046. The Federal Government sought to compel free 
public use of the private marina on the ground that the 
marina became subject to the federal navigational servitude 
because the owners had dredged a channel connecting it to 
"navigable water." 
The Government's attempt to create a public right of access 
to the improved pond interfered with Kaiser Aetna's "reason-
able investment backed expectations." We held that it went 
"so far beyond ordinary regulation or improvement for naviga-
tion as to amount to a taking .... " Id., at 4049. Nor is the 
United States, as opposed to the several States, possessed of 
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first instance. A State is, of course, bound by the Just Com-
pensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, Chicago, Burling-
ton & Quincy Railroad Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 233, 236-
237 ( 1897), but here appellants have failed to demonstrate 
that the "right to exclude others" is so essential to the use or 
\ economic value of their property that the State-fauthorized 
limitation of it amounted to a "taking." 
There is also little merit to appellants' argument that they 
have been denied their property without due process of law. 
In Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 (1934), this Court 
stated that 
"[Neither] property rights nor contract rights are abso-
lute; . . . . Equally fundamental with the private right 
is that of the public to regulate it in the common inter-
est. . . . nf] [T]he guaranty of due process, as has often 
been held, demands only that the law shall not be unrea-
sonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means 
selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the 
objective sought to be obtained." Id., at 523, 525. See 
also Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 
(1949); Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 
117, 124-125 (1978). 
Appellants have failed to provide sufficient justification for 
concluding that this test is not satisfied by the State's asserted 
interest in promoting more expansive rights of free speech 
and petition than conferred by the Federal Constitution.8 
V 
Appellants finally contend that a private property owner 
has a First Amendment right not to be forced by the State to 
s Althcugh appellants contend there are adequate altenrntive avenues of 
communication available for appellees, it does not violate the United 
States Ccnstitution for the State Supreme Court to conclude that access 
to appellants' property in the manner required here is necessary to the· 
prolli~tion of state-protected rights of free speech and petitfon . 
(- n ~ r" •-fJ 
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use his property as a forum for the speech of others. 0 They 
state that in Wooley v. Maynard , 430 U. S. 705 (1977), this 
Court concluded that a State may not constitutionally require 
a.n individual to participate in the dissemination of an ideologi-
9 Appellers contend that this issue is not properly before 11s because 
appellants' have not met their burden of showing that. it. was raised in the 
sta,te courts. It is well settled that in challenging the validity of a state 
la.w on the ground that it. is repugnant to the Constitution of the Fnited 
States, "No particular form of words or phrases is essential, but only that 
the claim of invalidity on the ground therefor be brought to the att rntion 
of the stat,e court with fair precision and in due time. And if the record 
as :1 whole shows either expressly or by clear intendment that this was 
don e, the claim is to be regarded as having been adequa.tely presented." 
Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U . S. 63 , 67 (1928). 
Before the Supreme Court of California. appella.nts argued: 
"The constitutional right. to exclude potential communicants from private 
property is inextricably intertwined with the right of the propert~· owner 
to Pelect t he way he wishes to use his property. . . . The right , which 
has been recognizrd as deriving from the owner's statu,- a8 owner, also 
derives from the owner's status as himself a. potential communicant. De-
fendant urgPs that his constitut ional righ t to free speech ,vo11 ld be in-
fringed if he wpre required to make his property ava ilable to others for 
t he purpo,:c of their expressive activity ." Brief in Response to Amicus 
Curiae Briefs, at 30, July 10, 1978. 
In making this argument appellants explicitly relied on Wooley v. 
Maynard, 430 U.S. 70S (1977), and West Virginia State Board of Educa-
tion v. Barnette. 319 11. S. 624 (1943) . Brief in Response to Amicus 
Curiae Briefs, supra, at, 40-42. Before this Court appellants contend 
that "The constitutional rights of private property owners also have 
their origins in the First Amendment. right of the propert~· owner not to 
be forred by the state to use his property as a. forum for the speech 
of others." Brief of Appellants, p . 12: See also Juri~dictional State-
ment, p . 12. And appellants throughout this litigation h:iw been a::;,::ert-
ing their fedPral constitutional right to prohibit public Pxpre,:::;ive artiv ity 
on their property that is not directly relfl tecl to Prune Yard '::; commercial 
purposes . 
In addition , this Court has held federal claims to have been adequately 
presented even though not raised in lower state courts when the highest 
state court renders an unexpected interpretation of state law or reverses 
its prior interpretation. Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill7 -
- -
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cal message by displaying it on his private property in a man-
ner and for the express purpose that it be observed and read 
by th e public. This rationale applies here, they argue, 
because the message of Wooley is that the State may not force 
an individual to display any message at all. 
Wooley, however, was a case in which the government itself 
prescribed the message, required it to be displayed openly on 
appellee's personal property that was used "as part of his 
daily life," ru1d refused to permit him to take any measures 
to cover up the motto even though the Court found that the 
display of the motto served no important state interest. 
Here, by contrast. there are a number of distinguishing fac-
tors. Most important, the shopping center by choice of its 
owner is not limited to the personal use of appellants. It is 
instead a business establishment that is open to the public 
to come and go as they please. The views expressed by mem-
bers of the public in passing out pamphlets or seeking signa-
tures for a petition thus will not likely be identified with 
281 U.S. 673, 677-678 (1930); Missouri ex rel. Missouri Insurance Co. v. 
Geimer, 281 U. S. 313, 320 (1930) ; Saunders v. Shaw, 244 U.S. 317. 320 
(1917). Here prior to its decision below, the California Supreme Court 
had express!)· dec ided to follow Lloyd v. Tanner, supra. in defining t he 
scope of state constitutional rights of free speech and petition. D iamond 
v. Blond. 11 Cal. 3d 331, 335, cert. denied, 419 U. S. 885 (1974). It 
was not until the instant case that the California Sunreme Court over-
ruled D iamond v. Blond, supra, and held that t.he Californ ia Constitution 
can and does require shopping center owners to gra.nt access to individuals 
exer<:ising their state rights of free expression a,nd petition. 
Prior to re:1ching t.he California Supreme Ccurt , appellants a rgued that 
the D iamond decision bound the California Superior Court, and Court 
of Appeal to rule in appellanb ' fav or. Appelhmt::: prevailed in the8e 
courts, and Diamond wa:; held to be controlliug. On cf' before thP Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, ns noted above, appellants rxpli cit ly presented 
thrir fede ral constitutional right to prohibit public rxprcssion on their 
property in terms of ·wooley and Barnette. It wa;;: not until that. time 
that the)· could have reasona bly expected that. the validity of the ea rlier 
Diamond decision would be que,-tionrd. In thc:;e circumstance::; we con-
dude that appellants have adequately raised the federnl que:;tion. 
- -
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those of the owner. Second. no specific message is dictated 
by the State to be displayed on appellants' property. There 
consequently is no danger of governmental discrimination 
against a particular message. Finally, as far as appears here 
appellants can expressly disavow any connection with the 
message by simply posting signs in the area where the speakers 
or handbillers stand. Such signs, for example, could disclaim 
any sponsorship of the message and could explain that the 
persons are communicating their own messages by virtue of 
state law. 
Appellants also argue that their First Amendment rights 
have been infringed in light of West llirginia State Board of 
Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943) and Miarni 
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241 (1974) . 
Ba7"nette is inapposite because it involved the compelled reci-
tation of a message containing an affirmation of belief. This 
Court held such compulsion unconstitutional because it "re-
quire [ d] the individual to communicate by word and sign his 
acceptance" of government dictated political ideas. whether 
or not he subscribed to them. 319 U. S , at 633. Appellants 
are not similarly being compelled to affirm their belief in any 
governmentally prescribed position or view, and they are free 
to publicly dissociate themselves from the views of the 
speakers or handbillers. 
Tornillo struck down a Florida statute requiring a news-
paper to publish a political candidate's reply to criticism pre-
viously published in that newspaper. It rests on the principle 
that the State cannot tell a newspaper what it must print. 
The Florida statute contravened this principle in that it 
"exact[ed] a penalty on the basis of the content of a news-
paper." 418 U. S., at 256. There also was a danger in Tor-
nillo that the statute would "dampen the vigor and limit the 
variety of public debate" by deterring editors from publishing 
controversial political statements that might trigger the appli-
cation of the statute.. Id. , at 257. Thus, the statute· was 
- -
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found to be an "intrusion into the function of editors." Id., 
~t 258. These concerns obviously are not present here. 
We conclude that neither appellants' federally recognized 
property rights nor their First Amendment rights have been 
infringed by the California Supreme Court's decision recogniz-
ing a right of appellees to exercise state protected rights of 
expression and petition on appellants' property. The judg-
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JUSTIC E HARRY A . BLACKMU N May 13, 19 80 
Re: No. 79- 289 - Pr u neyard Shopp i ng Ce nter v. Robins 
Dear Bil l: 
As you know from our prior correspondence, I am 
favorably disposed toward your draft opinion in this case, 
which now has an ove r whe lm ing Court behind it. I have 
expressed my willingness to Join it with two suggested 
changes that you have accommodated in the recirculation of 
May 12. On the third of my suggestions, however, we have 
not been able to agree. Although I have no desire, 
particularly at this time of year, to belabor ,the incon-
sequential, I am sufficiently at sea on this one point 
that I thought it might deserve a further exchange. 
Your opinion presently includes the following sen-
tence on pp. 8-9: "Nor as a general proposition is the 
United States, as opposed to the several States, possessed 
of residual authority that enables it to define 'property' 
in tlile first instance." The sentence appears in the con-
text of a discussion of Kaiser Aetna v. United States, and 
appears to be offered as a distinction between that case 
and the one now before the Court. 
I confess that I am puzzled by this sentence. Since 
Kaiser Aetna involved an application of the Takings Clause 
of the . Fifth Amendment, the context appears to suggest 
that the proposition stated is intended to have constitu-
tional moorings. It seems to me, then, to suggest that 
the Constitution places limitations on the power of the 
United States (presumably including Congress) to create 
and define property rights that it does not also apply to 
the States. 
If this reading is at all accurate, then I doubt 
that the sentence is fully in accprd with prior dee is ions 
that have recognized federally created property rights, 







to continued employment in civil service jobs. 
since the power of the Federal Government to 
property interests is not implicated in this 
statement seems unnecessary to the decision . 
On the other hand, if my reading of the sentence is 
inaccurate, then I am unsure what else it might mean. 
Perhaps it is intended to signify only that state-crec}ted 
property rights are defined in the first instance by state 
law. But if so, in my view the language chosen sweeps 
more broadly than the intent. 
There may be some other meaning of which I am 
unaware, and if so I would be grateful for enlightenment. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
1~ --
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CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTIC E HAR RY A . BLACKMUN May 14 , 198 0 
Re : No . 79-289 - Pr une yard Shopping Ce nter v . Robins 
Dear Bill: 
Your response to my letter of May 13 confirms that 
your intent with respect to the sentence over whi ch we 
have disagreed is to state a proposition far broader than 
any I find implicated in the c a se. As I am presently 
advised, you wis h to convey the thought that , while a 
State constitutionally has the power , s o long as it gives 
just compensation, to declare that hence for th no private 
property interests would be r ecognized under, its law, 
Congress would be p recluded by the Constitu tion fr om 
exercising a similar power. I do not find this to be a 
self-evident proposition of law, and I am not prepared, at 
this juncture, to go along with this view concerning the 
constitutional limitations on Congress vis-a-vis the 
States with respec t to the creation, alteration, or taking 
of private property. 
The hypothetical question you raised, whether 
"Congress could simply legislate that in none of the 50 
states could there be any private property, although it 
would pay for existing rights at the time it enacted that 
legislation," is obviously not presented on this record. 
Accordingly, the conclusion that Congress could not is one 
to which I am presently unwilling to subscribe, even in 
dictum of a general nature. Nor am I prepared to agree 
with your apparent suggestion that the States have greater 
power to withdraw property rights than Congress. That 
thought may come closer to the issues in this case, but it 
is a matter we need not decide, since, as your op.inion 
persuasively argues, the California courts have not gone 
anywhere near the extreme examples that you have posed. 
Others may have a different understanding 
language I have questioned. But your explanation 






sentence we have been discussing that would reflect a less 
ambitious thesis. In light or your letter, of course , I 
recognize that your present intention is to stand firm . 
If you do so, and at the risk of being accused of 
retreating , would you please add the following at the end 
of your opinion : 
"MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN joins the opinion of the 
Court except that sentence thereof , ante, at 
8-9, which reads 'Nor as a general proposition 
is the United States, as opposed to the several 
States, possessed of residual authority that 
enables it to define "property" in the first 
instance . ' " 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
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Mr. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I join the opinion of the Court on the 
understanding that our decision is limited to the 
type of shopping center involved in this case. 
Different questions would be presented if a State 
were to authorize strangers to picket or leafleteer 
in privately-owned, free-standing stores and 
commercial premises. Nor does our dee is ion today 
apply to all "shoppinq centers." This generic term 
may include retail establishments that vary widely 
in size, location, and relevant characteristics. 
As the Court observes, State power to regulate 
private property is limited to the adoption of 
reasonable restrictions that "do not amount to a 
taking without just compensation or contravene any 
other federal constitutional provision." Ante, at 
6. 
I do not understand the Court to rei ect 
entirely the claim that a private property owner 
may in some circumstances have a "First Amendment 
right not to be forced by the State to use his 
property as a forum for the speech of others." 
2. 
Substantial First Amendment questions are raised 
when a State undertakes to transform privately-
owned property into a forum for the expression of 
views. The State may not compel a person to affirm 
a belief he does not hold. See Wooley v. Maynard, 
430 U.S. 705 (1977); West Virginia State Board of 
Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
Although today's decision properly reiects the 
contention that "the State may not force an 
individual to display any message at all," ante, at 
11, I do not believe that the result in Wooley v. 
Maynard, supra, would have changed had the State of 
~
New Hampshire forced its citizQns to place the 
£AA.,/ 
slog an "Live Free or Di e'fin the-i-F dooi;:.steps--e-ir 
dJ,(.,, 
their shop windows--rather than their automobiles. 
I\ 
vt<,;;z,~~~ 
As the Court observes, this case involves 
I\ 
~ -,0 
~ ight of access to property rather than a Stnt~ 
I\ I\ 
~4s~~ 
...P-Fesgribeei messageA Id., at 11, 12. But the 
former ~ ~ indistinguishably 
"'\ 
into the 
latter. For example, a newspaper's editors 
ordinarily select the material they wish to print. 
A State may not constitutionally require ~ 
-"\. 
J peFSon-s to provide a medium for the expression of 
3. 
differing views. See Miami Herald · Publ ishinq Co. 
v. Tornillo, 418 u. s. 241 (1974): Columbia 
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National 
Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 117 (1973) (plurality 
opinion) • This case presents quite a different 
situation. See ante, at 1 2-1 3. The 
characteristics of the Prune/ ard and the fact that 
its owner remains free to disavow views expressed 
there by members of the public persuade me that the 
right of access provided by the California 
Constitution does not infringe u9on the appellant's 
First and Fourteenth Amendment right "to refrain 
from speaking at all." Wooley v. Maynard~ supra, at 
71 4. The Court reaches the same conclusion after 
carefully analyzing the facts of this case. Ante, 
at 11-12. I believe that a like analysis is 
necessary whenever a court is asked to uphold State 
action that requires an owner to lend his property 
to expressive uses, whether or not the property is 
open to the public for non-expressive purposes. 
5/21/80 
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Mr. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in part and in the 
judgment. 
Although I join the judgment, 
all of the reasoning in Part V of the 
I do not agree with 
Court's opinion. I 
join Parts I-IV on the understanding that our decision is 
limited to the type of shopping center involved in this case. 
Different questions would be presented if a State were to 
authorize strangers to picket or leaf le teer in privately-
owned, free-standing stores and commercial premises. Nor 
does our decision today apply to all "shopping centers." This 
generic term may include retail establishments that vary 
widely in size, location, and other relevant characteristics. 
As the Court observes, State power to regulate private 




restrictions that "do not amount to a taking without just 
compensation or contravene any other federal constitutional 
provision." Ante, at 6. 
I 
Restrictions on property use, like other state 
laws, are invalid if they infringe the freedom of expression 
and belief protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 
In Part V of today's opinion, the Court rejects appellants' 
contention that "a private property owner has a First 
Amendment right not to be forced by the State to use his 
property as a forum for the speech of others." Ante, at 9-10. 
Although I agree that the owner of this shopping center, on 
the facts before us, has no cognizable First Amendment claim, 
I believe that some of the language in the Court's opinion is 
unnecessarily and perhaps confusingly broad. In my view, a 
State's attempt to transform privately-owned property into a 
forum for the expression of views could raise serious First 
Amendment questions in an appropriate case. 
The State may not compel a person to affirm a 
belief he does not hold. \., See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 
(1977): \,,West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 
319 U.S. 624 (1943). Whatever the full sweep of this 
principle, I do not believe that the result in Wooley v. 
Maynard, supra, would have changed had the State of New 
Hampshire directed its citizens to place the slogan "Live 
3. 
Free or Die" in their shop windows rather than on their 
automobiles. In that case, we said that "[a] system which 
secures the right to proselytize religious, political, and 
ideological causes must also guarantee the concomitant right 
to decline to foster such concepts.""v430 U.S., at 714. This 
principle on its face protects a citizen who refuses to 
dedicate his property to the marketplace of ideas. And I can 
find no reason to exclude the owner whose property is "not 
\_,, 
limited to [his] personal use •••• " Ante, at 11. A person 
who has merely invited the public onto his property for 
commercial purposes may not fairly be said to have 
relinquished his right to decline "to be an instrument for 
fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view he 
finds unacceptable."'yWooley v. Maynard, supra, at 715 . .!./ 
As the Court observes, this case involves only a 
right of limited access to property--not a message compelled 
'\., 
by state law. Id. , at 11, 1 2. But the former easily may 
shade into the latter. For example, a law that WG-tl-,1 
requir';;t newspaper editors to provide 
expression of differing views~ l:¼±d 
an avenue for the 
~ f 
. \. b impose;...__ unaccepta le 
limits upon their First Amendment right to select material 
for publication. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 
~ iy--c-r. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 4 07 U.S. 5 51 , 5 69 
T"property [does not] lose its private character 







418 U.S. 241 (1974). See also Columbia Broadcasting System, 
Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 117 
(1973) (plurality opinion). Such rights of access burden the 
speaker's "fundamental right" to decide what he will say. 
~ 
Wooley v. Maynard, supra, at 714; see Miami Herald Publishing 
...... 
Co. v. Tornillo, supra, at 257. As such, they are tantamount 
to compelled affirmation and thus presumptively 
unconstitutional. 
The selection of material for publication is not 
generally a concern of shopping centers. But this 
distinction may be irrelevant when views expressed by members 
of the public on commercial property are likely to be 
identified by 1 isteners as the views of the owner. If a 
state law mandated public access to the bulletin board of a 
free-standing store, hotel, office, or small shopping center, 
customers might well understand the messages to reflect the 
views of the proprietor. That unfortunate individual would 
be faced with a choice: he could either permit his customers 
to proceed under a mistaken impression or he could disavow 
the message, with the inevitable implication that he 
disagrees with its substance. Should he take the first 
course, he has effectively been compelled to affirm someone 
else's belief. Should he choose the second, he has been 
forced to speak when he would prefer to remain silent. In 
short, he has lost control over his freedom to speak or not 
5. 
to speak on certain issues. The mere fact that he is free to 
dissociate himself from the views expressed on his property, 
-~ ante, at 1 2, cannot restore his "right to refrain from 
"' speaking at all. II Wooley v. Maynard, supra, at 714. 
A property owner also may be faced with speakers 
who wish to use his premises as a platform for views that he 
finds morally repugnant. A minority-owned business confronted 
with leafleteers from the American Nazi Party or the Ku Klux 
Klan, a church-operated enterprise asked to host 
demonstrations in favor of abortion, or a union required to 
· supply a forum to right-to-work advocates could be placed in 
an intolerable position if state law requires it to make its 
private property available to anyone who wishes to 
pamphleteer or propagandize. These and like situations may 
evoke such strong emotions as virtually to compel a response. 
This is particularly so when the owner is known to have taken 
a position opposed to the view being expressed on his 
property. In these circumstances, it makes no difference 
that the messages will not be taken as those of the owner. 
Here, too, the right to control one's own speech may be 
burdened impermissibly. 
II 
One might imagine other circumstances in which a 
right of access to commercial property would burden the 
owner's First and Fourteenth Amendment right to refrain from 
0 
6. 
speaking. But appellants have identified no such 
circumstance. No reasonable observer would have assumed that 
the appellees' petitions, circulated in the mall of this vast 
center, expressed the views of the PruneYard or of its owner. 
The shopping center occupies several city blocks. It 
'-.,..... / 
contains more than 65 shops, 10 restaurants, and a theater. 
Interspersed among these establishments are common walkways 
and plazas designed to attract the public. See ante, at 1, 
8. Appellees are high school students who set up their card 
table in one corner of a central courtyard known as the 
"Grand Plaza." Juris. St. B-2. 
petition and solicited signatures. 
They showed passersby a 
Persons solicited could 
not reasonably have believed that the petition embodied the 
views of the shopping center merely because it owned the 
ground on which they stood. 
Because the 1 imi ted right of access held to be 
afforded by the California Constitution placed no burden on 
the appellants' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights in the 
circumstances presented, I join the judgment of the Court. 
But I do not interpret our decision today as a blanket 
approval for State efforts to transform all privately-owned 
commercial property into a public forum. Such an effort 
would raise substantial First Amendment questions not present 
in this case. 
Dear Byron: 
Here is a first draft of a concurrinq opinion in 
Pruneyara. _ ~ 








Date: May 22, 1980 
Pruneyard 
In a conversation with Justice White today, he 
expressed the hope that we would expand our opinion. He 
thinks it is fine as far as it goes. But he feels rather 
strongly that the First Amendment issue is one of 
considerable importance; that the Court opinion's treatment 
of this issue is far too broad; and he is not sure he can 
join a concurrence rather than an outright dissent. 
I will now try to summarize my understanding of 
Justice White's thoughts. For the most part, they simply 
would require that we emphasize somewhat more explicltly 
points we already have made. 
He thinks that as a matter of federal 
constitutional law, the First Amendment protects one from 
being compelled to support views with which he disagrees. 
Justice White observed that we had made the point very well 
with respect to views that were "repugnant" to the property 
owner. He thinks we should emphasize equally that the owner 
of private property simply may not wish his property to be 
used as a public forum. For example, in the forthcoming 
• 
2. 
election if the campaign literature of one candidate may be 
handed out, then literature of all others - including even 
the fringe parties - would have to be allowed. Justice White 
thinks this would be obnoxious even in a center the size of 
Pruneyard - although he has not yet said I must say this for 
him to join. 
He asked whether I had taken a look at the cases 
which hold that union dues cannot be used for political 
purposes contrary to the wishes of union members. It has 
been some time since I looked at these cases. My vague 
recollection is that they are not as strong in this respect 
as I would have liked. We had a case involving Detroit 
school teachers three or four years ago in which I dissented. 
I believe the Court held that the percentage of dues being 
used for political purposes should be deducted from 
dissenting union members. Anyway, Ellen, take a look at the 
labor cases. 
Justice White also mentioned Central Hardwar!, an 
opinion I wrote that came down - I believe - on the same day 
Lloyd v. Tanner was decided. I have not looked at Central 
Hardware in eight years. It was, as I recall, a freestanding 
store and the Court held that the owner need not allow union 
solicitation. 




Supreme Court, in this case, had in effect balanced the free 
speech rights of the pamphleteers against the free speech 
rights of the property owner. He would say that a state may 
do this up to a point as a matter of state law, but that the 
federal constitution certainly does not require it. 
* * * 
Although the foregoing is not too specific, I want 
to accommodate Justice White as far as we can. He did say 
that he probably could go with a concurrence if we emphasize 
(as I thought we had) that this particular center was unique 
in its dimensions and the way in which it operates. Also, he 
inquired whether there was any evidence introduced as to the 
effect of the pamphleteering on First Amendment rights. My 
recollection is there was no evidence. 
Unless you already have done so, Ellen, I suggest 
you see whether anything helpful in any of our prior cases 
might be added to our opinion. In addition to First 
Amendment cases, I suppose cases dealing with the privacy 
interest of private property owners might also be examined 
for possibly relevant language. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
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conversation with Justice White today, he 
expressed the hope that we would expand our opinion. He 
thinks it is fine as far as it goes. But he feels rather 
strongly that the First Amendment issue is one of 
considerable importance: that the Court opinion's 
of this issue is far too broad: and he is not sure he can 
join a concurrence rather than an outriqht dissent. ·:: 
of 
would require that we emphasize somewhat more explicitly 
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~-~~~ He thinks that as a matter of federal 
constitutional law, the First Amendment protects one from 
beinq compelled to support views with which he disagrees. 
Justice White observed that we had made the point very well 
with respect to views that were "repugnant" to the property 
owner. He thinks we should emphasize eaually that the owner 
of private property simply may not wish his property to be : 
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election if the campaiqn literature of one candidate may be 
handed out, then literature of all others - includinq even 
the fringe parties - would have to be allowed. Justice White 
thinks this would be obnoxious even in a center the size of 
Pruneyard - althouqh he has not yet said I must sav this for 
him to join. J?.- -i ~-r-. J'~ .:.i-_• rr' ./':½° r ~~ J~:-- ~.,r •. ,,; 
.,., - .... ). He asked whether I had taken a look at 
which hold that union dues cannot be used for political 
purposes contrary to the wishes of union members. 
been some time since I looked at these cases. My vague 
recollection is that they are not as strong in this respect 
as I would have liked. We had a case involving Detroit 
school teachers three or four years a~o in which I dissented. 
I believe the Court held that the percentaqe of dues being 
used for political purposes should be deducted from .'7J 
dissenting union members. Anyway, Ellen, take a look at 
labor cases. i-., "" ~:. ·-- '.-:.." ·;r:.:.. '""'".c•-' ~ "Ir"~,- .... ~ ~ .;-,il,;' rr~::~·.: 
. ~rn " Justice White also mentionen Central Hardward, an 
opinion I wrote that came down - I believe - on the same day 
Lloyd v. Tanner was decided. I have not looked at Central 
Hardware in eight years. It was, as I recall, a freestandino 
store and the Court held that the owner need not allow union 
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Finally, Justice White observed that the 
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Supreme Court, in this case, had in effect balanced the free 
speech rights of the pamphleteers aqainst the free speech 
ri~hts of the property owner. He would say that a state may 
do this up to a point as a matter of state law, but that the 
federal constitution certainly does not require 
* * 
Although the foreqoing is not too specific, I want 
to accommodate Justice White as far as we can. He did say 
that he probably could qo with a concurrence if we emphasize 
(as I thought we had) that this particular center was uniaue 
in its dimensions and the way in which it operates. Also, he 
inquired whether there was any evidence introduced as to the 
effect of the pamphleteering on First Amendment ri9hts. My , 
recollection is there was no evidence. 
Unless you already have done so, Ellen, I suqgest 
you see whether anythinq helpful in any of our prior cases 
might be added to our opinion. In addition to First 
Amendment cases, I suppose cases dealinq with the privacy 
interest of private property owners might also be examined 




TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Ellen 
RE: No. 79-289, Pruneyard 
Attached is a draft of an II expanded II concurrence in 
this case. Part 
except that the 
IA, p. 1-7 
ultimate 




position has been omitted. Part IB on pp. 7-14 is new. 
Part IB-1 contains analysis drawing principally on the 
Abood and Central Hardware cases to support Mr. Justice White's 
view that property owner's have a generalized First Amendment 
right not to have their property used as a public forum. If you 
believe that, then you must also believe that the regulation in 
this case is constitutional only if it is a precisely drawn 
means of serving a compelling state interest. See your draft 
Consolidated Edison opinion. I therefore have included a Part 
IB-2 considering whether this standard is met. The draft 
concludes that, on the facts of this case, the regulation 
survives this test. Part II, p. 1 5, is a slightly expanded 
~ 
2. 
conclusion incorporating both aspects of the analysis and still 
finishing with your view that the Court has not broadly 
validated state-imposed access rights. 
I will briefly state my concerns with this approach. 
(1) First, as you can see, it requires a fairly major 
analytical effort to come to the conclusion Justice White wants 
to reach. The opinion has become rather too long to be merely 
"raising the red flag." Instead, it looks more like an extended 
discussion of your considered views on the subject. 
(2) Second, we are moving into unexplored territory in 
Part IB. Our original draft (now Part IA) expounds no new 
principles. I think it merely draws some rather obvious 
conclusions from established law as applied to the facts of this 
case. No one could seriously challenge are basic legal 
assumptions in that part. And our assertions are closely tied 
to the facts of this case. 
The situation is quite the contrary in Part IB. Here, 
we take a single case--Abood--and expand it into a major legal 
principle of unknown dimensions. Jon is quite worried about the 
implications, for example, of government use of taxpayer funds 
for expressive purposes. David believes that that issue is not 
a serious one, because government has broad powers to use tax 
money for otherwise permissible regulations. Analytically, 
however, the situation is quite a puzzle if Abood means what we 
say it does. 
3. 
The language in Abood strongly supports what I have 
said in the draft. But no other cases from this Court have 
applied these principles. The Central Hardware and other labor 
cases cited in the draft never mention First Amendment rights. 
Al though they can be read as I have done in the draft, it is 
quite a stretch from the language used in the opinions. I 
certainly do not believe that I have said anything inaccurate in 
the draft, and my research ( not yet exhaustive) has revealed 
nothing to the contrary. But none of the parties has briefed 
the issue from this perspective or even cited Abood. I have 
some reluctance about attempting this novel analysis in a case 
in which it was not briefed here or discussed by the courts 
below. 
In short, Justice White's position requires an 
entirely separate--and entirely new--analysis from that which 
you previously had suggested. I am led to conclude that it may 
be better for you to stay on the surer ground of Part IA, and 
leave this new approach to Justice White. ~ .. 
(3) Third, Justice White's position requires you 
say that the State may impose rights of access to property only 
on the basis of a compelling state interest. The obligation to 
provide access to union organizers has been established in the 
labor cases cited in the draft, without any consideration of the 
First Amendment implications. While I have no trouble agreeing 
that the interest in maintaining industrial peace is compelling, 
I wonder whether all the restrictions previously upheld were 
. . 
4. 
"precisely drawn" in the way the First Amendment requires. I 
also wonder whether all such rights of access should be required 
to pass First Amendment scrutiny. Again, I fear that the 
principle you would be embracing here may have unknown 
implications. Finally, this approach requires you to consider 
whether the State has a compelling interest in this case. Given 
the rarity with which speech regulations are sustained, it is a 
major undertaking for you to say that this one passes muster. 
Again, absent briefing and argument, I have some hesitation 
about coming out on either side of this question. 
One last point involves a very tentative footnote 2, 
which I have added in Part IB. This note suggests that privacy 
interests may be implicated in the most extreme situations. It 
is the sheerest sort of dictum, even for a concurrence, and I am 
not at all sure whether you will want to say anything along 
these lines. However, I sense from talking to Justice White's 
clerk that one of the things that has been bothering them is the 
"Nazi rally on the front lawn" hypothetical. Of course, that 
hypothetical is troublesome. But I think it is so extreme that 
it could be handled in the way suggested in Footnote 2--without 
any need to create a generalized First Amendment right to refuse 
access to property. Even if you decide to omit the new Part IB, 
perhaps something like Footnote 2 could be added to our existing 
draft so as to allay some of the concern with extreme 
hypotheticals. 
5/24/80 
No. 79-289, PruneYard Shoppinq Center v. Robins 
Mr. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in part 
and in the judgment. 
Al though I join the judgment, I do not 
agree with all of the reasoning in Part V of the 
Court's opinion. I join Parts I-IV on the 
understanding that our dee is ion is 1 imi ted to the 
type of shopping center involved in this case. 
~tions would be presented if a State 
were to authorize strangers to picket or leafleteer 
in privately-owned, free-standing stores and 
commercial premises. Nor does our decision today 
apply to all "shopping centers." This generic term 
may include retail establishments that vary widely 
in size, location, and other relevant 
characteristics. As the Court observes, State 
power to regulate private property is limited to 
the adoption of reasonable restrictions that "do 
not amount to a taking without just compensation or 
contravene any other federal constitutional 
provision." Ante, at 6. 
2. 
I 
Restrictions on property use, like other 
~~~ 
state laws, M'"e' invalid if they infringe the 
-1 
freedom of expression and belief protected by the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments. In Part V of 
today's opinion, the Court rejects appellants' 
contention that "a private property owner has a 
First Amendment right not to be forced by the State 
to use his property as a forum for the speech of 
others." Ante, at 9-10. Although I agree that the 
owner of this shopping center, on the facts before 
us, 
4ub.~t.. kl> ~~ ~ 
has I~ cognizable First Amendment claim, ~ 
-'\ 
2J, bQlioYe that; some of the language in the Court's 
opinion is unnecessarily and perhaps confusingly 
broad. In my view, a State's attempt to transform 
privately-owned property into a forum for the 
expression of views 
w 
Aould raise serious 
Amendment questions in -:,:-,;;;( M~•-~ . .. op-r:-u,:~e case. 
A 
First 
The State may not compel a person to 
affirm a belief he does not hold. See Wooley v. 
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); West Virginia State 
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 
3. 
(1943). Whatever the full sweep of this principle, 
I do not believe that the result in Wooley v. 
Maynard, supra, would have changed had the State of 
New Hampshire directed its citizens to place the 
slogan "Live Free or Die" in their shop windows 
rather than on their automobiles. In that case, we 
said that "[a] system which secures the right to 
proselytize religious, political, and ideological 
causes must also guarantee the concomitant right to 
decline to foster such concepts." 430 U.S., at 
714. This principle on its face protects a~ 
who refuses to 
tvf-&,..-
~ 





~ marketplace of ideasA And I k find no reason to 
exclude the owner whose property is "not limited to 
[his] personal use . . •• " Ante, at 11. A person 
who has merely invited the public onto his property 
for commercial purposes may not fairly be said to 
have relinquished his right to decline "to be · an 
instrument for fostering public adherence to an 
ideological point of view he finds unacceptable." 
Wooley v. Maynard, supra, at 715.l/ 
As the Court observes, 
a ~ ~,,,,~ 
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~heir First Amendment right to select material for 
'\ 
publication. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. 
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). See also Columbia 
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National 
Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 117 (1973) (plurality 
~ ~ 
opinion). Sucht{ right/ of access burden/\ the 
,J..ul '1~---.-- .# • ~ - r-r ~~$ ~ 
~il.k'-11's "fundamental right" to decide whatl\..-h-e 
k. ~ ~--~ h, £.:,._ ~~ ,v-~ 4--
"\w-¥11 S<T¥- Wooley v. Maynard, supra, at 714; see ~ - J,~ 
~~~ Torn i 11 o , supra , at 
257. As such, they are tantamount to compelled 
affirmation and thus presumptively 
unconstitutional. 
The selection of material for publication 
is not generally a concern of shopping centers. 
But this distinction may be irrelevant when views 
expressed by members of the public on commercial 
property are 1 ikely to be identified by 1 isteners 
as the views of the owner. If a state law mandated 
~~ . 
5. 
public access to the bulletin board of a free-
stand inq store, hotel, off ice, or small shopping 
center, customers might well understand the 
messages to reflect the views of the proprietor. 
That unfortunate individual would be faced with a 
choice: he could either permit his customers to 
proceed under a mistaken impression or he could 
disavow the messages, with the inevitable 
implication that he disagrees with their substance. 
Should he take the first course, he has effectively 
been compelled to affirm someone else's belief. 
Should he choose the second, he has been forced to 
speak when he would prefer to remain silent. In 
short, he has lost control over his freedom to 
speak or not to speak on certain issues. The mere 
fact that he is free to dissociate himself from the 
views expressed on his property, ante, at 12, 
. -
cannot restore his "right to refrain from speaking 
at all." Wooley v. Maynard, supra, at 714. 
A property owner also may be faced with 
speakers who wish to use his premises as a platform 
~•••--'•c.,,,,-w,cJ ~ ~ k ~. 
for views that he finds morally repugnant. I\ A 
minority-owned business confronted with leafleteers 
6. 
from the American Nazi Party or the Ku Klux Klan, a 
church-operated enterprise asked to host 
demonstrations in favor of abortion, or a union 
required to supply a forum to right-to-work 
advocates could be placed in an intolerable 
position if state law requires it to make its 
private property available to anyone who wishes to 
pamphleteer or propagandize • These and like 
situations may evoke such strong emotions as 
virtually to compel a response. This is 
particularly so when the owner is known to have 
taken a position opposed to the view being 
expressed on his property. In these circumstances, 
it makes no difference that the messaqes will not 
be taken as those of the owner. Here, too, the 
riqht to control one's own speech may be burdened 
·n . mstances l c1rcu 
which a right of access to commercial property 
would burden the owner's First and Fourteenth 
Amendment right to refrain from speaking. But 
appellants have identified no such circumstance. No 
reasonable observer would have assumed that the 
Jj, J J. I ~w 
1./4-, 7. 
appellees' petitions, circulated in the mall of 
this vast center, expressed the views of the 
PruneYard or of its owner. The shopping center 
occupies several city blocks. It contains more 
than 65 shops, 10 restaurants, and a theater. 
Interspersed among these establishments are common 
walkways and plazas designed to attract the public. 
See ante, at 1, 8. Appellees are high school 
students who set up their card table in one corner 
of a central courtyard known as the "Grand Plaza." 
Juris. St. B-2. They showed passersby a petition 
and solicited signatures. Persons solicited could 
not reasonably have believed that the petition 
embodied the views of the shopping center merely 
because it owned the ground on which they stood. 
B 
Even if the owner's speech is unaffected 
by a particular right of access, that right 
nevertheless may burden impermissibly the freedoms 
of association and belief protected by the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments. 
8. 
In Abood v. Detroit Board ·of Education, 
431 U.S. 209 (1977), the Court considered the 
activities of a teachers' union that had negotiated 
an "agency shop" agreement with the Detroit Board 
0 f Ed UC at i On • Individual teachers argued that the 
union could not ?roperly use "service fees," 
collected as a condition of continued employment in 
the public schools, for political and ideological 
purposes unrelated to collective bargaining. The 
Court held that a State may not constitutionally 
require a person "to contribute to the support of 
an ideological cause he may oppose • II Id. , 
at 235. 
The enforced contributions at issue in 
Abood infringed public employees' "freedom ..• to 
associate for the purpose of advancing beliefs and 
ideas," by preventing them from refusing to 
associate with ideas they did not share. Id. , at 
233-234. Just as a person has a right to 
contribute to an organization for the purpose of 
spreading a political message, id., at 234, see 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), so he has a 

1 0. 
of topics. Thus, a state law that seeks to 
transform private property into a public forum 
often will put the property owner to the same 
unconstitutional choice condemned in Abood. 
This principle is implicit in our cases 
permitting employers to exclude union organizers 
from their privately-owned property in certain 
circumstances. Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 
U.S. 539, 543-545 (1972); NLRB v. Babcock &-Wilcox 
~, 351 U.S. 105 (1956); cf. Eastex v. NLRB, 437 
U.S. 556 (1978); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 
(1976). In each case, the Court recognized that 
the owner of property has a protected interest in 
preventing strangers from using that pt'operty to 
express views with which the owner disagrees. In 
each case, it was irrelevant that the property 
might be open to the public for other purposes. 
Although the Court never has identified explicitly 
the source of that right, Abood demonstrates that 
it derives ultimately from the First Amendment.l/ 
2 
The foregoing authorities demonstrate 
that the appellants properly may assert a First and 
11. 
Fourteenth Amendment right to prevent the use of 
their property by strangers for expressive 
purposes. The cases also show, however, that a 
State may restrict that right in appropriate 
circumstances. For example, the United States has a 
compelling interest in avoiding labor-management 
strife through collective bargaining. That 
interest requires that the employer's right to 
exclude union organizers be accommodated to the 
statutory right to self-organization "with as 
little destruction of one as is consistent with the 
maintenance of the other." NLRB v. Babcock & 
Wilcox, supra, at 112; see Hudgens v. NLRB, supra, 
424 U.S. ·, at 521. And in Abood itself, the Court 
held that the "important contribution of the union 
shop to the system of labor relations established 
by Congress" justified a requirement that public 
employees contribute to a union's collective 
bargaining activities. 431 U.S., at 222. This was 
so even though the contributions would be used to 
support ideological positions to which individual 
employees would object. Id., at 222-22. 
The State also has a compelling interest 
in ensuring an adequate public forum within its 
1 2. 
boundaries for the expression of views to members 
of the public. Thus, local governments routinely 
maintain public parks and auditoriums from general 
tax revenues. If a resident were to object that he 
did not wish to support the viewpoints of persons 
permitted to use such public facilities, the 
incidental impact on his First Amendment interests 
would be outweighed by the state interest in 
fostering free expression. That same state 
interest was the motivating force behind the 
California Supreme Court's decision in this case. 
The California court reviewed evidence 
concerning the declining importance of traditional 
public forums in California society, and the 
increasingly prominent role of large shopping 
centers like the PruneYard. It concluded that such 
centers "provide an essential and invaluable forum 
for exercising" the speech and petition rights 
secured by the state constitution. Although would-
be speakers have no federally protected right to 
use shopping centers for expressive purposes, the 
state has a compelling interest in maintaining 
opportunities for public speech at a time when 
traditional forums are declining in importance. 
1 3. 
The right of access shaped by the 
California court to meet this need is narrowly 
drawn. The court emphasized that it was not dealing 
with "an individual homeowner or • a modest 
retail establishment." Juris. St. C-12. In 
describing the type of establishment to which the 
right of access would apply, the court referred to 
"'miniature downtowns'" where "25,000 persons are 
induced to congregate daily." Id., at C-12 n. 5, 
C-13. The Prune Yard itself is an enormous center 
where thousands of people shop each day. See 
supra, at And the California court made clear 
that the owners of such centers could adopt 
appropriate time, place, and manner regulations. 
On all the facts of this case, the minimal 
intrusion on the appellants' protected rights is 
justified by the compelling state interest in 
maintaining adequate opportunities for its 
residents to exercise their rights of expression. 
II 
The 1 imi ted right of access afforded by 
the California Constitution, as interpreted in this 




Fourteenth Amendment right to refrain from 
speaking. The right of access does invade to some 
extent the appellants' freedoms of association and 
belief by compelling them to provide support--in 
the form of a forum--to ideological causes with 
which they may disagree. In the circumstances 
presented, however, a 1 imi ted intrusion on 
protected freedoms is accomplished by means of a 
narrowly drawn regulation that serves the 
compel! ing state interest in compensating for the 
uniquely severe loss of traditional avenues of 
expression that has been found to exist in the 
State of California. I therefore join the judgment 
of the Court. But I do not interpret our dedision 
today as a blanket approval for State efforts to 
transform all privately-owned commercial property 
into a public forum. Such an effort would raise 
substantial First Amendment questions not present 




~/ Cf. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 
551, 569 (1972) ("property [does not] lose its 
private character merely because the public is 
generally invited to use it for designated 
purposes"). 
II In a proper case, the property owner 
may also be protected by the principle that "a 
State has no business telling a man, sitting alone 
in his own house, what books he may read or what 
films he may watch." Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 
557 (1969). Stanley invalidated criminal laws 
against private possession of obscenity. The 
Court there observed that a State has no interest 
in controlling the moral content of a person's 
thoughts. Id., at 565. This principle prevents a 
State from taking away expressive materials that a 
person may wish to peruse privately. The same 
principle may prevent the State from forcing 
individual exposure to any particular point of 
view. Thus, if a State were to require homeowners 
FN;>... .... 
to permit speakers to congregate on their front 
lawns, the massive intrusion into personal privacy 
and freedom of belief could well be 
unconstitutional. The homeowner and his family 
could be subjected to intolerably offensive speech 
with no reasonable means of escape. Cf. Cohen V. 
California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971); Rowan v. Post 
Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970). No such problem 
is implicated in this case. 
er 5/20/80 
No. 79-289, Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins 
Mr. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in part 
and in the judgment. 
Al though I join the judgment, I do not 
agree with all of the reasoning in Part V of the 
Court's opinion. I join Parts I-IV on the 
understand inq that our decision is 1 imi ted to the 
type of shopping center involved in this case. 
Different questions would be presented if a. State 
were to authorize strangers to picket or leafleteer 
in privately-owned, free-standing stores and 
--
commercial premises. Nor does our decision today 
apply to all "shopping centers." This generic term 
may include retail establishments that vary widely 
in size, location, and other re]evant 
characteristics. As the Court observes, State 
power to regulate private property is limited to 
the adoption of reasonable restrictions that "do 
not amount to a taking without just compensation or 
contravene any other federal constitutional 
provision." Ante, at 6. 
2. 
I 
Restrictions on property use, like other 
state laws, are invalid if they infringe the 
freedom of expression and belief protected by the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments. In Part V of 
today's opinion, the Court rejects appellants' 
contention that "a private property owner has a 
First Amendment right not to be forced by the State 
to use his property as a forum for the speech of 
others." Ante, at 9-10. Although I agree that ~d/4 
,)'1A--~f-c.4..~ 
owner of this shopping center has no u:i .bJ..e 
A - • 
~~/k~L~ 
Amendment claim, I believe that~the Court's o6inion-
u . ~-Jl~~Lr~ 
3"W~~~~G-...9J~ac1~:.....-..:.._~Ls--A--=~111Y~~~lf>·eellZ.li, a Stat~•s'attemp{ 
to transform privately-owned property into a forum 
for the expression of views could raise serious 
First Amendment questions in an appropriate case. 
The State may not compel a person to 
affirm a belief he does not hold. See Wooley v. 
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 ( 1977); West Virginia State 
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 
(1943). Whatever the full sweep of this principle, 
I do not believe that the result in Wooley v. 
Maynard, supra, would have changed had the State of 
3. 
New Hampshire directed its citizens to place the 
slogan "Live Free or Die" in their shop windows 
rather than on their automobiles. In that case, we 
said that "[a] system which secures the right to 
proselytize religious, political, and ideological 
causes must also guarantee the concomitant right to 
decline to foster such concepts." 430 U.S., at 
714. This principle on its face protects a citizen 
who refuses to dedicate his property to the 
marketplace of ideas. And I can find no reason to 
exclude the owner whose property is "not limited to 
[his] personal use .•.. " Ante, at 11. A person 
who has merely invited the public onto his property 
for commercial purposes may not fairly be said to 
have relinquished his right to decline "to be an 
instrument for fostering public adherence to an 
ideological point of view he finds unacceptable." 
Wooley v. Maynard, supra, at 715.1/ 
As the Court observes, this case involves 
only a right of limited access to property--not a 
message compelled by state law. Id., at 11, 12. 
1/ Cf. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 569 
T1972) ("property [does not] lose its private 
character merely because the public is generally 
invited to use it for designated purposes"). 
4. 
But the former easily may shade into the latter. 
For example, a law that would require newspaper 
editors to provide an avenue for the expression of 
differing views would impose unacceptable 1 imi ts 
upon their First Amendment right to select material 
for publication. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. 
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). See also Columbia 
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National 
Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 117 (1973) (plurality 
opinion). Such rights of access burden the 
speaker's "fundamental right" to decide what he 
will say. Wooley v. Maynard, supra, at 714; see 
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, supra, at 
257. As such, they are tantamount to compelled 
affirmation and thus presumptively 
unconstitutional. 
The selection of material for publication 
is not generally a concern of shopping centers. 
~~~~ ~~ 
But ~si~ s1u·a,g,1::u; Fftey... ,;::q when views expressed 
on commercial propert?a~y to be identified 
by listeners as the views of the owner. If a state 
law mandated public access to the bulletin board of 
a free-standing store, small hotel, office, ~ 
5. 
4ll'-~ a-~h{Ju,-~~'"'1 ~J 
apartment building\ customers might well understand 
the messages to reflect the views of the 
proprietor. That u,nfo:t:na-t:c individual would be 
faced with a choice: he could either permit his 
customers to proceed under a mistaken impression or 
he could disavow the message, with the inevitable 
implication that he disagrees with its substance. 
Should he take the first course, he has effectively 
been compelled to affirm someone else's belief. 
G,~-•<-
Should he ~t rec the second, he has been forced to 
~ 
speak when he would prefer to remain silent. In 
short, he has lost control over i:;;c-~~a~ ~ 
~ ~~~~~ m~c-t that he 
is free to dissociate himself from the views 
expressed on his property, ante, at 12, cannot 
restore his "right to refrain from speaking at 
all." Wooley v. Maynard, supra, at 714. 
A property owner also may be faced with 
speakers who wish to use his premises as a platform 
for views that he finds morally repugnant. A 
minority-owned business confronted with leafleteers 
from the American Nazi Party or the Ku Klux Klan, a 
church-operated enterprise asked to host 
6. 
i,,f.~/4,ZC~  ~ 
4# ~ ~~& , t a d:-" 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ -Je, ~--t+-4ld~ 
in favor of abortion, or a union ,,,,,_.-
advocates 
position 
to supply a forum to right-to-work 





i±:s ri~h1' rn 
rrsm-a-in s il en.t • These situations may evoke such 
I\ 
strong emotions as virtually to compel a r esponse. 
This is particularly so when the owner is known to 
b ( ( 6 , a ; 
have taken a position dkametx:..i.0ally opposed to the 
~ 
view being expressed on his property. In these 
circumstances, it makes no difference that the 
messages will not be taken as those of the owner. 
Here, too, the right to control one's own speech 
may be burdened impermissibly. 
II 
One miqht imagine other circumstances in 
which a right of access to commercial property 
would burden the owner's First and Fourteenth 
Amendment right to refrain from speaking. But 
~ 
appellants have identified no such circumstance. No 
d?1f73P'.~ 
~4-f~ ~ 
reasonable observer would have assumed that _f:hs!lE. 
~ k,µ_, ,,~e:,~.&.~~ ~~ ~ a-1 
peti tions~expressed the views of the PruneYard or 
of its owner. The shopping center occupies several 





restaurants, and a theater. Interspersed among 
these establishments are common walkways and plazas 
designed to attract the public. See ante, at 1, 8. 
Appellees are high school students who set up their 
card table in one corner of a central courtyard 
known as the "Grand Plaza." Juris. St. B-2. They 
showed passersby a petition and solicited 
signatures. 'Pl,e glaj.,.,_,,s e £ 4,1, ¼ ~ ~~could 
not reasonably have believed that the petition 
embodied the views of the shopping center merely 
because it owned the ground on which they stood. 
Because the limited right of access 
~ k ~ ..&1:~-.~ ~Ef!? 
\ afforded by the Cal:=a Cons ti tut ion placed no 
burden on the appellants' First and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights in the circumstances presented, I 
join the judgment of the Court. J3.uJ: I do~ St..-t--
~"f!J .-ra ~ ; • > -
interpret our decision today as a blanket approval 
for State efforts to transform privately-owned 
commercial property into a public forum. Such 
a- ~ 
,\ effort/ 
question~ ~t::::;1, ':t~-~~ccs~ 
raise substantial First Amendment 
limited principle established by 
California Supreme Court in this case, a different 
-and difficult--issue would be presented. 






TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Ellen 
RE: No. 79-289 Pruneyard 
Attached is a new draft with changes marked. I'd like 
to point out three things. 
1. I thought that the guest ion whether the need to 
regulate large numbers of speakers imposed an intolerable burden 
was more relevant to the "taking-due process" side of the case 
than to the First Amendment. Therefore, I added a reference to 
this in the first paragraph of the opinion. 
2. One change you had suggested on page 4 of the 5/24 
draft seemed to me to go too far in adopting the Abood theory. 
You suggest that the opinion say that a person has a 
"' fundamental right' to decide what views he will support--
whether by his own speech or by a third party using his 
property." But the assertion that a person has an unqualified 
right not to support speech by a third party using his property 





is precisely the analysis from Abood we had wished to avoid. 
The present draft makes the narrower assertion that rights of 
access are unconstitutional when they force the property owner 
to break his silence by calling forth a disavowal or otherwise 
affecting his personal speech--as in Tornillo itself. The draft 
now mentions that Abood may stand for a broader principle, but 
it does not decide the question. Footnote 2. I therefore have 
changed the language ( now on page 5) to simply quote what the 
Chief Justice wrote in Wooley. 
3. I also have expanded somewhat the "morally 
repugnant idea" branch of the analysis. Relying on Abood' s 
thesis that a person cannot be compelled to specify the ideas to 
which he objects in order to avoid supporting them, the draft on 
p. 7 suggests that a shopping center could refuse access to all 
expressive activity simply by saying that it would find some 
speakers so objectionable as to call for a response. On p. 9, 
the draft says that appellants fail this test because they did 
not show that any groups to which they strongly object would use 
their premises. 
you need to in 
This line of thinking could be saying more than 
an opinion that is intended to be suggestive 
rather than definitive. 
~·~)?'"~-- ::z !~~~  
~-~ --z..-7~~fe~~ 
~~~J--r?~~t~7~~~ ', -rl,? ~~~ I~ 
~ 7  ~0J'~ ~ 
 ~ ~ <~ fa,~ ~ _,,,., ~ 
d2 ~ O,'-~ - ph?y r~ ~7 
~ -:p~~-
er 5/26/80 
No. 79-289, PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins 
Mr. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in part 
and in the judgment. 
Al though I join the judgment, I do not 
agree with all of the reasoning in Part V of the 
Court's opinion. I join Parts I-IV on the 
understanding that our decision is 1 imi ted to the 
type of shopping center involved in this case. 
Significantly different questions would be 
presented if a State were to authorize strangers to 
picket or leafleteer in privately-owned, free-
standing stores and commercial premises. Nor does 
our decision today apply to all "shopping centers." 
This generic term may include retail establishments 
that vary widely in size, location, and other 
relevant characteristics. Even large 
establishments may be able to show that the number 
or type of persons wishing to speak on their 
premises would create a substantial annoyance to 
customers that could only be eliminated by 
elaborate, expensive, and possibly unenforceable 
time, place, and manner restrictions. As the Court 
2. 
observes, state power to regulate private property 
is limited to the adoption of reasonable 
restrictions that "do not amount to a taking 
without just compensation or contravene any other 
federal constitutional provision." Ante, at 6. 
I 
Restrictions on property use, like other 
state laws, also would be invalid if they infringe 
the freedom of expression and belief protected by 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments. In Part V of 
today's opinion, the Court rejects appellants' 
contention that "a private property owner has a 
First Amendment right not to be forced by the State 
to use his property as a forum for the speech of 
others." Ante, at 9-10. Alt~ ugh I agree that the 
owner of this shopping center, on the facts before 
us, has failed to establish a cognizable First 
.Jlu:;t: 
Amendment claim , /\ some of the language in the 
Court's opinion is unnecessarily and perhaps 
confusingly broad. In my view• J; / tate )... a"t::.e~ 
rt.a- $ 
.,..A:e transform privately-owned property 
1 " '- __ .,~-- , 
H.---,~s 
for the expression of J\ views  





First Amendment questions in many situations. 






The State may not compel a person to 
affirm a belief he does not hold. See Wooley v. 
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977)~ West Virginia State 
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 
(1943). Whatever the full sweep of this principle, 
I do not believe that the result in Wooley v. 
Maynard, supra, would have changed had the State of 
New Hampshire directed its citizens to place the 
slogan "Live Free or Die" in their shop windows 
rather than on their automobiles. In that case, we 
said that "[a] system which secures the right to 
proselytize religious, political, and ideological 
causes must also guarantee the concomitant right to 
decline to foster such concepts." 430 U.S., at 
714. This principle on its face protects a person 
who refuses to allow his property to be used as a 
marketplace for the ideas of others. And I can 
find no reason to exclude the owner whose property 
is "not limited to [his] personal use II 
Ante, at 11 . A person who has merely invited the 
public onto his property for commercial purposes 
may not fairly be said to have relinquished his 
4. 
right to decline "to be an instrument for fostering 
public adherence to an ideological point of view he 
finds unacceptable." Wooley v. Maynard, supra, at 
715.]../ 
As the Court observes, this case involves 
only a state-created right of 1 imi ted access to a 
specialized type of property. Id., at 11, 12. But 
even when no particular message is mandated by the \ 
State, First Amendment interests are affected by 
state action that forces a property owner to grant 
access to third-party speakers. In both cases, the 
purpose is to allow speech. And in many 
situations, a right of access will infringe 
protected interests no less than Sf?eech compelled 
by the State itself. For example, a law that 
re qui res a newspaper to permit use of its columns 
by others to express differing views imposes an 
unacceptable burden upon the newspaper's First 
Amendment right to select material for publication. 
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 
241 (1974). See also Columbia Broadcasting System, 
Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 




















' access burdens the affected newspaper's 
"fundamental right to decide what to print or 
omit." Wooley v. Maynard, supra, at 714; see Miami 
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, supra, at 257. 
As such, it is tantamount to compelled affirmation 
and thus presumptively unconstitutional.±./ 
The selection of material for publication 
is not generally a concern of shopping centers. 
But this distinction may be irrelevant when views 
expressed by members of the public on commercial 
property are likely to be identified by listeners 
as the views of the owner. If a state law mandated 
public access to the bulletin board of a free-
standing store, hotel, off ice, or small shopping 
center, customers might well understand the -
messages to views of the proprietor. 
he could either permit his customers to 
under a mistaken impression or he could 
disavow the messages, with the 
implication that he disagrees with their 
inevitable y 
substance. 
Should he take the first course, he has effectively 
been compelled to affirm someone else's belief. 
6. 
Should he choose the second, he has been forced to 
speak when he would prefer to remain silent. In 
short, he has lost control over his freedom to 
speak or not to speak on certain issues. The mere 
~ 
fact that the EHmer is free to dissociate himself 
/\ 
from the views expressed on his property, see ante, 
at 12, cannot restore his "right to refrain from 
speaking at all." Wooley v. Maynard, supra, at 
714. 
A property owner also may be faced with 
speakers who wish to use his premises as a platform 
for views that he finds morally repugnant. Numerous 
examples come to mind. A minority-owned business 
confronted with leafleteers from the American Nazi 
Party or the Ku Klux Klan, a church-operated 
enterprise asked to host demonstrations in favor of 
abortion, or a union required to supply a forum to 
right-to-work advocates could be placed in an 
intolerable position if state law requires it to 
make its private property available to anyone who 
wishes to pamphleteer or propagandize. These and 
1 ike situations may evoke such strong emotions as 
virtually to compel a response. 
7. 
This is particularly so when the owner is 
known to have taken a position opposed to the view 
being expressed on his property. But an owner also 
may claim that he strongly objects to some of the 
causes to which the state-imposed right of access 
would extend, and that he therefore opposes 
ideological activities "of any sort" that are not 
related to the purposes for which the public is 
invited onto his property. See Abood v. Detroit 
Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 213, 241 (1977). 
To require him to ,specify the particular ideas he 
finds so objectionable as to compel a response 




Ibid ~ hus, the 
without public 
right to control 
one's own speech may be burdened impermissibly even 
when listeners will not assume that the messages 
expressed on private property are those of the 
owner.~ 
II 
One easily may identify other 
circumstances in which a right of access to 
commercial property would burden the owner's First 
8. 
and Fourteenth Amendment right to refrain from 
speaking. But appellants have identified no such 
circumstance. Nor did appellants introduce 
evidence that would support a holding in their 
favor under either of the legal theories outlined 
above. 
U4..1 
~ ~~ ~i.J ~~ ~~~ 
No r~~Ri'er -WQuld...have assumed ~<~ ~ 
of 
the PruneYard or of its owner. The shopping center 
occupies several city blocks. It contains more 
than 65 shops, 10 restaurants, and a theater. 
Interspersed among these establishments are common 
walkways and plazas designed to attract the public. 
See ante, at 1, 8. Appellees are high school 
students who set up their card table in one corner 
of a central courtyard known as the "Grand Plaza." 
Juris. St. B-2. They showed passersby several 
petitions and solicited signatures. Persons 
solicited could not reasonably have believed that 
the petitions embodied the views of the shopping 









Appellants have not alleged that they 
object to the ideas contained in the appellees' 
petition. Nor do they assert that some groups who 
might reasonably be expected to speak at the 
Prune Yard will express views that are so 
objectionable as to require a response even when 
listeners will not mistake their source. The 
record contains no evidence concerning the numbers 
or types of interest groups in the area that may 
seek access to this shopping center, and no 
testimony that would show that the appellants 
strongly disagree with any of them. 
Because appellants have not shown that 
the limited right of access held to be afforded by 
the California Constitution burdened their First 
and Fourteenth Amendment rights in the 
circumstances presented, I join the judgment of the 
Court. But I do not interpret our decision today 
as a blanket approval for state efforts to 
transform privately-owned 
4S ~ 
into a public forum,.~ .,8'uch aFt 
~ 
substantial 
in this case. 
commercial property 
--iLZt->d.,c::..~ 




~/ Cf. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 
551, 569 (1972) ("property [does not] lose its 
private character merely because the public is 
generally invited to use it for designated 
purposes"). 
II Even if a person's own speech is not 
affected by a right of access to his property, a 
requirement that he lend support to the expression 
of a third party's views may burden impermissibly 
the freedoms of association and belief protected by 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments. In Abood V. 
Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 235 
(1977), we held that a State may not 
constitutionally require a person "to contribute to 
the support of an ideological cause he may oppose • \ 
II To require a landowner to supply a forum to 
causes he finds objectionable also might be an 
unacceptable "compelled subsidization" in some 
circumstances. 431 U.S., at 237. Cf. Central 
Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 543-545 (1972); 
NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956); 
see generally Eastex v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 557 (1978); 
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976). 
FN2. 
l~I 
appellants do not argue that Abood supports the 
-1 
claimed right to exclude speakers from their 
property. Nor have they alleged that they disagree 
with the messages at issue in this case. 
l/ In a proper case, the property owner 
also may be protected by the principle that "a 
State has no business telling a man, sitting alone 
in his own house, what books he may read or what 
films he may watch." Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 
557 (1969). Observing that a State has no interest 
in controlling the moral content of a person's 
thoughts, id., at 565, the Court in Stanley 
invalidated a law imposing criminal penalties for 
the private possession of obscenity. Stanley 
prevents a State from removing from the home 
expressive materials that a person may wish to 
peruse privately. The same principle may extend to 
state efforts to force individual exposure to 
third-party messages. Thus, a law that required 
homeowners to permit speakers to congregate on 
their front lawns would be a massive and possibly 
unconstitutional intrusion into personal privacy 
and freedom of belief. No such problem is 




TO: Ellen DATE: May 26, 1980 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Pruneyard 
You have made a valiant effort to accommodate 
Justice White's views. I agree that Abood and Central 
Hardware appear to provide considerable support. Yet, for the 
reasons stated in your memorandum, I am not inclined to 
accept in this case the full reach· of Part II-B. 
I must say, however, that the more I think about 
this case, the closer the First Amendment issue seems. I am 
still reluctant to dissent, and yet neither the California 
Court nor Justice Rehnguist's opinion provides any standard 
or general principle that will afford guidance in other 
cases. 
Nevertheless, I suggest that we try one more draft 
concurring in the judgment on the First Amendment issue, 
limiting it as narrowly as we can to the facts, the findings 
of the California Court, and the failure - if my recollection 
is accurate - of appellant to make the factual showing that 
would have supported more strongly its First Amendment claim. 
It could have introduced evidence - especially in California 





groups", ranging the Mansons and Patty Hearst's friends among 
" the lunatic fringes to the innumerable state and national 
"causes" - social, political, moral, religous or whatever. 
Developing reasonable time~nner regulations that would 
cope with hundreds of demands the pamphleteer would impose an 
intolerable burden. Moreover, the inconvenience and 
annyoance of the shopping public would be substantial - just 
as it is now_/' to airport travelers who are annoyed and 
harassed by pamphleteers. Even if time, place and manner 
regulations were found - after challenge - to be reasonable, 
enforcing them in all probability would be extremely 
difficult if not impossible. Arguments along these lines 
have been made in this case, but I do not recall that any 
evidence supporting them was introduced. If not, we should 
make something of this. 
Also, I would like for you to incorporate 
cautiously in a footnote or two references to Abood and 
Central Hardware identifying 
- support they~give to a 
~ 
the tangential - but theoretical 
property owner when the state 
authorizes use of his property for the exercise of First 
Amendments rights by others. 
In sum, if we can isolate this case (without 
converting it into a "company town", Marsh v. Alabala case), 
# 
I will adhere to my concurrence. We will probably lose 
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You have made a valiant effort to acco~modate 




Hardware appear to provide consiaerable support. Yet, for thP 
reasons stated in your memorandum, I am not inclined to ·, 
accept in this case the full reach of Part II-B. . ~ . 
I must sav, however, that the more I think about 
this case, the closer the First Amenarnent issue seems. I am 
still reluctant to dissent, and yet neither the California 
Court nor Justice Rehnquist's opinion provides any standard 
or aeneral principle that will afford quidance in other 




Nevertheless, I sugqest that we try one more draft 
concurrinq in the iudqment on the First Amendment issue, ~ 
lirnitinq it as narrowly as we can to the facts, the findinqs 
of the California Court, and the failure - if mv recollection 
is accurate - of appellant to make the factual showinq that 
would have supported more strongly its First Amendment claim. 
It could have introduced evidence - especially in California 
- identifyinq the hundreds, if not thousands, of "cause . "' \. 
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the lunatic fringes to the innumerable state and national 
"causes" - social, political, mer.al, reljgous or whatever. 
Developing reasonable time, and manner requlations that would 
cope with hundreds of de~ands the pamphleteer would impose an 
intolerable burden. Moreover, the inconvenience and ... ,...,5, ::4; 
annyoance of the shoppina public woulc be substant i al 
as it is now - to airport travelers w,ho are annoyed and 
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harassed by pamphleteers. Even if time, nlace and manner. 
reaulations were found - after challenge - to be reasonable, ~ 
enforcing them in all _probability would be extremelv 
difficult if not impossible. Arquments alonq these lines 
have been made in this case, but I do not recall that any 
evidence supporting them was introduced. If not, we should 
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May 27, 1980 
No. 79-289 Pr.uneyard 
Dear Byron: 
- Since our talk, I have done so~e further work on my 
draft opinion. Two copies of a revised draft ar0. Pncloseo. 
1 ~onsiaer~a relying specifically on Abood 3n 
Central Hardware to support the view that a property owner 
has a generalized First Amendment riqht nP.ver to have his 
oroperty used as a public forum. ~here is languagP in these 
cases that lends suoport to this view. I have conc1.udPd, 
how0vPr, that in this casr I would prefer not to qo quite 
that far. T~P case was not argued - as I understand it - on 
that basis. Moreover, without more stui:ly e1nd thouqht, T c-lm 
not sur.e where such "" bro~• ri'ltionalr-> woula l 0 ar"l on~. , .. Nor, 
indAe~, am I sur~ that this w~s vnur thouqht. 
In any event, I ~ave trien to sharpen un, and 
strengthen, my analysis on fairlv w0 ll PSt~blished First 
Amenc1mPnt grounos. I still "!nd uo wit"li n "r,onr.urr.Pnc~" 
rather than a "dissent", althouqh t rP~ogniZP thRt th 0 
question is close. On th~ record before us, however, T f~~l 
more comfortable with a concurrence. 
I am s~nding a copy of my draft aown to th?. printer 
today to "get in line" down there. I woulr'! still w~lcome, 
however, any suggestions you may hav~ . I h~ve not yet qiven 
Bill Rehnquist a cooy, but will do so when I hear from you. 
I appr.eciat8 your waiting, ~nd giving me th~ 
opportunity to draft som~thinq we both could join. ~ 
Sinc-erely, 
Mr. Justice White 
lfp/ss 
. .. 
... <l ., 5/2,1/8 0 
Ct\~•b!.~S 1 
~ ll.+-f"f ('.; ~C l.>vt_ (A) 
No. 79-289, PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins 
Mr. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in part and in the 
judgment. 
Although I join the judgment, I do not agree with all 
of the reasoning in Part V of the Court's opinion. I join Parts 
I-IV on the understanding that our decision is limited to the 
type of shopping center involved in this case. Significantly 
different questions would be presented if a State were to 
~ 
authorize strangers to picket or leafleteer in privatelyfowned, 
free-standing stores and commercial premises. Nor does our 
decision today apply to all II shopping centers. 11 This generic 
term may include retail establishments that vary widely in size, 
location, and other relevant characteristics. Even large 
establishments may be able to show that the number or type of 
persons wishing to speak on their premises would create a 
substantial annoyance to customers that could only be eliminated 
by elaborate, expensive, and possibly unenforceable time, place, 
2. 
and manner restrictions. As the Court observes, state power to 
regulate private property is limited to the adoption of 
reasonable restrictions that "do not amount to a taking without 
just compensation or contravene any other federal constitutional 
provision." Ante, at 6. 
I 
Restrictions on property use, like other state laws, 
also would be invalid if they infringed the freedom of 
expression and belief protected by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments. In Part V of today's opinion, the Court rejects 
appellants' contention that "a private property owner has a 
First Amendment right not to be forced by the State to use his 
property as a forum for the speech of others." Ante, at 9-10. I 
agree that the owner of this shopping center, on the facts 
before us, has failed to establish a cognizable First Amendment 
claim. But some of the 1 anguage in the Court's opinion is 
unnecessarily and ,perhaps confusingly 
action that transforms privatel .f;owned 
broad. In my view, state 
property into a forum for 
the expression of the public's views would raise serious First 
Amendment questions in many situations. 
A 
The State may not compel a person to affirm a belief 
he does not hold. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977): 
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 
(1943). Whatever the full sweep of this principle, I do not 
believe that the result in Wooley v. Maynard, supra, would have 
3. 
changed had the State of New Hampshire directed its citizens to 
place the slogan "Live Free or Die" in their shop windows rather 
than on their automobiles. In that case, we said that "[a] 
system which secures the right to proselytize religious, 
political, and ideological causes must also guarantee the 
concomitant right to decline to foster such concepts." 430 
U.S., at 714. This principle on its face protects a person who 
refuses to allow his ?roperty to be used as a marketplace for 
the ideas of others. And I can find no reason to exclude the 
~ 
owner whose property is "not limited to [his] personal use . 
i..._.,,) 
• " Ante, at 11. A person who has merely invited the public onto 
his property for commercial purposes may not fairly be said to 
have relinquished his right to decline "to be an instrument for 
fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view he 
finds unacceptable." Wooley v. Maynard, supra, at 715 • .!./ 
As the Court observes, this case involves only a 
state-created right of 1 imi ted access to a specialized type of 
property. Id., at 11, 12. But even when no particular message 
is mandated by the State, First Amendment interests are affected 
by state action that forces a property owner to grant access to 
third-party speakers. In both cases, the purpose is to allow 
speech. And in many situations, a right of access will infringe 
protected interests no less than speech compelled by the State 
itself. For example, a law that requires a newspaper to permit 
use of its columns by others to express differing views imposes 
an unacceptable burden upon the newspaper's First Amendment 
4. 
right to select material for publication. Miami Herald 
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). See also 
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National 
Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 117 (1973) (plurality opinion). Such a 
right of access 
right to decide 
supra, at 714; 
burdens the affected newspaper's "fundamental 
what to print or omit." Wooley v. Maynard, 
see Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 
supra, at 257. As such, it is tantamount to compelled 
affirmation and thus presumptively unconstitutional.2/ 
The selection of material for publication is not 
generally a concern of shopping centers. But this distinction 
may be irrelevant when views expressed by members of the public 
on commercial property are likely to be identified by listeners 
as the views of the owner. If a state law mandated public 
access to the bulletin board of a free-standing 
office, or small shopping center, customers 
store, hotel, 
might well 
understand the messages to reflect the views of the proprietor. 
The same would be true if the public were allowed to solicit or 
pamphleteer in the entrance area of a store or in the lobby of a 
private building. The property owner or proprietor would be 
faced with a choice: he could either permit his customers to 
proceed under a mistaken impression or he could disavow the 
messages. Should he take the first 
been compelled to affirm someone 
course, he has effectively 
else's belief. Should he 
choose the second, he has been forced to speak when he would 
prefer to remain silent. In short, he has lost control over his 
5. 
freedom to speak or not to speak on certain issues. The mere 
fact that he is free to dissociate himself from the views 
expressed on his property, see ante, at 12, cannot restore his 
"right to refrain from speaking at all." Wooley v. Maynard, 
supra, at 714. 
A property owner also may be faced with speakers who 
wish to use his premises as a platform for views that he finds 
morally repugnant. Numerous examples come to mind. A minority-
owned business confronted with leafleteers from the American 
Nazi Party or the Ku Klux Klan, a church-operated enterprise 
asked to host demonstrations in favor of abortion, or a union 
required to supply a forum to right-to-work advocates could be 
placed in an intolerable posit ion if state law re qui res it to 
make its private property available to anyone who wishes to 
pamphleteer or propagandize. These and like situations may 
evoke such strong emotions as virtually to compel a response. 
This is particularly so when the owner is known to 
have taken a position opposed to the view being expressed on his 
property. But an owner also may claim that he strongly objects 
to some of the causes to which the state-imposed right of access 
would extend, and that he therefore opposes ideological 
activities "of any sort" that are not related to the purposes 
for which the public is invited onto his property. See Abood v. 
Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 213, 241 (1977). To 
require him to specify the particular ideas he finds so 
objectionable as to compel a response would force him to 
6. 
relinquish his "freedom to maintain his own beliefs without 
public disclosure." Ibid.l/ Thus, the right to control one's 
own speech may be burdened impermissibly even when 1 isteners 
will not assume that the messages expressed on private property 
are those of the owner.!/ 
II 
One easily may identify other circumstances in which a 
right of access to commercial property would burden the owner's 
First and Fourteenth Amendment right to refrain from speaking. 
But appellants have identified -no such circumstance. Nor did 
appellants introduce evidence that would support a holding in 
their favor under either of the legal theories outlined above. 
On the record before us, I cannot say that customers 
of this vast center would be likely to assume that appellees' 
limited speech activity expressed the -views of the PruneYard or 
of its owner. The shopping center occupies several city blocks. 
It contains more than 65 shops, 10 restaurants, and a theater. 
Interspersed among these establishments are common walkways and 
plazas designed to attract the public. See ante, at 1, 8. 
Appellees are high school students who set up their card table 
in one corner of a central courtyard known as the "Grand Plaza." 
Juris. St. B-2. They showed passersby several petitions and 
solicited signatures. Persons solicited could not reasonably 
have believed that the petitions embodied the views of the 
shopping center merely because it owned the ground on which they 
stood. 
7. 
Appellants have not alleged that they object to the 
ideas contained in the appellees' petitions. Nor do they assert 
that some groups who might reasonably be expected to speak at 
the PruneYard will express views that are so obiectionable as to 
require a response even when listeners will not mistake their 
source. The record contains no evidence concerning the numbers 
or types of interest groups in the area that may seek access to 
this shopping center, and no testimony that would show that the 
appellants strongly disagree with any of them. 
Because appellants have not shown that the 1 imi ted 
right of access held to be afforded by the California 
Constitution burdened their First and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights in the circumstances presented, I join the judgment of 
the Court. But I do not interpret our decision today as a 
~ 
blanket approval for state efforts to transform privately~owned 
commercial property into public forums. Any such state action 
would raise substantial federal constitutional questions not 
present in this case. 
FOOTNOTES 
~/ Cf. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 569 
(1972) ("property [does not] lose its private character merely 
because the public is generally invited to use it for designated 
purposes"). 
II Even if a person's own speech is not affected by a 
right of access to his property, a requirement that he lend 
support to the expression of a third party's views may burden 
impermissibly the freedoms of association and belief protected 
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. In Abood v. Detroit 
Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 235 (1977), we held that a 
State may not constitutionally require a person "to contribute 
to the support of an ideological cause he may oppose . • . . " 
To require a landowner to supply a forum for causes he finds 
objectionable also might be an unacceptable "compelled 
subsidization" in some circumstances. 431 U.S., at 237. Cf. --
Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 543-545 (1972) 
( "property rights" may permit exclusion of union organizers); 
NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956) (same); 
see generally Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 571-576 
(1978); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 521-522 (1976). The 
appellants do not argue, however, that Abood supports the 
claimed right to exclude speakers from their p roperty. Nor have 
they alleged that they disagree with the messages at issue in 
this case. See infra
1
at __ . 
ll The problem is compounded where, as in many 
smaller shopping centers or in the lobby areas of hotels, 
several stores are leased to and operated by different 
proprietors with divergent views. 
FN2. 
ii In a proper case, the property owner also may be 
protected by the principle that "a State has no business telling 
a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or 
what films he may watch." Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 
( 1 969). Observing that a State has no interest in control! ing 
the moral content of a person's thoughts, id., at 565, the Court 
in Stanley invalidated a law imposing criminal penalties for the 
private possession of obscenity. Stanley prevents a State from 
removing from the home expressive materials that a person may 
wish to peruse privately. The same principle may extend to 
state efforts to force individual exposure to third-party 
messages. Thus, a law that required homeowners to permit 
speakers to congregate on their front lawns would be a massive 
and possibly unconstitutional intrusion into personal privacy 
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Mr. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in part and in the 
judgment. 
Although I join the judgment, I do not agree with all 
of the reasoning in Part V of the Court's opinion. I join Parts 
I-IV on the understanding that our dee is ion is limited to the 
type of shoppinq center involvPn in this case. Significantly 
differP.nt questions would be oresentP.d if a State were to 
authorize strangers to picket or leafleteer in Privately-owned, 
free-standing stores and commercial premises. Nor. does our 
decision today apply to all "shopping centers." This generic 
term may include retail establishments that vary widely in size, 
location, and other relevant characteristics. Even larqe 
establishments may be able to show that the number or type of 
persons wishing to speak on their premises wouln create a 
substantial annoyance to customers that could only be eliminated 
by elaborate, expensive, and possibly unenforceable time, place, 
2. 
and manner restrictions. As the Court observes, state power to 
r egulate private property is limited to the ac'loption of 
r e asonable restrictions that "do not amount to a taking without 
just compensation or contravene any other federal constitutional 
provision." Ante, at 6. 
I 
Restrictions on property use, like other state laws, 
also would be the freedom of 
expression 
invalid if they 
and belief protected by 
infringed 
the First and Fourteenth 
Arnendmen ts. In Part V of to¢lay' s a-pinion, the Court rei ect s 
appellants' contention that "a private property owner has a 
First Ai"Tlendment riqht not to be force<'! by the State to use his 
property as a forum for the speech of others." Ante, ;:it 9-10. I 
agree that the owner of this shoooinq center, on the facts 
before us, has failed to establish a cognizable First Amendment 
claim. But some of the languaqe in the Court's a-pinion is 
unnecessarily and perhaps confusingly broad. In my view, state 
action that transforms privately-owne d prope rty into a forum for 
the expression of the public's views would raise serious First 
Amendment questions in many situations. 
A 
The State may not compel a person to affirm a belief 
h e noes not hold. See Wooley v. Ma ynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); 
We st Virginia State Bo a rd of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 
( 1943). Whatever the full sweep of this principle, I no not 
believe that the result in Wooley v. Maynard, supra, would have 
3. 
changed had the State of New Hampshire directed its citizens to 
place the slogan "Live Free or Die" in their shop windows rather 
than on their automobiles. In that case, we said that "[a.) 
system which secures the right to proselytize religious, 
political, and ideological causes must also guarantee the 
concomitant right to decline to foster such concepts . " 4 3 0 
U. S., at 714. This principle on its face protects a person who 
refuses to allow his property to be used as a mr.1r.ketplace for 
the ideas of others. And I can find no reason to exclune the 
owner whose property is "not limited to [his) personal use . 
. " Ante, at 11. A person who has merely invited the public onto 
his property for commercial purposes may not fairly be said to 
have relinquished his right to decline "to be an instrument for 
fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view he 
finds unacceptable." Wooley v . Maynard, supra, at 715.!/ 
As the Court observes, this case involves only a 
state-created right of limited access to a specialized type of 
property. ~ - , at 11, 12 . But even when no particular message 
is mandated by the State, First Amendment interests are affected 
by state action that forces a property owner to qrant access to 
third - party speakers . In both cases, the purpose is to allow 
speech. And in many situations, a right of access will infrinoe 
protected interests no less than speech compelled by the State 
itself. For example, a law that requires a newspnper to permit 
use of its columns by others to exor.ess differing views imposes 
an unacceptable burden upon the newspaper's First Amendment 
4. 
right to select material for publication. Miami Herald 
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). See also 
Columbia Broadcastinq · system, Inc. v. Democratic National 
Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 117 (1973) (J?lurality opinion). Such a 
right of access burdens the affected newspaper's "fundamenta 1 
right 
sul:)ra, 
to aec ide 
at 714; 
what to print or 
see Miami Hera.la 
omit." Wooley_ v. Maynarn, 
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 
supra, at 257. As such, it is tantamount to compelled 
affirmation and thus presumptively unconstitutional.I/ 
The selection of material for publication is not 
generally a concern of shopping centers. But this distinction 
may be irrelevant when views expressed by members of the public 
on commercial property are likely to be identified by listeners 
as the views of the owner. If a stat,;, law mandated public 
access to the bulletin board of a free-standing store, hotel, 
office, or small shopping center, customers miqht wel l 
unaerstand the messages to reflect the views of the proprietor. 
The same would be true if the public were allowed to solicit or 
pamphleteer in the entrance area of a store or in the lobby of a 
private building. The property owner or proprietor would be 
faced with a choice: he could either permit his customers to 
proceed under a mistaken impression or he could disavow the 
messages. Should he take the first 
been compelled to affirm someone 
course, he has effectively 
else's belief. Should he 
choose the second, he has been forced to speak when he would 
prefer to remain silent. In short, he has lost control over his 
5. 
freP.dom to speak or not to speak on certain issues. The mere 
fact that he is free to dissociate himself from the views 
expressed on his property, see ante, at 1 2, cannot restore his 
"right to refrain from speaking at all." Wooley v. Maynard, 
supra, at 714. 
A property owner also may be faced with speakers who 
wish to use his premises as a platform for views that he finns 
morally repugnant. Numerous examples come to mind. A minority-
owned business confronted with leafleteers from the American 
Nazi Party or the Ku Klux Klan, a church-operated enterprise 
asked to host demonstrations in favor of abortion, or a union 
required to supply a forum to right-to-work advocates could be 
placed in an intolerable posit ion if state law requires it to 
make its private property available to anyone who wishes to 
pamphleteer or propagandize. These and like situations may 
evoke such strong emotions as virtually to compel a response. 
This is particularly so when the owner is known to 
have taken a position opposed to the view beinq expressed on his 
property. But an owner also may claim that he stronqly obiP.cts 
to some of the causes to which the state-imposed right of access 
would extenrj, ann that he thPrefore opposPs ideoloqical 
activities "of any sort" that are not re la tea to the purposes 
for which the public is invited onto his property. See Aboon v. 
Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 213, 241 (1977). To 
require him to specify the particular ideas he finds so 
objectionable as to compel a response would force him to 
6. 
relinquish his "freedom to maintain his own beliefs without 
public disclosure." Ibid.l/ Thus, the right to control one's 
own speech may be burdened impermissibly even when listeners 
will not assume that the messages expressed on private property 
are those of the owner .!/ 
II 
One easily may identify other circumstances in which a 
right of access to commercial property would burden the owner's 
First and Fourteenth Amendment right to refrain from speaking. 
But appellants have identified no such circumstance . Nor did 
appellants introduce evidence that would support a holding in 
their favor under either of the leqal theories outlined above. 
On the record before us, I cannot say that customers 
of this vast center ·would be likely to assume that a9pellees' 
limited speech activity expressed the views of the PruneYard or 
of its owner. The shopping center occupies several city blocks . 
It contains more than 65 shops, 10 restaurants, and a theater. 
Interspersed amonq these establishments are common walkways and 
plazas designed to attract the public. See ante, at 1, 8. 
Appellees are high school students who set up their card table 
in one corner of a central courtyard known as the "Grand Plaza." 
Juris. St. B-2 . They showed passersby several petitions and 
solicited signatures. Persons solicited could 
have believed that the petitions embodied the 
not reasonably 
views of the 
shopping center merely because it owned the qround on which they 
stoon. 
7. 
Appella.nts have not alleged that they object to the 
ideas contained in the appellees' petitions. Nor do they assert 
that some groups who might reasonably · be expected to speak at 
the PruneYard will express views that are so obiectionable as to 
require a response even when listeners will not mistake their 
sourc-=?. The record contains no evidenr.e concerning the numbers 
or types of interest groups in the area that may seek access to 
this shopping center, and no testimony that would show that the 
appellants strongly disagree with any of them. 
Because appellants have not shown that the limited 
right of access held to be afforded by the California 
Constitution burdened their First an~ Fourteenth Amendment 
rights in the circumstances presented, I ioin the 
the Court. But I do not interpret our decision 
i udgmen t of 
tooay as a 
blanket approval for state efforts to transform privately-owned 
commercial property into public forums. Any such state action 
would raise substantial federal constitutional questions not 
present in this case. 
l 
FOOTNOTES 
~/ Cf. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 569 
( 1972) ( "property [does not] lose its private character merely 
because the public is generally invited to use it for designated 
purposes"). 
2/ Even if a person's own speech is not affected by a 
riqht of access to his property, a requirement that he lend 
support to the expression of a third party's views may burden 
irnperrn i ss ibly the f reedorns of association and belief protected 
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. In Abood v. Detroit 
Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 235 (1977), we held tha.t a 
State may not constitutionally requin~ a person "to contribute 
to the suoport of an ideological cause he may oppose • 
To require a landowner to supply a forum for causes he 
" 
finds 
objectionable also might be an unacceptable "compelled 
subsidization" in some circumstances. 431 U.S., at 237. Cf. 
Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 543-545 (1972) 
( "property rights" may permit exclusion of union orqanizers): 
NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956) (same); 
see generally Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 
(1978): Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 521-522 




claimed right to exclude speakers from their property. Nor havP. 
they alleged that they disagree with the messaqes at issue in 
this case. See infra .=i.t 
3/ The 
shoppinq 
problem is compounded where, 





several stores are leased to and operated by different 
proprietors with divergent views. 
. , ' FN2. 
_!/ In a proper case, the property owner also may be 
protected by the principle that "a State has no business telling 
a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or 
what films he may watch . " Stanley' v . Georgia, 394 U.S . 557 
(1969). Observing that a State has no inter.est in controlling 
the moral content of a person's thoughts, id . , at 565, the Court 
in Stanley invalidated a law imposing criminal penalties for the 
private possession of obscenity . Stanley prevents a State from 
removing from the home expressive materials that a pP.r son may 
wish to peruse privately. The same principle may extend to 
state efforts to force individual exposure to third-party 
messages . Thus , a law that required homeowners to permit 
speakers to congregate on their. front lawns would be a massive 
and possibl y unconstitutional intrusion into personal privacy 
and freedom of belief . No such problem is .i.mpJ. i ca ted in this 
cas e . 
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MR. ;JuSTJ/CE ROWELL, concurring in part and in .th.e 
judgment. · 
Although 1 join the judgment, I do nqt agree with all of tq.e 
reasoning in Part V of the Court's opinion. I join Parts I-IV 
on the understanding that our decision is limited to the type of 
shopping center involved in this case. Significantly different 
questions would be presented if a State were to authorize 
strangers to picket or leafleteer in privately owned, free-
standing stores and commercial premises. Nor does our deci,. 
sion today apply to all "shopping centers." This generic term 
may include retail establishments that vary widely in size, 
location, and other relevant characteristics. Even large estab-
lishments may be able to show that the number or type of 
persons wishing to speak on their premises would create a sub-· 
stantial annoyance to customers that could only be eliminated 
by elaborate, expensive, and possibly unenforceable time, 
place, and manner restrictions. As the Court observes, state 
power to regulate private property is limited to the adoption 
of reasonable restrictions that "do not amount to a taking 
without just compensation or contravene any other federal 
constitutional provision." Ante, at 6. 
I 
Restrictions on property use, like other state laws, also 
would be invalid if they infringed the freedom of expression 
and belief protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 
/ 
'19-289-CONCUR (A) 
2 PRUNEYARD SHOPPING CENTER v. ROBrN~ 
In Part V of today's opinion, the Court rejects appellants' 
contention that "a private property owner has a First Amend~ 
ment right not to be forced by the State to use his property 
as a forum for the speech of others." Ante, at 9-10. I agree 
tha.t the owner of this shopping center, on the facts before us, 
has failed to establish a cognizable First Amendment claim. 
But some of the language in the Court's opinion is unneces .. 
sarily and perhaps confusingly broad. In my view, state 
action that transforms privately owned property into a forum 
for the expression of the public's views would raise serious 
First Amendment questions in many situations. 
A 
The State may not compel a person to affirm a belief he 
does not hold. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); 
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 
624 (1943). Whatever the full sweep of this principle, I do 
not believe that the result in Wooley v. Maynard, supra, would 
have changed had the State of New Hampshire directed its 
citizens to place the slogan "Live Free or Die" in their shop 
windows rather than on their automobiles. In that case, we 
said that " [a] system which secures the right to proselytize 
religious, political, and ideological causes must also guarantee 
the concomitant right to decline to foster such concepts." 430 
U. S., at 714. This principle on its face protects a person who 
refuses to allow his property to be used as a marketplace for 
the ideas of others. And I can find no reason to exclude the 
owner whose property is "not limited to [his] personal 
use .. , ." Ante, at 11.. A person who has merely invited the 
public onto his property for commercial purposes may not 
fairly be said to have relinquished his right to decline "to be 
an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological 
point of view he finds unacceptable." Wooley v. Maynard, 
supra, at 715.1 
1 Cf. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U. S. 551, 569 (1972) ("property 
I ·, 
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As the Court observes, this case involves only a state-created 
right of limited a.ccess to a specialized type of property. Id., 
at 11, 12. But even when no particular message is mandated 
by the State, First Amendment interests are affected by state 
action that forces a property owner to grant access to third-
party speakers. In both cases, the purpose is to allow speech. 
And in many situations, a right of access will infringe pro-
tected interests no less than speech compelled by the State 
itself. For example, a law that requires a newspaper to per-
mit use of its columns by others to express differing views 
imposes an unacceptable burden upon the newspaper's First 
Amendment right to select material for publication. Miami 
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241 ( 1974). See 
also Columbia Broa.doasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Na-
tional Committee, 412 U. S. 94, 117 (1973) (plurality opin-
ion) . Such a right of a.ccess burdens the affected newspaper1s 
"fundamental right to decide what to print or omit." Wooley 
v. Maryland, supra, at 714; see Miami Herald Publishing Co. 
v. Tornillo, supra, at 257. As such, it is tantamount to com-
pelled affirmation and thus presumptively unconstitutional.2 
[does not] lose its private character merely because the public is generally 
invited to use it for designated purposes"). 
2 Even if a person's own speech is not affected by a right of access to 
his property, a requirement that he lend support to the expression of a 
third party's views may burden impermissibly the freedoms of association 
and belief protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. In Abood 
v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U. S. 209, 235 (1977) , we held that a 
State may not constitutionally require a person "to contribute to the sup-
port of an ideological cause he may oppose .... " To require a landowner 
to supply a forum for causes he finds objectionable also might be an 
unacceptable "compelled subsidization" in some circumstances. 431 U. S., 
at 237. Cf. Central, Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 543-545 (1972) 
("property rights" may permit exclusion of union organizers); NLRB v. 
Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U. S. 105, 112 (1956) (same); see generally 
Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U. S. 556, 571-576 (1978); Hudgens v. NLRB, 
424 U. S. 507, 521-522 (1976). The appellants do not argue, however, 
that Abood supports the claimed right to exclude speakers from their 
79-289-CONCUR (A) 
4 PRUNEYARD SHOPPING CENTER v. ROBINS 
The selection of material for publication is not generally a 
concern of shopping centers. But this distinction may be 
irrelevant when views expressed by members of the public 
on commercial property are likely to be identified by listeners 
as the views of the owner. If a state law mandated public 
access to the bulletin board of a freestanding store, hotel, 
office, or small shopping center, customers might well under-
stand the messages to reflect the views of the proprietor. 
The same would be true if the public were allowed to solicit or 
pamphleteer in the entrance area of a store or in the lobby 
of a private building. The property owner or proprietor 
would be faced with a choice: he could either permit his cus-
tomers to proceed under a mistaken impression or he could 
disavow the messages. Should he take the first course, he 
has effectively been compelled to affirm someone else's belief. 
Should he choose the second, he has been forced to speak 
when he would prefer to remain silent. In short, he has lost 
control over his freedom to speak or not to speak or certain 
issues. The mere fact that he is free to dissociate himself 
from the views expressed on his property, see ante, at 12, can-
not restore his "right to refrain from speaking at all." Wooley 
v. Maynard, supra, a,t 714. 
A property owner also may be faced with speakers who 
wish to use his premises as a pla,tform for views that he finds 
morally repugnant. Numerous examples come to mind. A 
minority-owned business confronted with leafleteers from the 
American Nazi Party or the Ku Klux Klan, a church-operated 
enterprise asked to host demonstrations in favor of abortion, 
or a union required to supply a forum to right-to-work advo-
cates could be placed in an intolerable position if state law 
requires it to make its private property available to anyone 
who wishes to pamphleteer or propagandize. These and like 
situations may evoke such strong emotions as virtually to com-
pel a response. 
property. Nor have they alleged that they disagree with the messages at 
issue in this case. See infra, at -. • 
79-289-CONCUR (A) 
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This is particularly so when the owner is known to have 
taken a position opposed to the view being expressed on his 
property. But an owner also may c'laim that he strongly 
objects to some of the causes to which the state-imposed right 
of access would extend, and that he therefore opposes ideologi-
cal activities "of any sort" that are not related to the purposes 
for which the public is invited onto his property. See Abood 
v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 213, 241 ( 1977). 
To require him to specify the particular ideas he finds so 
objectionable as to compel a response would force him to 
relinquish his "freedom to maintain his own beliefs without 
public disclosure." lbid.3 Thus, the right to control one's 
own speech may be burdened impermissibly even when lis-
teners will not assume that the messages expressed on private 
property are those of the owner.4 
II 
One easily may identify other circumstances in which a 
right of access to commercial property would burden the own-
er's First and Fourteenth Amendment right to refrain from 
speaking. But appellants have identified no such circum-
3 The problem is compounded where, as in many smaller shopping cen-
t ers or in the lobby areas of hotels, several stores are leased to and operat ed 
by different proprietors with divergent views. 
4 In a proper case, the property owner also may be protected by the 
principle that "a Sta te has no business t elling a man, sit6ng alone in his 
own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch." Stanely 
v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557 (1969). Observing that a State has no interest 
in cont rolling the moral content of a person's thoughts, id , a.t 565, the 
Court in Stanley invalidated a law imposing criminal penalties for the 
private possession of obscenity. Stanely prevents a State from removing 
from the home expressive materials that a person may wish to peruse 
privately. The same prin ciple may extend to state effort s to force individ-
ual exposure to third-party messages. Thus, a law that required home-
owners to permit speakers to congregate on their front lawns would be a 
massive and possibly unconstitutional intrusion into personal privacy and 
freedom of belief. No such problem is implicated in this case. 
79-289-CONCUR (A) 
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stance. Nor did appellants introduce evidence that would 
support a holding in their favor under either of the legal 
theories outlined above. 
On the record before us, I cannot say that customers of this 
vast center would be likely to assume that appellees' limited 
speech activity expressed the views of the Prune Yard or of 
its owner. The shopping center occupies several city blocks. 
It contains more than 65 shops, 10 restaurants, and a theater. 
Interspersed among these establishments a.re common walk-
ways and plazas designed to attract the public. See ante, at 
1, 8. Appellees are high school students who set up their 
card table in one corner of a central courtyard known as the 
"Grand Plaza." Juris. St. B-2. They showed passersby sev-
eral petitions and solicited signatures. Persons solicited 
could not reasonably have believed that the petitions em-
bodied the views of the shopping center merely because it 
owned the ground on which they stood. 
Appellants have not alleged that they object to the ideas 
contained in the appellees' petitions. Nor do they assert that 
some groups who might reasonably be expected to speak at 
the Prune Yard will express views that a.re so objectionable as 
to require a response even when listeners will not mistake 
their source. The record contains no evidence concerning the 
numbers or types of interest groups in the area that may seek 
access to this shopping center, and no testimony that would 
show that the appellants strongly disagree with any of them. 
Because appellants have not shown that the limited right 
of access held to be afforded by the California Constitution 
burdened their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights in 
the circumstances presented, I join the judgment of the Court. 
But I do not interpret our decision today as a blanket approval 
for state efforts to transform privately owned commercial 
property into public forums. Any such state action would 
raise substantial federal constitutional questions not present 
in this case. 
Q-~-,3 ~ 
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MR. JusTICE POWELL, concurring in part and in the 
judgment. 
~ 
Although I join the judgment, I do not agree with all of the 
reasoning in Part V of the Court's opinion. I join Parts I-IV 
on the understanding that our decision is limited to the type of 
shopping center involved in this case. Significantly different __[.. J.. 
questions would be presented if a State ii 111 o te authorize[ L 
strangers to picket or lea.fieteer in privately~[- _ _ 
standing stores and commercial premises. Nor does our deci-
sion today apply to all "shopping centers." This generic term 
may include retail establishments that vary widely in size, 
location, and other relevant characteristics. Even large estab-
lishments may be able to show that the number or type of 
persons wishing to speak on their premises would create a sub-
stantial annoyance to customers that could only be eliminated I tr. 
by elaborate, expensive, and possibly unenforcea le time, 
place, and manner restrictions. As the Court observes, state 
power to regulate private property is limited to the adoption 
of reasonable restrictions that "do not amount to a taking 
without just compensation or contravene any other federal 
,c.QP.stitutiona.l provision." Ante, at 6. 
Restrictions on property u~e, like other state laws, ~ 
·wQYla ~ invalid if they infringed the freedom of expression 
~ belief protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendm~ 
~tt 
79-289-CONCUR (A) 
2 PRUNEYARD SHOPPING CENTER v. ROBINS 
In Part V of today's opinion, the Court rejects appellants' 
contention that "a private property owner has a First Amend-
ment right not to be forced by the State to use his property 
as a forum for the speech of others." Ante, at 9-10. I agree 
{§_at the owner of this shopping center(en tfl:e tite+ie bdme 'deJ--r . 
has failed to establish a cognizable First Amendment claim~" +IA,s 
But some of the language in the Court's opinion is unneces-
~. 
sarily and perhaps confusingly broad. In my view, state 
action that transforms privately owned property into a forum G 
for the expression of the public's views f uld raise serious C-
. t Amendment questions~n B'la.BY sitYa.tioas. 
• 
The State may not compel a person to affirm a belief he 
does not hold. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U. S. 705 (1977); 
West Virginw State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 
624 (1943). Wha.tever the full sweep of this principle, I do 
not believe that the result in Wooley v. Maynard, supra, would 
have changed had the State of New Hampshire directed its 
citizens to place the slogan "Live Free or Die" in their shop 
windows rather than on their automobiles. In that case, we 
said that " [a] system which secures the right to proselytize 
religious, political. and ideological causes must also guarantee 
the concomitant right to decline to foster such concepts." 430 
U.S., at 714. This principle on its face protects a person who 
refuses to allow~is property t6 t., .,;u~ as a marketplace for 
the ideas of others. And I can find no reason to exclude the 
owner whose property is "not limited to [his] personal 
use .... " Ante, at 11. A person who has merely invited the 
public onto his property for commercial purposes ~ ~ -{ ~ -
fairly be said to have relinquished his right to decline "to be 
an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological 
point of view he finds unacceptable." Wooley v. Maynard, 
supra, at 715:1 
:icf. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 -U. S. 551, 569 (1972) ("property 
c:::r 
79-289-CONCUR (A) 
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As the Court observes, this case involves only a state-created 
right of limited access to a specialized type of property. Id., 
at 11 , 12. But even when no particular message is mandated 
by the State, First Amendment interests are affected by stat ~M\ t-
action that forces a property owner to §i;oRt 11. @0ii!li!l te third-
party speakers. , · ~ . s 
X 
\>A\v~~iv-e.. l I ~ l,n many situations, a right of access will iHfr:inge J3~ \ 
teeted interest :!! no less).than speech compe led by the State • • ~ 
itself. For example, a law tMt reeruir es a newspaper per- (~w})., ~ 
~ use • its columns Ilg atl Hfl t e @nfffQi!l i!l '1ift:m;i;,;;i g uiliVir.il 
imposes an unacceptable burden upon the newspaper's First 
Amendment right to select material for publication. Miami 
Heraid Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241 (1974). See 
also Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Na-
tional Committee, 412 U. S. 94, 117 (1973) (plurality opin-
ion). Such a right of access burdens the afh@tieti newspaper's 
}\ J l "fundamental right to decide what to print or omit." Wooley 
. °'~.1\1.l_fi J I v) ftlll"!Jitlln;tl, supm, at 714; see Miami Herald Publishing Co. 
v. Tornillo, supra, at 257. As such, it is tantamount to com- [ ) 
£:lled affirmation and.Jffius"'}Presumptively unconstitutiona.I.2 -1 -~ 
~--J [does not] lose its privat e character merely because the public is generally .----- -invited to use it for designated pur~ ") . ~ 
2 Even if a person;s own speech is not affected by a right of access to 
his property, a requirement that he lend support to the expression of a 
third party's views may burden impennissibly the freedoms of association 
and belief protected b:v the First and Fourteenth Amendments. In Abood 
v.... Detroit Board of Education, 431 U. S. 209, 235 (1977) , we held that a 
State may not eaBstittttieit1t1 lb require a person "to cont ribute to the stip-
port of an ideological cause he may oppose . .. . " To require a landowner 
to supply a forum for causes he finds objectionable also might be an 
unacceptable "compelled subsidization" in some circumstances. 431 U. S., 
t 237) jtf. Central Hardware Co . v. NLRB, 407 U. S. 539, 543-545 (1972) 
("property rights" may permit exclusion of union organizers); NLRB v. / 
Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U. S. 105, 112 (1956) (same) I ~ee generally -P.. f(a.P. , 
Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U. S. 556, 571-576 (1978); Hudgens v. NLRB, - l 
424 U. S. 507, 521-522 (1976). The appellants do not argue, however, 
that Abood supports the claimed right to exclude speakers from thefr 
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The selection of material for publication is not generally a 
coi-icern of shopping centers. But ll il!I ei.if frlft ffla;" @; 
wreh ml ,. ft@Rt,ISiT! expressed by members of the public 
on commercial property 8N-lih1y ·t1 1 s · Jg ,i& .-1 1.ydiie~ft 
as the views of the owner. If a state law mandated public 
access to the bulletin board of a freestanding store, hotel, 
Cofl~ 'tWX:t ~or small shopping center, customers might well~ 
) I ~ the messages ~ reflect the views of the proprietor. 
The same would be true if the public were allowed to solicit or 
pamphleteer in the entrance area of a store or in the lobby 
of a private building. The property owner or proprietor 
• ~ \ would be faced with a choice: he~ermit his cus-
f'-t,to_.1,; r 
I 
omers to p'F8Q~9Q lHIQQF a mistaken impression or he could 
disavow the messages. Should he take the first course, he 
~ -• 
Qias !effectivelyj been compelled to affirm someone else's belief. 
Should he choose the second, he has been forced to speak 
when he would prefer to remain silent. In short, he has lost -[-
££)ntrol ?ver his freedom to speak or not to speak oJ certain '"" 
issues. The mere fact that he is free to dissociate himself 
from the views expressed on his property, see ante . at 12. can-
not restore his "right to refrain from speaking at all." Wooley 
v. Maynard, supra, at 714. 
A property owner also may be faced with speakers who 
wish to use his premises as a platform for views that he finds 
morally repugnant. Numerous examples come to mind. A 
minority-owned business confronted with leafleteers from the 
American Nazi Party or the Ku Klux Klan, a church-operated ~ 
enterprise asked to host demonstrations in favor of abortion, _ ( ~fl\ 
or a union Feqtjired_\t? supply a forum to right-to-work aavo- t~ 
cates could be placed in an intolerable position if state law 
quires it to make its private property _available to any~ne ~.Stvo~ 
wno wishes to}~Ultphhl E AF propsgel'ld:we- ~~~~~'9-- hcrl\~ ~ 
l!i-9¥ .,,.~ff -•lion,., ..,...oil!< 1<1.cA!IL- ;o~r-o-c.l,,. ill . 
5~~<:J,M...I 
property. Nor have they alleged that they disagree with the messages at 
issue in this case. See infra, at - : -MIJ._~,r~ 
t() ¼L 
iOf ~~ +o 
k it\v,kd] 
~~r 
~ T~ flN-S5WUL 4o res 
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[Thi~ is ~M~ietdtuly so- when the / owner is !ER8WM: t0 ha~ 
taken a position opposed to the view being expressed on his 
property. But an owner ,a.los HMt,y @1B.in,: ~hret hefstrongly 
objects to some of the causes to which the state-imposed righ~ 
of access would extencfattd t;ha:t he flfl8r8£Qf ppose; iaeoTog~ Mtl-j 
cal activities "of any sort" that are not rela to the purposes 
for whichAthe public j · ·1 l onto his property. See Abood 
v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 213, 241 (1977). 
To reqmre-:»-im to specify the particular ideas he finds -
object~• to compel a response would force him to 
relinquish his "freedom to maintain his own beliefs without 
public disclosure." lbid. 3 Thus, the right to control one's 
own speech may be burdened impermissibly even when lis-
~ ners will not assume that the messages expressed on private 
property are those of the owner.4 
1--- II CfWv - One easily)~ identify other Gircumstances in which a 
~5b5.J---
right of access to commercial property would burden the own-
er's First and Fourteenth Amendment right to refrain from 
speaking. But appellants have identified no such circum-
8 The problem is compounded where, as in many smaller shopping cen-
t ers or in the lobby areas of hotels, several stores are leased to ~Pd oµeptea 
different proprietors with divergent views. 
4 In a proper case, the property owner also may be protected by the 
E_rinciple that "a State has no business telling a man, sit6ng alon~ inf["· 
own house. what books e may read or what films he may watch." Sta 
V. G~ia, 394 U. S. 5~ (1969 ) . Observing that a State has no inte est c· l!) 'd 
in controlling the moral content of a person's thoughts, -i,t/;, s,t 565-, t e !...!-'.? 
Court in Stanley invalidated a !awl· osing criminal enalties for the 
private possession of obscenity. Sta prevents n State from removing t y 
from the home expressive materials t 1at a person may wish to peruse ~ovt ~ -~ 
privately. The same principle may extend to state ~ft~r.c;J individ-
ual exposure to third-party messages. Thus, a law that requirec:I home-
owners to permit speakers to congregate on their front lawns would be a 
massive and possibly unconstitutional intrusion into personal privacy and f , 
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stance. Nor did appellants introduce evidence that woul~ 
support a holding in their favor under either of the legal 
theories outlined above. 
On the record before us, I cannot say that customers of this 
vast center would be likely to assume that a.ppellees' limited 
speech activity expressed the views of the Prune Ya.rd or of 
its owner. The shopping center occupies several city blocks. 
It contains more than 65 shops, IO restaurants, and a theater. 
Interspersed among these establishments a.re common walk,. 
ways and plazas designed to attract the public. See ante, at 
1, 8. Appellees are high school students who set up their 
!l_ard table in one corner of a central courtyard known as the 
"Grand Plaza." Juris. S~ B-2. They showed passersby sev-
eral petitions and solicited signatures. Persons solicited 
could not reasonably have believed that the petitions em-
.2,odied the views of the shopping center merely because it 
owned the ground on which they stood. 
Appellants have not alleged that they object to the ideas 
contained in the appellees' petitions. Nor do they assert that 
some groups who ;fuight\_ reasonabl~be expected to speak at 
the Prune Yard will express views t at are so objectionable as 
to require a response even when listeners will not mistake 
their source. The record contains no evidence concerning the -numbers or types of interest groups ~n tJ u that may seek 
access to this shopping center, and no testimony teat, wottlel 
i§lww.) that the appellants strongly disagree with any of them. 
Because appellants have not shown that the limited right 
of a.ccess held to be afforded by the California Constitution 
burdened their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights in 
the circumstances presented, I join the judgment of the Court. 
ii.,;, I do not interpret our decision today as a blanket approval 
ft>r state efforts to transform privately j owned commercrnl 
property into public forums. Any such state action would 
raise substantial federal constitutional questions not present 
in this case. 
.. - -
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring in part and in the 
judgment. 
Although I join the judgment, I do not agree with all of the 
reasoning in Part V of the Court's opinion. I join Parts I-IV 
on the understanding that our decision is limited to the type of 
shopping center involved in this case. Significantly different 
questions would be presented if a State authorized strangers 
to picket or leafleteer in privately-owned, freestanding stores 
and commercial premises. Nor does our decision today apply 
to all "shopping centers." This generic term may include 
retail establishments tha.t vary widely in size, location, and 
other relevant characteristics. Even large establishments may 
be able to show that the number or type of persons wishing to 
speak on their premises would create a substantial annoy-
ance to customers that could be eliminated only by elaborate, 
expensive, and possibly unenforceable time, place, and manner 
restrictions. As the Court observes, state power to regulate 
priva.te property is limited to the adoption of reasonable 
restrictions that "do not amount to a taking without just 
compensation or contravene any other federal constitutional 
provision." Ante, at 6. 
I 
Restrictions on property use, like other state laws, are 
invalid if they infringed the freedom of expression and 
belief protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 
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In Part V of today's opinion, the Court rejects appellants' 
contention that "a private property owner has a First Amend-
ment right not to be forced by the State to use his property 
as a forum for the speech of others." Ante, at 9-10. I agree 
that the owner of this shopping center has failed to establish 
a cognizable First Amendment claim in this case. But some 
of the language in the Court's opinion is unnecessarily and 
perhaps confusingly broad. In my view, state action that 
transfonns privately owned property into a forum for the 
expression of the public's views could raise serious First 
Amendment questions. 
The State may not compel a person to affirm a belief he 
does not hold. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); 
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 
624 ( 1943). Whatever the full sweep of this principle, I do 
not believe that the result in Wooley v. Maynard, supra, would 
have changed had the State of New Hampshire directed its 
citizens to place the slogan "Live Free or Die" in their shop 
windows rather than on their automobiles. In that case, we 
said that "[a] system which secures the right to proselytize 
religious, political, and ideological ca.uses must also guarantee 
the concomitant right to decline to foster such concepts." 430 
U. S., at 714. This principle on its face protects a person who 
refuses to allow use of his property as a marketplace for 
the ideas of others. And I can find no reason to exclude the 
owner whose property is "not limited to [his] personal 
use .... " Ante, at 11. A person who has merely invited the 
public onto his property for commercial purposes cannot 
fairly be said to have relinquished his right to decline "to be 
an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological 
point of view he finds unacceptable." Wooley v. Maynard, 
supra, at 715.1 
1 Cf. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U. S. 551, 569 (1972) ("property 
[does not] lose its private character merely because the public is generally 
inyited to use it for designated purposes .... ") . 
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As the Court observes, this case involves only a state-created 
right of limited a.ccess to a specialized type of property. Id., 
at 11, 12. But even when no particular message is mandated 
by the State, First Amendment interests are affected by state 
action that forces a property owner to admit third-party 
speakers. In many situations, a right of access is no less 
intrusive than speech compelled by the State itself. For 
example, a law requiring that a newspaper pennit others to 
use its columns imposes an unacceptable burden upon the 
newspaper's First Amendment right to select material for 
publication. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 
U. S. 241 (1974). See also Columbia Broadcasting System, 
Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S. 94, 117 
(1973) (plurality opinion). Such a right of access burdens 
the newspaper's "fundamental right to decide what to print 
or omit." Wooley v. Maynard, supra, at 714; see Miami 
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, supra, at 257. As such, 
it is tantamount to compelled affirmation and, thus, presump-
tively unconstitutional.2 
The selection of material for publication is not generally a 
2 Even if a person's own speech is not affected by a right of access to 
his property, a requirement that he lend support to the expression o-f a 
third party's views may burden impermissibly the freedoms of association 
and belief protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. In Abood 
v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 235 (1977), we held that a 
State may not r,equire a person "to contribute to the support of an 
ideological cause he may oppose. . . ." To require a landowner to 
supply a forum for causes he finds objectionable also might be an unac-
ceptable "compelled subsidization" in some circumstances. 431 U. S., 
at 237; cf. Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U. S. 539, 543-545 (1972) 
("property rights" may permit exclusion of union organizers); NLRB v. 
Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956) (same). See generally 
Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U. S. 556, 571-576 (1978); Hudgens v. NLRB, 
424 U. S. 507, 521-522 (1976). The appellants do not argue, however, 
that Abood supports the claimed right to exclude speakers from their 
property. Nor have they alleged that they disagree with the messages at 
issue in this case. See infra, at -. 
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concern of shopping centers. But similar speech interests are 
affected when listeners are likely to identify opinions expressed 
by members of the public on commercial property as the 
views of the owner. If a state law mandated public access to 
the bulletin board of a freestanding store, hotel, office, or 
small shopping center, customers might well conclude that 
the messages reflect the view of the proprietor. The same 
would be true if the public were allowed to solicit or pam-
phleteer in the entrance area of a store or in the lobby of 
a private building. The property owner or proprietor would 
be faced with a choice: he either could permit his customers 
to receive a mistaken impression or he could disavow the 
messages. Should he take the first course, he effectively 
has been compelled to affirm someone else's belief. Should 
he choose the second, he has been forced to speak when 
he would prefer to remain silent. In short, he has lost 
control over his freedom to speak or not to speak on certain 
issues. The mere fact that he is free to dissociate himself 
from the views expressed on his property, see ante, at 12, can-
not restore his "right to refrain from speaking at all." Wooley 
v. Maynard, supra, at 714. 
A property owner also may be faced with speakers who 
wish to use his premises as a platform for views that he finds 
morally repugnant. Numerous examples come to mind. A 
minority-owned business confronted with leafleteers from the 
American Nazi Party or the Ku Klux Klan, a church-operated 
enterprise asked to host demonstrations in favor of abortion, 
or a union compelled to supply a forum to right-to-work advo-
cates could be placed in an intolerable position if state law 
requires it to make its private property available to anyone 
who wishes to speak. The strong emotions evoked by speech 
in such situations may virtually compel the proprietor to· 
respond. 
The pressure to respond is particularly apparent when the 
owner has taken a position opposed to the view being ex-
pressed on his property. But an owner who strongly objects 
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to some of the causes to which the state-imposed right of 
access would extend may oppose ideological activities "of any 
sort" that are not related to the purposes for which he invited 
the public onto his property. See Abood v. Detroit Board of 
Education, 431 U. S. 209, 213, 241 (1977). To require the 
owner to specify the particular ideas he finds objectionable 
enough to compel a response would force him to relinquish 
his "freedom to maintain his own beliefs without public 
disclosure." lbid.3 Thus, the right to control one's own 
speech may be burdened impermissibly even when listeners 
will not assume that the messages expressed on private 
property are those of the owner.4 
II 
One easily can identify other circumstances in which a 
right of access to commercial property would burden the own-
er's First and Fourteenth Amendment right to refrain from 
speaking. But appellants have identified no such circum-
stance. Nor did appellants introduce evidence that would 
support a holding in their favor under either of the legal 
theories outlined above. 
3 The problem is compounded where, as in many smaller shopping cen-
ters or in the lobby areas of hotels, several stores are leased to different 
proprietors with divergent views. 
4 In a proper case, the property owner also may be protected by the 
principle that "a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his 
own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch." Stanley 
v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 565 (1969). Observing that a State has no 
interest in controlling the moral content of a person's thoughts, ibid., the 
Court in Stanley invalidated a law imposing criminal penalties for the 
private possession of obscenity. Stanley prevents a State from removing 
from the home expressive materials that a person may wish to peruse 
privately. The same principle may extend to state action that forces 
individual exposure to t11ird-party messages. Thus, a law that required 
homeowners to permit speakers to congregate on their front lawns would 
be a massive and possibly unconstitutional intrusion into personal privacy 
and freedom of belief. No such problem arises in this case. 
• 
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\. 
On the record before us, I cannot say that customers of this 
vast center would be likely to assume that appellees' limited 
speech activity expressed the views of the Prune Yard or of 
its owner. The shopping center occupies several city blocks. 
It contains more than 65 shops, 10 restaurants, and a theater. 
Interspersed among these establishments are common walk-
ways and plazas designed to attract the public. See ante, at 
1, 8. Appellees are high school students who set up their 
card table in one corner of a central courtyard known as the 
"Grand Plaza." Juris. Statement B-2. They showed pass-
ersby several petitions and solicited signatures. Persons 
solicited could not reasonably have believed that the petitions 
embodied the views of the shopping center merely because it 
owned the ground on which they stood. 
Appellants have not alleged that they object to the ideas 
contained in the appellees' petitions. Nor do they assert that 
some groups who reasonably might be expected to speak at 
the Prune Yard will express views that are so objectionable as 
to require a response even when listeners will not mistake 
their source. The record contains no evidence concerning the 
numbers or types of interest groups that may seek access to 
this shopping center, and no testimony showing that the 
appellants strongly disagree with any of them. 
Because appellants have not shown that the limited right 
of access held to be afforded by the California Constitution 
burdened their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights in 
the circumstances presented, I join the judgment of the Court. 
I do not interpret our decision today as a blanket approval 
for state efforts to transform privately-owned commercial 
property into public forums. Any such state action would 
raise substantial federal constitutional questions not present 
in this case. 
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MR. JusTICE POWELL, concurring in part and in the 
judgment. 
Although I join the judgment, I do not agree with all of the 
reasoning in Part V of the Court's opinion. I join Parts I-IV 
on the understanding that our decision is limited to the type of 
shopping center involved in this case. Significantly different 
questions would be presented if a State authQD2;ed strangers 
to picket or leafleteer in private! owned, freestanding stores 
and commercial premises. Nor do s our decision today apply 
to all "shopping centers." This generic term may include 
retail establishments that vary widely in size, location, and 
other relevant charact~ristics. Even large establishments may 
be able to show that the number or type of persons wishing to 
speak on their premises would create a substantial annoy-
ance to customers that could be eliminated only by elaborate, 
expensive, and possibly unenforceable time, place, and manner 
restrictions. As the Court observes, state power to regulate 
private property is limited to the adoption of reasonable 
restrictions that "do not amount to a taking without just 
compensation or contravene any other federal constitutional 
provision." Ante, at 6. 
I 
_ Restiie · ro erty use, like other state laws, are 
invalid if they infringe the freedom of_ expression and 
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In Part V of today's opinion, the Court rejects appellants' 
contention that "a private property owner has a First Amend-
ment right not to be forced by the State to use his property 
as a forum for the speech of others." Ante, at 9-10. I agree 
that the owner of this shopping center has failed to establish 
a cognizable First Amendment claim in this case. But some 
of the language in the Court's opinion is unnecessarily and 
perhaps confusingly broad. In my view, state action that 
transforms privately owned property into a forum for the 
expression of the public's views could raise serious First 
Amendment questions. 
The State may not compel a person to affirm a belief he 
does not hold. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U. S. 705 (1977); 
West Virgini,a State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 
624 ( 1943). Whatever the full sweep of this principle, I do 
not believe tha.t the result in Wooley v. Maynard, supra, would 
have changed had the State of New Hampshire directed its 
citizens to place the slogan "Live Free or Die" in their shop 
windows rather than on their automobiles. In that case, we 
said that "[a] system which secures the right to proselytize 
religious, political, and ideological causes must also guarantee 
the concomitant right to decline to foster such concepts." 430 
U. S., at 714. This principle on its face protects a person who 
refuses to allow use of his property as a marketplace for 
the ideas of others. And I can find no reason to exclude the 
owner whose property is "not limited to [his] personal 
use .... " Ante, at 11. A person who has merely invited the 
public onto his property for commercial purposes cannot 
fairly be said to have relinquished his right to decline "to be 
an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological 
point of view he finds unacceptable." Wooley v. Maynard, 
supra, at 715.1 
1 Cf. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U. S. 551, 569 (1972) ("property 
[does not] lose its private character merely because the public is generally 
invited to use it for designated purposes .... "), 
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As the Court observes, this case involves only a state-created 
right of limited a.ccess to a specialized type of property. Id., 
at 11, 12. But even when no particular message is mandated 
by the State, First Amendment interests are affected by state 
action that forces a property owner to admit third-party 
speakers. In many situations, a right of access is no less 
intrusive than speech compelled by the State itself. For 
example, a law requiring that a newspaper permit others to 
use its columns imposes an unacceptable burden upon the 
newspaper's First Amendment right to select material for 
publication. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 
U. S. 241 (1974). See also Columbia Broadcasting System, 
Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S. 94, 117 
(1973) (plurality opinion). Such a right of access burdens 
the newspaper's "fundamental right to decide what to print 
or omit." Wooley v. Maynard, supra, at 714; see Miami 
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, supra, at 257. As such, 
it is tantamount to compelled affirmation and, thus, presump-
tively unconstitutional.2 
The selection of material for publication is not generally a 
2 Even if a person's own speech is not affected by a right of access to 
his property, a requirement that he lend support to the expression o-f a 
third party's views may burden impermissibly the freedoms of association 
and belief protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. In Abood 
v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U. S. 209 , 235 (1977), we held that a 
State may not require a person "to contribute to the support of an 
ideological cause he may oppose .... " To require a landowner to 
supply a forum for causes he finds objectionable also might be an una,c-
ceptable "compelled subsidization" in some circumstances. 431 U. S., 
at 237; cf. Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U. S. 539, 543-545 (1972) 
("property rights" may permit exclusion of union organizers); NLRB v. 
Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956) (same). See generally 
Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U. S. 556, 571-576 (1978); Hudgens v. NLRB, 
424 U. S. 507, 521-522 (1976). The appellants do not argue, however, 
that Abood supports the claimed right to exclude speakers from their 
property. Nor have they alleged that they disagree with the messages at 
issue in this case. See infra, at -. 
. . 
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concern of shopping centers. But similar speech interests are 
affected when listeners are likely to identify opinions expressed 
by members of the public on commercial property as the 
views of the owner. If a state law mandated public access to 
the bulletin board of a freestanding store, hotel, office, or 
small shopping center, customers might well conclude that 
the messages reflect the view of the proprietor. The same 
would be true if the public were allowed to solicit or pam-
phleteer in the entrance area of a store or in the lobby of 
a private building. The property owner or proprietor would 
be faced with a choice: he either could permit his customers 
to receive a mistaken impression or he could disavow the 
messages. Should he take the first course, he effectively 
has been compelled to affirm someone else's belief. Should 
he choose the second, he has been forced to speak when 
he would prefer to remain silent. In short, he has lost 
control over his freedom to speak or not to speak on certain 
issues. The mere fact that he is free to dissociate himself 
from the views expressed on his property, see ante , at 12, can-
not restore his "right to refrain from speaking at all." Wooley 
v. Maynard, supra, at 714. 
A property owner also may be faced with speakers who 
wish to use his premises as a platform for views that he finds 
morally repugnant. Numerous examples come to mind. A 
minority-owned business confronted with leafleteers from the 
American Nazi Party or the Ku Klux Klan, a church-operated 
enterprise asked to host demonstrations in favor of abortion, 
or a union compelled to supply a forum to right-to-work advo-
cates could be placed in an intolerable position if state law 
requires it to make its private property available to anyone 
who wishes to speak. The strong emotions evoked by speech 
in such situations may virtually compel the proprietor to 
respond. 
The pressure to respond is particularly apparent when the 
owner has taken a position opposed to the view being ex-
pressed on his property. But an owner who strongly obje/ 
,;;i 
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to some of the causes to which the state-imposed right of 
access would extend may oppose ideological activities "of any 
sort" that are not related to the purposes for which he mv1 e 
the public onto his property. See Abood v. Detroit oard of 
Education, 431 U. S. 209, 213, 241 ( 1977). To require the 
owner to specify the particular ideas he finds objectionable 
enough to compel a response would force him to relinquish 
his "freedom to maintain his own beliefs without public 
disclosure." I bid.3 Thus, the right to control one's own 
speech may be burdened impermissibly even when listeners 
will not assume that the messages expressed on private 
property are those of the owner.
4 
II 
One easily can identify other circumstances in which a 
right of access to commercial property would burden the own-
er's First and Fourteenth Amendment right to refrain from 
speaking. But appellants have identified no such circum-
stance. Nor did appellants introduce evidence that would 
support a holding in their f~vir 11nder either of the legal 
~heories outlined above. °1J.-~~ .... ,AJ 
3 The problem is compounded wh e, as in ~w.1i"-Bl'Htl,~ shopping cen-
ters o_r in th~ lob?y areas ~f hotels ~ l stores are leased to different 
proprietors with divergent views. · ~ 
4 In a proper case, the property owner also may be protected by the 
principle that "a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his 
own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch." Stanley 
v. Georgia, 394 U. S . 557, 565 (1969). Observing that a State has no 
interest in controlling the moral content of a person's thoughts, ibid., the 
Court in Stanley invalidated a law imposing criminal penalties for the 
private possession of obscenity. Stanley prevents a State from removing 
from the home expressive materials that a person may wish to peruse 
privately. The same principle may extend to state action that forces 
individual exposure to third-party messages. Thus, a law that required 
homeowners to permit speakers to congregate on their front la.wns would 
be a massive and possibly unconstitutional intrusion into personal privacy 
and freedom of belief. No such problem arises in this case. / 
~ ~ 
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On the record before us, I cannot say that customers of this 
vast center would be likely to assume that appellees' limited 
speech activity expressed the views of the Prune Yard or of 
its owner. The shopping center occupies several city blocks. 
It contains more than 65 shops, 10 restaurants, and a theater. 
Interspersed among these establishments are common walk-
ways and plazas designed to attract the public. See ante, at 
1, 8. Appellees are high school students who set up their 
card table in one corner of a central courtyard known as the 
"Grand Plaza." Juris. Statement B-2. They showed pass-
ersby several petitions and solicited signatures. Persons 
solicited could not reasonably have believed that the petitions 
embodied the views of the shopping center merely because it 
owned the ground on which they stood. 
Appellants have not alleged that they object to the ideas 
contained in the appellees' petitions. Nor do they assert that 
some groups who reasonably might be expected to speak at 
the Prune Yard will express views that are so objectionable as 
to require a response even when listeners will not mistake 
their source. The record contains no evidence concerning the 
numbers or types of interest groups that may seek access to 
this shopping center, and no testimony showing that the 
appellants strongly disagree with any of them. 
Because appellants have not shown that the limited right 
of access held to be afforded by the California Constitution 
burdened their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights in 
the circumstances presented, I join the judgment of the Court. 
I do not interpret our decision today as a blll:lan~k!;_etwa~IJJ.l.1,1,l;W---
for state efforts to transform privately wne commercial 
property into public forums. Any such' state action would 
raise substantial federal constitutional questions not present 
in this case. 
m ,-....,(' Crn , ·e LI 
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tr. Jue:.~ i e~, S,:,1:1wart 
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MR. JusTICE POWELL, concurring in part and in the 
judgment. 
Although I join the judgment, I do not agree with all of the 
reasoning in Part V of the Court's opinion. I join Parts I~IV 
on the understanding that our decision is limited to the type of 
shopping center involved in this case. Significantly different 
questions would be presented if a State authorized strangers 
to picket or leafleteer in privately owned, freestanding stores 
and commercial premises. Nor does our decision today apply 
to all "shopping centers." This generic term may include 
retail establishments that vary widely in size, location, and 
other relevant characteristics. Even large establishments may 
be able to show that the number or type of persons wishing to 
speak on their premises would create a substantial annoy-
ance to customers that could be eliminated only by elaborate, 
expensive, and possibly unenforceable time, place, and manner 
restrictions. As the Court observes, state power to regulate 
private property is limited to the adoption of reasonable 
restrictions that "do not amount to a taking without just 
compensation or contravene any other federal constitutional 
provision," Ante, at 6. 
I 
Restrictions on property use, like other state laws, are 
invalid if they infringe the freedom of expression and 
belief protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, 
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In Part V of today's opinion, the Court rejects appellants
1 
contention that "a private property owner has a First Amend-
ment right not to be forced by the State to use his property 
as a forum for the speech of others." Ante, at 9-10. I agree 
that the owner of this shopping center has failed to establish 
a cognizable First Amendment claim in this case. But some 
of the language in the Court's opinion is unnecessarily and 
perhaps confusingly broad. In my view, state action that 
transforms privately owned property into a forum for the 
expression of the public's views could raise serious First 
Amendment questions. 
'fhe State may not compel a person to affirm a belief he 
does not hold. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); 
West Virgini.a State Board of Eaucation v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 
624 ( 1943). Whatever the full sweep of this principle, I do 
not believe tha.t the result in TT' ooley v. Maynard, supra, would 
have changed had the State of New Hampshire directed its 
citizens to place the slogan "Live Free or Die" in their shop 
windows rather than on their automobiles. In that case, we 
said that "[a] system which secures the right to proselytize 
religious, political. and ideological causes must also guarantee 
the concomitant right to decline to foster such concepts." 430 
U.S .. at 714. This principle on its face protects a person who 
refuses to allow use of his property as a marketplace for 
the ideas of others. And I can find no reason to exclude the 
owner whose property is "not limited to [his] personal . 
use .. . . " Ante, at 11. A person who has merely invited the 
public onto his property for commercial purposes cannot 
fairly be said to have relinquished his right to decline "to be 
an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological 
point of view he finds unacceptable." Wooley v. Maynard, 
supra, at 715.1 
1 
Cf. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U. S. 551 , 569 (1972) ("property 
[does not] 1o;.;e its priYate character merely becauoe the public 1s generally 
invited to use i t for designated purpo~s .• .. ") . 
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As the Court observes, this case involves only a state-created 
right of limited access to a specialized type of property. Id., 
at 11, 12. But even when no particular message is mandated 
by the State, First Amendment interests are affected by state 
action that forces a property owner to admit third-party 
speakers. In many situations, a right of access is no less 
intrusive than speech compelled by the State itself. For 
example, a law requiring that a newspaper pem1it others to 
use its columns imposes an unacceptable burden upon the 
newspaper's First Amendment right to select material for 
publication. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 
U. S. 241 (1974) . See also Columbia Broadcasting System, 
Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S. 94, 117 
(1973) (plurality opinion). Such a right of access burdens 
the newspaper's "fundamental right to decide what to print 
or omit." Wooley v. Maynard, supra, at 714; see Miami 
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, supra, at 257. As such, 
it is tantamount to compelled affirmation and, thus, presump-
tively unconstitutional. 2 
The selection of material for publication is not generally a 
2 Even if a. person's own speech is not affect ed by a. right of access to 
his property, a. requirement that he lend support to the expression of a 
third party's views may burden impermi,;:;ibly the freedom,; of a:;sociation 
and belief protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. In Abood 
v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U. S. 209, 235 (1977), we held that a 
State may not require a person " to contribute to the :;upport of an 
ideologicnl cause he may oppose . .. . " To require a. landowner to 
supply a forum for causes he find,; objectionable also might be an unac-
ceptnble "compelled subsidizat ion" in some circumstances. 431 U . S., 
at 237 ; cf. Central Hardware Co . v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 543-545 (1972) 
("property right~" may permit exclusion of union organizer:;); N LRB v. 
Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956) (same) . See generally 
Eastex, Inc . v. NLRB. 437 U. S. 556, 571-576 (1978) ; Hudgens v. NLRB, 
424 U. S. 507, 521-522 (1976) . The appellants do not argue, however, 
that Abood supports the claimed right to exclude speakers from their 
property. Nor have they alleged that t hey disagree with the messages at 
~ue in this case. See infra, at -. 
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concern of shopping centers. But similar speech interests are 
affected when listeners are likely to identify opinions expressed 
by members of the public on commercial property as the 
views of the owner. If a state lav., mandated public access to 
the bulletin board of a freestanding store. hotel, office, or 
small shopping center, customers might well conclude that 
the messages reflect the view of the proprietor. The same 
would be true if the public were allowed to solicit or pam-
phleteer in the entrance area of a store or in the lobby of 
a private building. The property owner or proprietor would 
be faced with a choice: he either could permit his customers 
to receive a mistaken impression or he could disavow the 
messages. Should he take the first course. he effectively 
has been compelled to affirm someone else's belief. Should 
he choose the second, he has been forced to speak when 
he ,rnulcl prefer to remain silent. In short, he has lost 
control over his freedom to speak or not to speak on certain 
issues. The mere fact that he is free to dissociate himself 
from thr views expressed on his property, see ante, at 12, can-
not restore his "right to refrain from speaking at all." Wooley 
v. Maynard, supra, at 714. 
A property owner also may be faced with speakers who 
wish to use his premises as a platform for views that he finds 
morally repugnant. Numerous examples come to mind. A 
minority-owned business confronted with leafleteers from the 
American Nazi Party or the Ku Klux Klan , a church-operated 
enterprise asked to host demonstrations in favor of abortion, 
or a union compelled to supply a forum to right-to-work advo-
cates could be placed in an intolerable position if state law 
requires it to make its private property available to anyone 
who ·wishes to speak. Thr strong emotions evoked by speech 
in such situations may virtually compel the proprietor to 
respond. 
The pressure to respond is particularly apparent when the 
o,rner has taken a position opposed to the view being ex-
pressed on his property. But an owner who strongly objects 
·q_ ~.,!l- --C'O).CTf: , \ 
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to some of the causes to which the state-imposed right of 
access would extend may oppose ideological activities "of any 
sort" that are not related to the purposes for which he has 
invited the public onto his property. See Abood v. Detroit 
Board of Education, 431 U. S. 209, 213, 241 (1977) . To re-
quire the owner to specify the particular ideas he finds 
objectionable enough to compel a response would force him to 
relinquish his "freedom to maintain his own beliefs without 
public disclosure." lbid. 3 Thus, the right to control one's 
own speech may be burdened impermissibly even when lis-
teners will not assume that the messages expressed on private 
property are those of the owner.4 
II 
One easily can identify other circumstances in which a 
right of access to commercial property would burden the own-
er's First and Fourteenth Amendment right to refrain from 
speaking. But appellants have identified no such circum-
stance. Nor did appellants introduce evidence that would 
support a holding in their favor under either of the legal 
theories outlined above. 
3 The problem is compounded where, as in shopping centers or in th,, 
lobby areas of hotels and office buildings, stores are leasf'd to diff Prem 
proprietors with divergent views. 
4 In a proper case, the property owner also may be protected by the 
principle that "a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in hi 
own house, what, books he may read or what films he may watch." Stanley 
v. Georgw, 394 U. S. 557, 565 (1969) . Observing that a State has no 
interest in controlling the moral content of a person's thoughts, ibid., the 
Court in Stanley invalidated a. law imposing criminal penalties for the 
private possession of obscenity. Sta11ley prevents a State from removing 
from the home expressive materials that a person may wish to peruse 
privately. The same principle may extend to sta.te action tliat, forces 
individual expo~ure to third-party messages. Thus, a law thaL required 
homeowners to permit speakers to congregate on their front lawns would 
be a massive and possibly unconstitutional intrusion into personal privac 
and freedom of belief. No such problem arises in this case. 
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On the record before us, I cannot say that customers of this 
vast center would be likely to assume that appellees' limited 
,speech activity expressed the views of the Prune Yard or of 
its owner. The shopping center occupies several city blocks, 
It contains more than 65 shops, 10 restaurants, and a theater. 
Interspersed among these establishments are common walk-
ways and plazas designed to attract the public. See ante, at 
1, 8. Appellees are high school students who set up their 
card table in one corner of a central courtyard known as the 
''Grand Plaza." Juris. Statement B-2. They showed pass-
ersby several petitions and solicited signatures. Persons 
solicited could not reasonably have believed that the petitions 
embodied the views of the shopping center merely because it 
owned the ground on which they stood. 
Appellants have not alleged that they object to the ideas 
contained in the appellees' petitions. Nor do they assert that 
some groups who reasonably might be expected to speak at 
the Prune Yard will express views that are so objectionable as 
to require a response even when listeners will not mistake 
their source. The record contains no evidence concerning the 
numbers or types of interest groups that may seek access to 
this shopping center, and no testimony showing that the 
appellants strongly disagree with any of them. 
Because appellants have not shown that the limited right 
of access held to be afforded by the California Constitution 
burdened their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights in 
the circumstances presented, I join the judgment of the Court. 
I do not interpret our decision today as a blanket approval 
for state efforts to transform privately owned commercial 
property into public forums. Any such state action would 
raise substantial federal constitutional questions not present 
in this case. 
' 
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MR. Jc;sncE POWELL, with whom MR. JUSTICE WHITE joins, I 
concurring in part and in the judgment. 
Although I join the judgment, I do not agree with all of the 
reasoning in Part V of the Court's opinion. I join Parts I-IV 
on the understanding that our decision is limited to the type of 
shopping center involved in this case. Significantly different 
questions would be presented if a State authorized strangers 
to picket or leafleteer in privately owned, freestanding stores 
and commercial premises. Nor does our decision today apply 
to all "shopping centers." This generic term may include 
retail establishments that vary widely in size, location, and 
other relevant characteristics. Even large establishments may 
be able to show that the number or type of persons wishing to 
speak on their premises would create a substantial annoy-
ance to customers that could be eliminated only by elaborate, 
expensive, and possibly unenforceable time, place, and manner 
restrictions. As the Court observes, state power to regulate 
private property is limited to the adoption of reasonable 
restrictions that "do not amount to a taking without just 
compensation or contravene any other federal constitutional 
provision." Ante, at 6. 
I 
Restrictions on property use, like other state laws, are 
invalid if they infringe the freedom of expression and 
belief protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 
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In Part V of today's opinion, the Court rejects appellants1 
contention that "a private property owner has a First Amend-
ment right not to be forced by the State to use his property 
as a forum for the speech of others." Ante, at 9-10. I agree 
that the owner of this shopping center has failed to establish 
a cognizable First Amendment claim in this case. But some 
of the language in the Court's opinion is unnecessarily and 
perhaps confusingly broad. In my view, state action that 
transforms privately ow11ed property into a forum for the 
expression of the public's views could raise serious First 
Amendment questions. 
The State may not compel a person to affirm a belief he 
does not hold. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); 
W est Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 
624 (1943). Whatever the full sweep of this principle, I do 
not believe that the result in Wooley v. Maynard, supra, would 
have changed had the State of New Hampshire directed its 
citizens to place the slogan "Live Free or Die" in their shop 
windows rather than on their automobiles. In that case. we 
said that "[a] system which secures the right to proselytize 
religious, political. and ideological causes must also guarantee 
the concomitant right to decline to foster such concepts." 430 
U. S., at 714. This principle on its face protects a person who 
refuses to allow use of his property as a marketplace for 
the ideas of others. And I can find no reason to exclude the 
owner whose property is "not limited to [his] personal 
use .... " Ante, at 11. A person ,vho has merely invited the 
public onto his property for commercial purposes cannot 
fairly be said to have relinquished his right to decline "to be 
an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological 
point of view he finds unacceptable." TV ooley v. Maynard, 
supra, at 715.1 
1 Cf. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U. S. 551, 569 (1972) ("property 
[does not] lo~e its prirnte character merely because t he public is generally 
invited to use it for designated purposes .... ") . 
• 
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As the Court observes, this case involves only a state-created 
right of limited a,ecess to a specialized type of property. Id., 
at 11 , 12. But even when no particular message is mandated 
by the State, First Amendment interests a.re affected by state 
action that forces a property owner to admit third-party 
speakers. In many situations, a right of access is no less 
intrusive than speech compelled by the State itself. For 
example, a law requiring that a newspaper permit others to 
use its columns imposes an unacceptable burden upon the 
newspaper's First Amendment right to select material for 
publication. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 
U. S. 241 (1974). See also Columbia Broadcasting System, 
Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S. 94, 117 
(1973) (plurality opinion). Such a, right of access burdens 
the newspaper's "fundamental right to decide what to print 
or omit." Wooley v. Maynard, supra, at 714; see Miami 
H erald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, supra, at 257. As such, 
it is tantamount to compelled affirmation and, thus, presump-
tively unconstitutional.2 
The selection of material for publication is not generally a 
2 Even if a person's own speech is not affected by a right of access to 
his property, a requirement that he lend support to the expression o-f a 
t hird party'>' views may burden impermissibly the freedoms of as:;ociation 
and belief protected by the Fir:;t and Fourteenth Amendments. In Abood 
v. Detroit B oard of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 235 (1977) , we held that a 
State may not require a person " to contribute to the support of an 
ideological cau;::e he may oppose . . .. " To require a landowner to 
supply a fo rnm for causes he find ~ objectionable also might be an unac-
ceptable "compelled subsidization" in some circumstances. 431 U. S., 
at 237; cf. Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 543-545 (1972) 
("property rights" may permit exclusion of union organizers) ; NLRB v. 
Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U . S. 105, 112 (1956) (same). See generally 
Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U. S. 556, 571-576 (1978); Hudgens v. NLRB, 
424 U. S. 507, 521-522 (1976) . The appellants do not argue, however, 
that Abood supports the claimed right to exclude speakers from their 
property. Nor have t hey alleged that they disagree with the messages at 
issue in this case. See infra, at -. 
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concern of shopping centers. But similar speech interests are 
affected when listeners are likely to identify opinions expressed 
by members of the public on commercial property as the 
views of the owner. If a state law mandated public access to 
the bulletin board of a freestanding store, hotel, office, or 
small shopping center, customers might well conclude that 
the messages reflect the view of the proprietor. The same 
would be true if the public were allowed to solicit or pam-
phleteer in the entrance area of a store or in the lobby of 
a private building. The property owner or proprietor would 
be faced with a choice: he either could permit his customers 
to receive a mistaken impression or he could disavow the 
messages. Should he take the first course, he effectively 
has been compelled to affirm someone else's belief. Should 
he choose the second, he has been forced to speak when 
he ·would prefer to remain silent. In short, he has lost 
control over his freedom to speak or not to speak on certain 
issues. The mere fact that he is free to dissociate himself 
from the views expressed on his property, see ante, at 12. can-
not restore his "right to refrain from speaking at all." Wooley 
v. Maynard, supra, at 714. 
A property owner also may be faced with speakers who 
wish to use his premises as a platform for views that he finds 
morally repugnant. Numerous examples come to mind. A 
minority-owned business confronted with leafleteers from the 
American Nazi Party or the Ku Klux Klan, a church-operated 
enterprise asked to host demonstrations in favor of abortion, 
or a union compelled to supply a forum to right-to-work advo-
cates could be placed in an intolerable position if state law 
requires it to make its private property available to anyone 
who wishes to speak. The strong emotions evoked by speech 
in such situations may virtually compel the proprietor to 
respond. 
The pressure to respond is particularly apparent when the· 
owner has taken a position opposed to the view being ex-
pressed on his property. But an owner who strongly objects 
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to some of the causes to which the state-imposed right of 
access would extend may oppose ideological activities "of any 
sort" that are not related to the purposes for which he has 
invited the public onto his property. See Abood v. Detroit 
Board of Education, 431 U. S. 209, 213, 241 (1977). To re-
quire the owner to specify the particular ideas he finds 
objectionable enough to compel a response would force him to 
relinquish his "freedom to maintain his own beliefs without 
public disclosure." lbid. 3 Thus, the right to control one's 
own speech may be burdened impermissibly even when lis-
teners will not assume that the messages expressed on private 
property are those of the owner.4 
II 
One easily can identify other circumstances in which a 
right of access to commercial property would burden the own-
er's First and Fourteenth Amendment right to refrain from 
speaking. But appellants have identified no such circum-
stance. Nor did appellants introduce evidence that would 
support a holding in their favor under either of the legal 
theories outlined above. 
3 The problrm i,; ·compounded where, as in shopping centc,rs or in the 
lobby area,: of hotels and office buildings, stores are leased to different 
proprietors with divergent views. 
4 In a proper case, the propert:,· owner also may be protected by the 
principle that "a State has no bu,;iness telling a, man, ;;itting alone in his 
own hou~e, ,,·hat books he may read or what films he may watch." Stanley 
v. Georgia, 394 "G. S. 557, 565 (1969). Observing that a State has no 
int ere:,t in rontrolliug the moral content of a per,;on's thought::;, ibid .. the 
Court in Stanley invalidated a law imposing criminal penalties for the 
private posses~ion of ob,,cenit)·. Stanley prevent::; a State from removing 
from the home expre::;::;iYe materials that a person may wish to peruse 
privately. The same principle may extend to sta te action that forces 
incliYiclual expo:;ure to third-party message::;. Thu,,, a law that required 
homeowners to permit speakers to congregate on their front lawns would 
be a massive and po1:;sibly unconstitutional intrusion into personal privacy 
and freedom of belief. No such problem arises in this case. 
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On the record before us, I cannot say that customers of this 
vast center would be likely to assume that appellees' limited 
speech activity expressed the views of the Prune Yard or of 
its owner. The shopping center occupies several city blocks. 
It contains more than 65 shops, 10 restaurants, and a theater. 
Interspersed among these establishments are common walk-
ways and pla.zas designed to attract the public. See ante, at 
1, 8. Appellees are high school students who set up their 
card table. in one corner of a central courtyard known as the 
1'Grand Plaza." Juris. Statement B-2. They showed pass-
ersby several petitions and . solicited signatures. Persons 
solicited could not reasonably have believed that the petitions 
embodied the views of the shopping center merely because it 
owned the ground on which they stood. 
Appellants have not alleged that they object to the ideas 
contained in the appellees' petitions. Nor do they assert that 
some groups who reasonably might be expected to speak at 
the Prune Yard will express views that are so objectionable as 
to require a response even when listeners will not mistake 
their source. The record contains no evidence concerning the 
numbers or types of interest groups that may seek access to 
this shopping center, and no testimony showing that the· 
appellants strongly disagree with any of them. 
Because appellants have not shown that the limited right 
of access held to be afforded by the California Constitution 
burdened their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights in 
the circumstances presented, I join the judgment of the Court, 
I do not interpret our decision today as a blanket approvaf 
for state efforts to transform privately owned commercia.r 
property into public forums. Any such state action would 
raise substantial federal constitutional questions not present 
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PETITIONING UPHELD 
AT SHOPPING MALLS 
High Court Says States May Order 
Access to Back Free Speech 
By LINDA GREENHOUSE 
In the case involved in today's opinion, including New York, New Jersey and 
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, Connecticut, contain the guarantee of 
No. ~289, the California Supreme Court free speech. However, government offi-
concluded last year that there was noth- cials in those three states said last night 
ing in Uoyd v. Tanner to prevent a state that their states appeared to have neither 
court from reading its state constitution statutes nor definitive court decisions ad-
'more expansively than the High Court dressing the question raised in today's 
had read the United States Constitution. · case. 
The California court based its decision While joining the Court's opinion, As-
strictly on the California Constitution's sociate Justices Byron R. White and 1 
free speech guarantees. Lewis F. Powell Jr. wrote separately to] 
Justice Rehnquist agreed with the Cali- emphasize wha~ th~ ~aw as the limited 
fornia court's approach. The -Lloyd case, nature of today s opiru~. There was no 
he said, did not "limit the authority of the eviden<;? that the shoppmg ~~ter ~er 
state to exercise its police power or its found mo~lly repugnant the views 
sovereign right to adopt in its own Consti- that ~ high 5<:bool s_tudents were 
tution individual liberties more expan- pro~oting, they said. But if he had, they 
WASHINGTON June 9-The Supreme sive than those conferred by the Federal contin~ hf :oold ha;~ h~d~~ art 
Court ruled today.that states can require ,Constitution.'.' The only li~it, he s~d. ~gh:1 a be's OW!11 :::i by th taf 
Special to 1lle New Yorlt Times 
• • 'would arise 1f the state action then vio- n were . mg vio a e s e-
the o:,vners of pnvate shopping centers ~o lated federally protected rights. enforced public access._. _ 
provide access to members of the public The opinion leaves each state's highest Tbe students were collecting signa: 
who want to circulate _petitioi:15 or other- court and legislature free to address the tures oo a petition that opposed the 1975 
wise peacefully exercise their nghts of issue of shopping center petitioning in United Nations resolution condemning 
free speech. any way that does not impinge on the Zionism as a form of racism. They com-
While the United States Constitution Federal Constitution - or free not to ad- plied with a request to leave and then 
does not provide a right to public access, dress the iss':1e 9:t all. · filed a la~t. . 
the Court said, neither does it prevent a The const1tut1ons of nearly all states, In_ a bnef m their behalf, the Amencan 
state court from finding such a right in its --------------==== Jewts~ Congress and_ ~; Synago~e 
·t ti .. --·•-- , Council of America said, the shoppmg 
own s~te cons~i u on. . center is the modem equivalent of the 
Ruling unarumously man appe~l. by a Greek agora," a public forum where the 
shopping center owner from a decision of right to free speech should be protected. 
the California Supreme Court, the Jus- The Federal Government also supported 
tices rejected the owner's argument that the students before the High Court. 
the state court violated personal property There are more than 19,000 shopping 
rights protected by the United States Con- centers in the country, most of them 
stitution when it ordered him to allow s~ler th~ ~e 21:3~re f'.runeYa~. Jus-
high school students to circulate petitions tice Rehnqll!st s op1n1on di~ no~ defme the 
. . term shoppmg center or md1cate what 
at his shopprng center· application the ruling might have to indi-
No 'Taking' of Property vidual, privately owned stores. 
"It is true that one of the essential . But in describ~g ~Yard, which is 
· ks · th b dle of property rights is ~ Campbell, Cahf., as a large comm~r-
st1c . m e un ., . Cla1 complex that covers several city 
the nght to exclude others? Associate blocks, contains numerous separate busi-
Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote for ness establishments, and is open to the I 
the Court. But all infringements on that public at large," Justice Rehnquist at · 
right, he continued, do not automatically least Implied that that the decision would 
become constitutional violations. not cover individual stores. · ·. 
The shopping center owners he said, In his concurring opinion, Justice Pow-
"have failed to demonstrate' that the ell said as much. "(?ur decisi~ is limitE:<1 
• 'ght t 1 de others' is so essential to to _the type of shoppmg cC!'te~ !Ilvolved !n 
n ° exc u . . this case," he wrote. "S1gruf1cantly d1f-
the use or economic valu~ of ~ei~ P~P- ferent questions would be presented if a 
erty that the state-authonzed hmitation state authorized strangers to picket or 
of it amounted to a 'taki~g. •. " The J:i~th leafieteer in privately owned, freestand-
Amendment to the Const1tut1on prohibits· ing stores and commercial premises." 1 
, the Government from "taking" property 
I without" just compensation." 
. Today's opinion is the latest in a series I . . == .. ==-
of cases going back to the 1940's that have 
required the Court to strike a balance be-
tween private property rights and the 
rights of free expression. 
Some legal scholars have discerned a 
shift toward the private property side of 
the equation, with Jus~ice Rehnqui~t 
generally directing the shift. The result m 
today's case was therefore something of 
a surprise. 
Eight years ago, in Lloyd v. Tanner, 
the Court ruled that the United States 
Constitution did not-give the public the 
right to distribute handbills at a privately 
owned shopping center. 
1 -· · 
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required the Court to strike a balance be-
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Some legal scholars have discerned a 
shift toward the private property side of 
the equation, with Justice Rehnquist 
generally directing the shift. The result in 
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